Similarly, we may draw another analogy. If I go to buy fried chicken and you hand my a live chicken, I will say that I want a dead chicken (not necessarily that one, mind you). Similarly, if I go to get oil and instead you give me unprocessed material, I will say that I want processed oil. In both cases, what I want is a product of a process that, in the case of chickens, necessarily causes harm, and, in the case of oil, happens to cause harm. The discinction between necessity and coincidence doesn't matter, however, as long as the person knows that harm is involved.

Okay, let's regroup our thoughts. We all acknowledge that there are moral complexities and unintended consequences deeply rooted in oil consumption and the like. We know this to be the case, but we do not intend for this to be the case. This distinction zicogja made is important.

The point I am trying to make is that, in addition to knowing what is involved in meat production--the harming of animals--we also intend for the animal to be harmed. Why? As I stated earlier, your dietary preference for meat is nothing less than the desire for dead bodily tissue. Bodily tissue comes from living things. You would not go to the market, order fried chicken, and accept being handed a living chicken. You'd want that chicken dead, because you want to eat its bodily tissue, plain and simple.

And why exactly is that "wrong" to you, again?

And why exactly is that "wrong" to you, again?

Okay, let's regroup our thoughts. We all acknowledge that there are moral complexities and unintended consequences deeply rooted in oil consumption and the like. We know this to be the case, but we do not intend for this to be the case. This distinction zicogja made is important.

The point I am trying to make is that, in addition to knowing what is involved in meat production--the harming of animals--we also intend for the animal to be harmed. Why? As I stated earlier, your dietary preference for meat is nothing less than the desire for dead bodily tissue. Bodily tissue comes from living things. You would not go to the market, order fried chicken, and accept being handed a living chicken. You'd want that chicken dead, because you want to eat its bodily tissue, plain and simple.

Okay, let's regroup our thoughts. We all acknowledge that there are moral complexities and unintended consequences deeply rooted in oil consumption and the like. We know this to be the case, but we do not intend for this to be the case. This distinction zicogja made is important.

The point I am trying to make is that, in addition to knowing what is involved in meat production--the harming of animals--we also intend for the animal to be harmed. Why? As I stated earlier, your dietary preference for meat is nothing less than the desire for dead bodily tissue. Bodily tissue comes from living things. You would not go to the market, order fried chicken, and accept being handed a living chicken. You'd want that chicken dead, because you want to eat its bodily tissue, plain and simple.

Maybe if your criteria is, that the "product" itself must be harmed, that might be a way to differentiate from oil products. (Actually that might be a point, if you want to explore that possibility, tell me.)

Animals are not products anymore than humans are products. Human slavery is an example where humans are treated like resources, just as meat-production is an example where animals are treated like resources. But as I've argued previously, all sentient beings, human and nonhuman, have basic welfare interests which override their being treated as property, or as products, or as resources manufactured for our use.

I think that by weighing the morality of meat-production in ways analogous to resources like oil, we've already presupposed the legitimacy of treating animals as products before deciding whether putting them into such a category violates their interests. This is something I think we should pursue.

Animals are not products anymore than humans are products. Human slavery is an example where humans are treated like resources, just as meat-production is an example where animals are treated like resources. But as I've argued previously, all sentient beings, human and nonhuman, have basic welfare interests which override their being treated as property, or as products, or as resources manufactured for our use.

I think that by weighing the morality of meat-production in ways analogous to resources like oil, we've already presupposed the legitimacy of treating animals as products before deciding whether putting them into such a category violates their interests. This is something I think we should pursue.

The reason I ask is that I reject consequentialism. An actions morality should be judges by itself, hence the immorality that is a consequence of using oil products might not count. But you would have to establish that the action of eating or buying meat is immoral on itself, and not due to it's consequences.

I argued that the moral wrongness of meat-eating is overidden only if the animals died due to accidents, or natural causes, or other sources which did not stem from the deliberate actions of other moral agents.

Now, I understand there's some contention over whether purchasing meat is really complicit in the moral wrongness of harming animals. However, this point of contention is not really crucial to my argument because if the action of harming animals is wrong, the main thrust of the argument succeeds.

That said, I'm not sure how I could argue the wrongness of causing harm to sentient beings without reference to the notion that doing so violates their basic welfare interests. You reject this line of reasoning because it is consequentialist?

Let's try to make things clear. Let us grant that causing harm is bad. Thus, let us grant that harming animals is bad (I don't believe this is true, but let's assume that it is for the sake of argument). Therefore, since humans are animals, harming humans is bad. So far I think that the OP would agree. So let us suppose that human X is killing other humans. Let us suppose that the only reason he is killing them is so that he can sell human meat for his own personal benefit. Now, let's say I buy human meat from him. Is my buying the human meat from him morally wrong? If so, why? Is my eating that human meat, which is the consequence of somebody's killing the human for the sole purpose of selling, wrong? If so, why?

I agree that causing harm is wrong in itself, not because it violates basic welfare interests. But I wouldn't say that the action of buying meat includes it's killing, that is a consequence

I argued that the moral wrongness of meat-eating is overidden only if the animals died due to accidents, or natural causes, or other sources which did not stem from the deliberate actions of other moral agents.

Now, I understand there's some contention over whether purchasing meat is really complicit in the moral wrongness of harming animals. However, this point of contention is not really crucial to my argument because if the action of harming animals is wrong, the main thrust of the argument succeeds.

It seems you accept premise (1) then, but for different reasons. What is there left to argue between us?

Let's look at your original argument. In (4), you said that eating animals requires the killing of animals, and then in (5), you concluded that therefore, eating animals is prima-facie morally wrong (except in cases where the animal died naturally or via some unintended action), since causing harm is morally wrong. But this does not clearly follow, if it follows at all. It is not necessary for me to kill an animal in order to eat an animal that has been killed. In other words, it is not necessary for me to cause harm to an animal in order to eat an animal that has been harmed. In other words, (4) is right, but only in some cases. If I am eating an animal that I have killed, then yes, my eating of the animal requires my killing of the animal. But in the case of most people who eat meat, their eating animals does not require them to kill any animal. Your first premise is that causing harm is morally wrong and from this you eventually end up with the conclusion that being a vegetarian is morally obligatory. But, as I noted, (4) is not necessarily true. Therefore, 5 does not follow, 6 is irrelevant, and 7 does not follow. Finally, since 7 does not follow, nor does 8.

The only real thing you have going to save your argument is to say exactly why purchasing meat is wrong because it is somehow complicit or in support of or a motivating force for the killing of animals. In other words, this point of contention is extremely crucial to (saving) your argument. As I've showed, even if we grant that the action of harming animals is wrong, we do not end up with the conclusion that vegeterianism is morally wrong (unless, as I'm here suggesting, you save by your argument by adding some additional notes or premises explaining why we should accept that purchasing and/or eating meat is morally wrong entirely on the grounds that it somehow is complicit in the causing of harm to animals), and thus the main thrust of your argument does not succeed.

Your reasoning is a slippery slope.
In an example:

1. Causing harm is prima facie morally wrong (assumed).
2. Oppressing humans causes them harm.
3. Oppressing humans is prima facie morally wrong.
4. Using oil-products requires oppressing humans.
5. Therefore, using oil-products is prima facie morally wrong.
6. The wrongness of using oil-products is not overriden. (?)
7. Therefore, using oil-products is ultima facie morally wrong.
8. Living without modern commodities is morally obligatory (see post 87).

I'm conceding the point that purchasing and eating meat from the store is complicit in the wrongdoing that takes place at the slaughterhouse. I'd like to redirect focus to the slaughterhouse itself, where the deliberate actions of moral agents harm animals.

I acknowledge this and am conceding premises (4-8), redirecting focus to premises (1-3) in the OP.

I was asking you to defend that point, not to concede it. I don't accept that point and nor does EmperorNero, I assume, or many other people, so you need to defend it.

I concede the point that the actions of the people who kill animals in slaughterhouses are wrong (although I don't believe it). The point is, even if we grant this, how do we end up with your conclusion that we should be vegetarian?

I'm quite alright with people not being vegetarian if causing harm to animals is morally wrong and the meat-industry is abolished (consequence of premises 1-3), since then humans would only continue to eat meat if the animal died due to natural causes, or if they continued to purchase meat from illicit meat-providers.

Living a life which was natural and not dependent upon the luxuries of civilization.