@richrf,
Here's a quote from Robert Pepperell. (Pepperell, R., & Punt, M.. Screen consciousness: cinema, mind and world. (Consciousness, Literature & the Arts, 4, 2006)) It comes in a passage arguing that both Internalism and Externalism are false.
The uncertain relationship between mind and world has of course generated countless finely nuanced philosophical arguments. But, put starkly, it seems there are three options:
That the mind and world are distinct.
That the mind and world are unified.
That the mind and world are both distinct and unified.
? While there are many powerful arguments in favour of the first two options, it is the third which I explore here, and the one I will suggest is most plausible.
Ren? Descartes (1596-1650) is often credited with formalising the dualistic distinction between thinking substance (res cognitans) and material substance (res extensa); that is, between ideas attributable to the mind on the one hand and the material world of bodies and objects on the other.
? Descartes' reputation as the prototypical dualist, however, does not fairly convey the complexity, some would say confusion, of his view on the distinction between mind and world. In the synopsis of the Meditations, we read:
? the human mind is shown to be really distinct from the body, and, nevertheless, to be so closely conjoined therewith as together to form, as it were, a unity.
And again in Mediation VI itself:
Nature teaches me ? that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so intimately conjoined, as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body compose a certain unity.
Despite the hint of qualification, Descartes is quite explicit: The mind and body are both 'really distinct' and united - they are two and one.