What's the difference between causation and correlation?

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Satan phil
 
Reply Mon 29 Jun, 2009 08:45 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;73514 wrote:
Are you asking for a scientific explanation? I'm sure someone here can present to you a detailed scientific syllogism regarding the necessity of water freezing. But I'm not so sure that is what you desire, is it?


Well, temperature is a measure of the average kinetic energy in the molecules of a substance. Cooling a substance such as water, slows the molecules down until they start "touching" and crystallize into a hexagonal crystal lattice... and so on.

All this describes what happens perfectly fine but I don't understand why any of these things happen rather than say, exploding into a mist of confetti.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Mon 29 Jun, 2009 08:52 pm
@Satan phil,
Quote:
All this describes what happens perfectly fine but I don't understand why any of these things happen rather than say, exploding into a mist of confetti.


There's no logical system that is going to deduce why a tomato doesn't turn into an onion or why my glass of water doesn't turn into a glass of wine. Unless you wanted to make one up, of course, but then you'd just be creating your own "why".

Science can only make sense of what happens, not what our minds can conjure could happen. Causes are what science deals with, not reasons. Reasons, the "whys", are for humans to quibble over.
 
Satan phil
 
Reply Mon 29 Jun, 2009 09:07 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;73519 wrote:
There's no logical system that is going to deduce why a tomato doesn't turn into an onion or why my glass of water doesn't turn into a glass of wine. Unless you wanted to make one up, of course, but then you'd just be creating your own "why".

Science can only make sense of what happens, not what our minds can conjure could happen. Causes are what science deals with, not reasons. Reasons, the "whys", are for humans to quibble over.


Well, most people seem to use the words interchangably. Aren't causes reasons? What's the difference?
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Mon 29 Jun, 2009 09:48 pm
@Satan phil,
Satan;73520 wrote:
Well, most people seem to use the words interchangably. Aren't causes reasons? What's the difference?


You're right, they are often used interchangably. However, the distinction I wish to make is that between the "how" and "why". Causes deal with the "how", syllogisms, A and B follow C. Science deals with the how, how water freezes, how plants give off oxygen, how the human pancreas functions, etc. "Why", in the context I'm referring, is outside the realm of science. Science cannot tell you why things are the way they are. Science cannot apply judgment to a given situation like we can, nor can any logical system. We are the ones that apply semantic value, and that should not be mistaken.

Now think of the common phrase, "Everything happens for a reason". Do you think people when stating this are speaking about a cause and effect sequence? Of course not, they are speaking of a why, a pseudo-mystical reason for something to have occurred. Stealing from Joseph Campbell, they're using a metaphor for that which transcends all levels of intellectual thought. Logic cannot ever answer the "why", so we make it up, and I think it gives many of us comfort to confide in a "why", a reason.
 
Satan phil
 
Reply Mon 29 Jun, 2009 10:10 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;73523 wrote:
You're right, they are often used interchangably. However, the distinction I wish to make is that between the "how" and "why". Causes deal with the "how", syllogisms, A and B follow C. Science deals with the how, how water freezes, how plants give off oxygen, how the human pancreas functions, etc. "Why", in the context I'm referring, is outside the realm of science. Science cannot tell you why things are the way they are. Science cannot apply judgment to a given situation like we can, nor can any logical system. We are the ones that apply semantic value, and that should not be mistaken.

Now think of the common phrase, "Everything happens for a reason". Do you think people when stating this are speaking about a cause and effect sequence? Of course not, they are speaking of a why, a pseudo-mystical reason for something to have occurred. Stealing from Joseph Campbell, they're using a metaphor for that which transcends all levels of intellectual thought. Logic cannot ever answer the "why", so we make it up, and I think it gives many of us comfort to confide in a "why", a reason.


I agree completely except that I consider "how" to be correlation and "why" to be causation. :listening:
 
ACB
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 05:10 am
@Satan phil,
Satan;73511 wrote:
Well, the question is simply asking to explain what was claimed earlier viz. that some regularities (like water freezing) are logical consequences of other more fundamental regularities. What regularity makes it logically impossible for water not to freeze?


If I understand post #302 correctly, the claim is that macro-level regularities such as water freezing can be (at least in principle) deduced by syllogism from the fundamental regularities.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 08:38 am
@ACB,
ACB;73591 wrote:
If I understand post #302 correctly, the claim is that macro-level regularities such as water freezing can be (at least in principle) deduced by syllogism from the fundamental regularities.


It does not follow from the fact that in a valid deductive argument, it is logically impossible for the premises to be true, and the conclusion false, that in a valid deductive argument that it is impossible for the conclusion to be false. To think it follows is to commit a fallacy.
 
Zetetic11235
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 12:06 pm
@kennethamy,
4a is a questionable attack. So is 4b.
What I was saying before is that if one takes enough observations of regularity at the level of fundamental particles as axioms, it seems that the interactions of objects composed of these constituent particles logically follows from these regularities. This is illustrated to some degree in physics engines all the time.

Why is 4a weak? We can explain why certain physical regularities such as no Moa living beyond the age of X do not say that it is physically impossible for a Moa to live X+1 years in terms of a physical hierarchy. Any true 'law' would be totally fundamental, so that every physical occurrence can be put in terms of it or a set of fundamental laws, so that we can check if it is indeed impossible for a Moa to live for x+1 years in terms of a set of more fundamental laws. If the possibility that some given Moa could live X+1 years arises logically from the fundamental laws (which are take as axioms in our system), then it is a physical possibility.

Why is 4b weak? For the same reason that 4a is, it does not address the idea of a hierarchy in physical regularities. A set of fundamental laws would be totally random, but their possible manifestations are predetermined. If a physical occurence or state of affairs is not precluded by fundamental regularities, then it is physically possible.

4c seems to fall prey to this same attack.


Also, science does indeed look for truth, but the truth is purely descriptive. Since the truth is descriptive, the natural tendency is to find something totally general that manifests itself in the specific. If we can describe phenomena at a fundamental level, the specifics of occurrence will simply stem directly out of the regularities present at the fundamental level. This is due to the fact that we are seeking to find fundamental similarity, such as; that all matter is constituent of fundamental particles, these fundamental particles are really the same but are charged with different amounts of energy (like in string theory) and that matter and energy are fundamentally linked. If these along with a few more regularities hold, then everything would then simply differ in organization and size. Since every macro level phenomena would be describable in terms of their constituent particles interacting, it all breaks down to the regularities of these fundamental particles which are, of course, determined inductively.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 01:27 pm
@Satan phil,
Satan;73520 wrote:
Well, most people seem to use the words interchangably. Aren't causes reasons? What's the difference?



One good reason for marrying my wife was that she was rich. But that was not the cause of my marrying my wife. That was because I loved her. So a reason was not a cause.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 10:51 pm
@Satan phil,
Satan,

The point is, to give you an answer to this:

Satan wrote:
All this describes what happens perfectly fine but I don't understand why any of these things happen rather than say, exploding into a mist of confetti.


I suggest mysticism or a belief system of some sort. You're not going to find the why through pure rational thought.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 11:02 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;73875 wrote:
Satan,

The point is, to give you an answer to this:



I suggest mysticism or a belief system of some sort. You're not going to find the why through pure rational thought.


That's because it is not a pure rational question. Why would such a thing happen? It is as if I were suddenly to ask you, why you are not a Serbian farmer. What sort of question would that be? Just because an event is contingent doesn't mean that there is any real possibility of its happening. There is a difference between possibility and real possibility.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 11:23 pm
@Satan phil,
kennethamy wrote:
That's because it is not a pure rational question. Why would such a thing happen? It is as if I were suddenly to ask you, why you are not a Serbian farmer. What sort of question would that be? Just because an event is contingent doesn't mean that there is any real possibility of its happening. There is a difference between possibility and real possibility.


Yes, good point, it is not a pure rational question.

And to answer the question, "Why would such a thing happen (or not happen)?", requires some sort of belief which seems irrational. For instance, I could say I'm a Serbian farmer (had I been) because this is "God's will", or something to that effect. This answers the "why", and I guess this sort of thing comforts some people. Not me, though.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 01:04 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;73885 wrote:
Yes, good point, it is not a pure rational question.

And to answer the question, "Why would such a thing happen (or not happen)?", requires some sort of belief which seems irrational. For instance, I could say I'm a Serbian farmer (had I been) because this is "God's will", or something to that effect. This answers the "why", and I guess this sort of thing comforts some people. Not me, though.


My point was that the question, why is something true (or not true) requires a background against which it makes sense to ask it. If you ask about a room, why is there no chair in this room, that makes sense, since chairs are often found in rooms. But to ask, why is there no tiger in this room, makes no sense (unless you concoct a background for why one would expect there to be a tiger in the room).
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 02:52 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;74039 wrote:
My point was that the question, why is something true (or not true) requires a background against which it makes sense to ask it. If you ask about a room, why is there no chair in this room, that makes sense, since chairs are often found in rooms. But to ask, why is there no tiger in this room, makes no sense (unless you concoct a background for why one would expect there to be a tiger in the room).


I understand, and that's the point I was acknowledging when I said, "good point".

Alright, guys, are there any other issues we haven't clarified here?
 
ACB
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 05:20 pm
@Zetetic11235,
I would like to know if anyone disagrees with these passages from Zetetic11235's post #328 (which seem convincing to me), and if so why.

Zetetic11235;73702 wrote:
What I was saying before is that if one takes enough observations of regularity at the level of fundamental particles as axioms, it seems that the interactions of objects composed of these constituent particles logically follows from these regularities. This is illustrated to some degree in physics engines all the time.


Quote:
Also, science does indeed look for truth, but the truth is purely descriptive. Since the truth is descriptive, the natural tendency is to find something totally general that manifests itself in the specific. If we can describe phenomena at a fundamental level, the specifics of occurrence will simply stem directly out of the regularities present at the fundamental level. This is due to the fact that we are seeking to find fundamental similarity, such as; that all matter is constituent of fundamental particles, these fundamental particles are really the same but are charged with different amounts of energy (like in string theory) and that matter and energy are fundamentally linked. If these along with a few more regularities hold, then everything would then simply differ in organization and size. Since every macro level phenomena would be describable in terms of their constituent particles interacting, it all breaks down to the regularities of these fundamental particles which are, of course, determined inductively.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 05:53 pm
@Satan phil,
I'm not too versed in quantum physics, but if I recall correctly, the regularities of constituent particles do not logically follow from the more general objects (the objects we can actually interact with and see).

Also the regularities of those constituent particles seem to be up in the air at the moment. The last I was reading, there was a lot of randomness in the equations. Many quantum physicists I've read up on have determined that it's nearly impossible to develop axioms for fundamental particles inductively, as there is constant change in some systems. Correct me if I'm wrong.
 
ACB
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 07:33 pm
@Zetherin,
Zetherin;74122 wrote:
I'm not too versed in quantum physics, but if I recall correctly, the regularities of constituent particles do not logically follow from the more general objects (the objects we can actually interact with and see).


I think Zetetic11235 was suggesting the opposite, i.e. that the regularities of 'ordinary' objects logically follow from those of their constituent particles, but that the latter do not logically follow from anything.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 09:31 pm
@ACB,
ACB;74148 wrote:
I think Zetetic11235 was suggesting the opposite, i.e. that the regularities of 'ordinary' objects logically follow from those of their constituent particles, but that the latter do not logically follow from anything.


I'm not quite sure what we're trying to get at here. How are we to claim that constituent particles do not logically follow from anything? Are we speaking of a certain constituent particle, or only of the constituent particles we're now aware of? Later on, we could find that the constituent particles we're now aware of could logically follow from other things (perhaps other particles), couldn't we?

But most importantly, I don't understand our topic of discussion - could you please clarify?
 
Satan phil
 
Reply Thu 2 Jul, 2009 02:17 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;73876 wrote:
There is a difference between possibility and real possibility.


What exactly do you mean and what is your evidence for this belief?

In classical modal logic, anything that isn't necessarily false is possible. I know of nothing that is necessarily false other than contradictions and those are only logical necessities, not physical necessities. I don't know what the difference is between possible and "really" possible.

Maybe you mean that somethings are more predictable than others? What do you think that proves? It only proves that somethings don't happen often. It doesn't prove that somethings never happen.

I'm out of town at the moment so I can't post frequently but I'm still at my original position regarding causality, necessity and explanations and have been unmoved by anything said thus far.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 2 Jul, 2009 06:44 am
@Satan phil,
Satan;74232 wrote:
What exactly do you mean and what is your evidence for this belief?

In classical modal logic, anything that isn't necessarily false is possible. I know of nothing that is necessarily false other than contradictions and those are only logical necessities, not physical necessities. I don't know what the difference is between possible and "really" possible.

Maybe you mean that somethings are more predictable than others? What do you think that proves? It only proves that somethings don't happen often. It doesn't prove that somethings never happen.

I'm out of town at the moment so I can't post frequently but I'm still at my original position regarding causality, necessity and explanations and have been unmoved by anything said thus far.


The difference between "possibility", and "real possibility" is often made in ordinary language. We may say something like, "Possibly John will show up, but it isn't a real possibility, since he is still stuck on his new girl friend, and is always hanging around with her, so let's not wait for him". In philosophy, to say that X is real, is usually to say that X is not "in thought alone" (Aristotle) but external to thought. And Hume often distinguishes between "ideal existence" and "real existence", between,"existence in the mind" and "existence independently of the mind". So taking a cue from that, "possibility" would be just logical possibility. But "real possibility" would be physical possibility.
 
 

 
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