What's the difference between causation and correlation?

@Satan phil,

Satan;72887 wrote:

I'm not because that's a straw man. Please use the quote feature to avoid this in the future.

Wow, I haven't seen this sort of sarcastic, offensive tone on this forum in a while. Please stop using it with the members you encounter.

If there's something you don't feel I'm understanding, then please try to clarify. Saying it's a straw man and leaving it as is, doesn't help communication. This isn't a pissing contest.

Now, "necessarily" is what makes up the straw man? I thought that was what you were speaking about. What are you speaking about then? What exactly are you arguing here? And, more importantly, what position do you think I'm holding?

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;72890 wrote:

Wow, I haven't seen this sort of sarcastic, offensive tone on this forum in a while.

I have.

Zetherin wrote:

You've honestly never used induction, of any sort, in your daily life?

I consider that to be asking an obvious and insulting question in a sarcastic tone.

Zetherin wrote:

What exactly are you arguing here?

Regularity Theory.

Laws of Nature [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

@Satan phil,

Satan wrote:

I have.

Well, don't hesitate to use the "Report" feature whenever you do. We like to try to keep this a peaceful and polite community.

Quote:

I've never argued against this, and I don't know what in my text gave the impression I was. In fact, this, on a whim (I'd have to do more research on the matter), looks to be something I'd agree with.

Know that despite our misunderstanding, I enjoy our conversation. Thanks.

Quote:

I consider that to be asking an obvious and insulting question in a sarcastic tone.

My apologies. I meant it sincerely.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;72899 wrote:

Well, don't hesitate to use the "Report" feature whenever you do. We like to try to keep this a peaceful and polite community.

I haven't broken any rules and I don't intend to. If you get a sarcastic attitude with me then I'll get one back. There's no need to read a rule book on how to treat other human beings. If you want to go back to a civil tone then we can.

Zetherin;72899 wrote:

I've never argued against this, and I don't know what in my text gave the impression I was. In fact, this, on a whim (I'd have to do more research on the matter), looks to be something I'd agree with.

Then what started this exchange?

Zetherin;72899 wrote:

Know that despite our misunderstanding, I enjoy our conversation. Thanks.

I'd enjoy this entire discussion a little more if it weren't so combative and filled with ridicule.

"You think you can jump 1,000 feet in the air?"

It's hard to have a meaningful conversation when people try to argue against an artificially weakened position.

@Satan phil,

Satan wrote:

Then what started this exchange?

It appears we've misunderstood each other's positions.

This is your position, correct?

Quote:

There's no reason to think the principle of induction holds at all. Not necessarily. Not probably. Not at all. It's not based on rationality. It's based on convention.

So, you believe that weighing probability isn't rational? (If I am misunderstanding you, please correct me). If my car stops after pressing on the brake 92% of the time, how is this not reason to believe there's a good chance the car will stop the next time I press the brake? I think an inductive conclusion like this is rational and useful.

Quote:

It's hard to have a meaningful conversation when people try to argue against an artificially weakened position.

It most definitely is, so please help try to enlighten me on your actual position.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;72904 wrote:

If my car stops after pressing on the brake 92% of the time, how is this not reason to believe there's a good chance the car will stop the next time I press the brake?

How do you know that just because it was 92% then, it will remain 92% in the future? Why do you believe things true now will remain true in the future? I shouldn't have to give you reasons against such beliefs if you can't even give me a single reason for them. I'm sure you'll say it's useful but of course that doesn't mean it's true. So, how did you come upon this knowledge that the future will resemble the present?

@Satan phil,

Satan;72914 wrote:

How do you know that just because it was 92% then, it will remain 92% in the future? Why do you believe things true now will remain true in the future? I shouldn't have to give you reasons against such beliefs if you can't even give me a single reason for them. I'm sure you'll say it's useful but of course that doesn't mean it's true. So, how did you come upon this knowledge that the future will resemble the present?

It is worth noticing that this business about the future resembling the past is only one case of the larger issue, namely why we should believe that the unobserved, and even, the unobservable, will resemble the observed. The same issue arises about our knowledge of the past, since the past is now unobservable. And, of course, our knowledge of unobservables like neutrons or electrons. It is the general problem of empiricism which tells us that all knowledge is based on observation. In other words, the nature of evidence. If we look at it from that angle, I suppose that the answer must be that it is in the nature of evidence that we infer what we do not know on what we do know. If we don't do that, then we can have no evidence for anything. So, either we infer from the observed to the unobserved, or we give up on the notion of having evidence.

@Satan phil,

Satan;72914 wrote:

How do you know that just because it was 92% then, it will remain 92% in the future? Why do you believe things true now will remain true in the future?

You don't know it. But it's rational to believe it. It's rational to believe that sleeping will ameliorate fatigue and drinking will ameliorate thirst. Past events don't predict the outcome of any given future one, but they do reliably predict the probable spread of outcomes in a collection of future events (assuming relative constancy of conditions).

@Satan phil,

Well, it is definitely probable that the future will be much like the past, but that does not make it rational to believe that it will be so. Probability and rationality are not one and the same. The problem arises in such things such as the idea that a ball thrown up in the air will come down to earth. While the probability suggests that it will happen, it is rational to think otherwise. Thus, induction is a purely non-rational function of human thought. Because it is just as rational to think the probable will happen to the improbable, induction is necessarily a function on non-rational human thought. It is based upon beliefs and custom, not rational thought.

@Aedes,

Aedes;72917 wrote:

Past events don't predict the outcome of any given future one, but they do reliably predict the probable spread of outcomes in a collection of future events (assuming relative constancy of conditions).

I agree that they have so far but to assume that they will remain reliable predictors begs the question. That was Hume's insight.

You're assuming that induction worked in the past so therefore it will work in the future but that's what you're trying to provide evidence for (things that worked in the past will continue to work in the future) thus begging the question.

@Satan phil,

Satan wrote:

How do you know that just because it was 92% then, it will remain 92% in the future?

I don't, and it probably won't.

Quote:

Why do you believe things true now will remain true in the future?

I never said I believed this all of the time. But I do believe it some of the time simply due to probability and past experience. For instance, I believe if I press on the brake pedal my car will begin to stop. I believe that if I press the buttons on this keyboard letters will pop up on screen. Do you not believe these things?

Quote:

So, how did you come upon this knowledge that the future will resemble the present?

I never said I had knowledge the future will resemble the present.

Aedes wrote:

You don't know it. But it's rational to believe it. It's rational to believe that sleeping will ameliorate fatigue and drinking will ameliorate thirst. Past events don't predict the outcome of any given future one, but they do reliably predict the probable spread of outcomes in a collection of future events (assuming relative constancy of conditions).

Aedes sums up my position quite well.

Theaetetus wrote:

Well, it is definitely probable that the future will be much like the past, but that does not make it rational to believe that it will be so
...

The problem arises in such things such as the idea that a ball thrown up in the air will come down to earth. While the probability suggests that it will happen, it is rational to think otherwise

Interesting. Care to share your definition of "rational", please?

@Satan phil,

It is not so much my definition, but rather is derived from Hume. Because it is just as conceivable in pure thought that an outcome or its opposite will happen, induction cannot be based in rational thought. Because one can think that both may happen, ideas of the future are based in custom and belief, not rationality.

@Satan phil,

Theaetetus wrote:

Because one can think that both may happen, ideas of the future are based in custom and belief, not rationality.

Are you implying all beliefs are irrational?

Well, there are many definitions of "rational" but here's the one I was referring to: "Using sound judgement". I think using the brake pedal to stop my car, since I've used the brake pedal in the past to stop my car, is using sound judgment.

@Zetherin,

Zetherin;72925 wrote:

Are you implying all beliefs are irrational?

Well, there are many definitions of "rational" but here's the one I was referring to: "Using sound judgement". I think using the brake pedal to stop my car, since I've used the brake pedal in the past to stop my car, is using sound judgment.

Not irrational, but rather non-rational. You can both conceive that your brake pedal, when depressed, will either stop the car, or not be functioning at the time, and thus, your car will not stop. It is sound judgment to think that the brakes will stop your car, but that is because of custom that you believe it is most likely. Custom is not a function of rationality; therefore, the thought behind customs and beliefs about them are non-rational in nature.

There is a major difference between non-rational and irrational. In your example of the car brakes, an irrational thought would be that if you step on the brakes, your car will accelerate.

@Theaetetus,

Satan; I don't know why you sent me that link, the Stanfordif they were true, there would be precise proviso free laws. For example, Einstein's gravitational field law asserts - without equivocation, qualification, proviso, ceteris paribus clause - that the Ricci curvature tensor of spacetime is proportional to the total stress-energy tensor for matter-energy; the relativistic version of Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism for charge-free flat spacetime asserts - without qualification or proviso - that the curl of the E field is proportional to the partial time derivative, etc. (1999, 446).

(The link above is my citation)
[/INDENT]

However, I also think that if a law is fundamental enough to escape the provisio clause, it is still accidental in nature. The fact that the fundamental regularity is accidental, however, does not necessarily mean that its logical consequences are accidental. Certain physical events could be necessitated by the presence of one set of accidental fundamental regularities, but not by another. If we take enough apparent regularities to be true, certain less fundamental physical consequences should follow, as long as the regularities can account for them.

Of course, this is why you say that the properties necessitate what they assert. When the regularities are taken as necessary we are in essence trying to develop a logical framework that fits reality as we have observed it. We are not trying to form an adaptive framework expicitly, but this is the result of the understanding that the regularities that are taken as axiomatic 'Laws of Nature' are not absolute. I cannot account for the practicality of the assumption that they will always be true, all I can say is that science is adaptive. Any process by which we observe, react, and adapt in order to seek a desired outcome is a result of induction.

I think that is is necesarily true that science cannot ever be totaly complete, because it is adaptive. I can claim that it is fundamentally correct, as a logical system, so long as the conclusions follow from the axioms, but I cannot account for the axioms; they are the result of induction. All I can say is that all adaptive processes are inductive, this is necessarily true. In a sense, science is in no way different from any other sort of adaptation; an animal sees the apparent consequence of an event and aviods or seeks this event depending on how it judges the event. It can even come up with was that might work to induce this event, based on further observation of the apparent consequences of its actions. But what do you expect? we are, after all, a bunch of apes. Smile

@Satan phil,

Theaetetus wrote:

Not irrational, but rather non-rational. You can both conceive that your brake pedal, when depressed, will either stop the car, or not be functioning at the time, and thus, your car will not stop. It is sound judgment to think that the brakes will stop your car, but that is because of custom that you believe it is most likely. Custom is not a function of rationality; therefore, the thought behind customs and beliefs about them are non-rational in nature.

There is a major difference between non-rational and irrational. In your example of the car brakes, an irrational thought would be that if you step on the brakes, your car will accelerate.

I now understand what you're saying, thanks for the clarification.

I see little value in making the distinction between non-rational and irrational, then. What does it matter if induction is part of custom or technically part of "rational thought"? This non-rational, conventional, pseudo-reasoning method has served me well for years, probably even more than methods currently accepted as part of "rational thought". I'm supposed to discriminate against it because some philosopher decided it's committing some logical fallacy? Hume's insight is interesting, but it's not going to stop me from setting my alarm every night before bed, turning my computer on, pressing my brake pedals, using my light switches, plugging in my phone charger, or any number of actions I have no "reason" (according to Hume) for doing because the outcome may not be as it always has been.

And just for further clarification, once again, Satan and Theaetetus, I very clearly understand the flaw in inductive reasoning. I truly, truly do. The thing is, I don't really see a reason to care. What are yours?

@Satan phil,

Satan;72922 wrote:

I agree that they have so far but to assume that they will remain reliable predictors begs the question. That was Hume's insight.

I'm not sure how insightful that is. You don't need to be a philosopher to tell us that we can't tell the future.

Satan;72922 wrote:

You're assuming that induction worked in the past so therefore it will work in the future

Every animal down to the slimiest worm has behavior that ALSO inherently contains this assumption. Because over the time scale of our lives conditions remain relatively constant, we quickly learn to adapt our behavior to repeat past successes and avoid past mistakes.

I assume that the hot stove that burned my hand yesterday will still burn my hand tomorrow. I can't tell the future in the absolute, but so logical and so likely is that to be true that the assumption is rational and well-founded.

If you cannot live by these assumptions, then you cannot live. If you hold all past experience equivocal and irrelevant, then you cannot learn, you cannot adapt, and you cannot survive.

Quote:

but that's what you're trying to provide evidence for (things that worked in the past will continue to work in the future) thus begging the question.

I'm not providing evidence that any past event WILL tell the future, but that's an irrelevant (and boring) question. I'll stipulate for you that in terms of absolute knowledge we cannot assume that what worked in the past will work in the future. That's fine. But no one cares about absolute knowledge except for clergymen, so it hardly matters.

@Satan phil,

Satan;72922 wrote:

I agree that they have so far but to assume that they will remain reliable predictors begs the question. That was Hume's insight.

You're assuming that induction worked in the past so therefore it will work in the future but that's what you're trying to provide evidence for (things that worked in the past will continue to work in the future) thus begging the question.

Yes. It is that assumption that defines what is called, "evidence". It is somewhat better than crystal balls, or the entrails of snails (if they have entrails), and even if we adopted crystal balls, or the entrails of snails, it would be because we had evidence that they would be a guide to the unobserved, and unobservable. So, it is either induction or nothing. It is not as if you are judging induction against something else which might be just as good. There is nothing to judge it against. It is either induction or nothing. Which is why the question of the justification of induction carries a false assumption. Namely, there is something else to justify it against. Of course, it was thought that the contest was between induction and deduction. But that is comparing oranges with grapes. And that is the mistake. Deduction is implicitly being used as the standard of inference, and then induction is compared with deduction, and is found wanting. In other words, induction fails because it is not deduction. That is really Hume's argument.

@Theaetetus,

Theaetetus;72926 wrote:

It is sound judgment to think that the brakes will stop your car, but that is because of custom that you believe it is most likely. Custom is not a function of rationality; therefore, the thought behind customs and beliefs about them are non-rational in nature.

Not all customs involve sound judgment. Many conventions of personal or social behaviour are due to mere force of habit or the desire to conform with other people. Some customs may be useless, or positively harmful. So why is it sound judgment to believe in induction? What factor makes it so? Can you elaborate, please.

@Aedes,

Aedes;73002 wrote:

That's fine. But no one cares about absolute knowledge except for clergymen, so it hardly matters.

Sour grapes. You're agreeing with me but then at the same time saying so what?

Agreed, so what? But that doesn't make me wrong. Does it? Wink

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