@kennethamy,
kennethamy;74325 wrote:You are wrong. How we know something can be different, but what it is we know can be the same. I can know a ball is round through sight, or through feel, but in both cases, what I know is the same thing, that the ball is round. Acid reflux feels bad, and I can know it by feeling it. An X ray technician can observe the acid reflux by observing it. It is the very same thing I feel, and the technician, observes.
All you have proved is that there are two different ways of knowing about a discharge of neurons (external observation and internal thought/feeling). You have not proved that a thought/feeling is
identical with a discharge of neurons. How could they be identical, if the former is a
means of knowing, and the latter the
object of the knowing? It is like saying that the seeing of a ball, or the feeling of a ball, is identical to the ball itself. Let us test the logic of your example:
1. The feel of acid reflux is one way of knowing the physical phenomenon of acid reflux.
2. The feel of acid reflux is identical with the physical phenomenon of acid reflux.
(This corresponds to the proposition that thought/feeling is identical to discharge of neurons.)
Therefore, by substitution:
3. The feel of acid reflux is one way of knowing the feel of acid reflux.
So premises (1) and (2) together lead to a tautology. But (1) is non-trivially true, so there must be something wrong with (2). Hence it must be wrong to claim that thought/feeling is identical to discharge of neurons.