What he is saying is that people make claims with alternate justificatorial criteria, then when challenged with another set of criteria revisit the original claim. The issue is the criteria on which a claim is based, not the claim. Something can be a true claim using X set of criteria but not Y. That has been the issue with this whole thread. Is there a universal set of criteria on which to base a claim?

In all the practical sense of the concept, I agree, that there is a reality outside all of our human chatter. So yes, I agree that certain words and actions occurred independent of what is said about them in retrospect.

In the rape case, I suppose it comes down to details, legally and socially. We all agree, I hope, that "no" means "no." More difficult cases include partial or complete intoxication. How drunk is too drunk? And what if both parties are drunk? What if a woman initiates "erotic play" in this drunken or mutually drunken state and does not say "no."

I'm just trying to show the points at which the word becomes a little blurry. I agree in every practical sense that there were/are facts involved.
This is just the way we humans think, and must think. It went down one way and not another. The hard part is interpretation. Well, it's not always hard; sometimes guilt is obvious.

---------- Post added 05-25-2010 at 06:57 PM ----------



But doesn't a word like "terrorism" have a non-factual meaning? It does imply certain factual actions, but it also implies more than this. I'll agree that some could use it in a more neutral sense, or at least attempt to. But it's one of those words....

What he is saying is that people make claims with alternate justificatorial criteria, then when challenged with another set of criteria revisit the original claim. The issue is the criteria on which a claim is based, not the claim. Something can be a true claim using X set of criteria but not Y. That has been the issue with this whole thread. Is there a universal set of criteria on which to base a claim?

The criteria for whether a king in chess has been checkmated are: the king has been checked, and the king has no legal move. You may, I suppose, offer other criteria for checkmate. But, so what?

Is there a falisfiable proposition that can be made about the fact that (X did the action of bombing) aside from the fact that (X did the action of bombing)?

All facts are true. "True fact" is a pleonasm. The question is, what is the fact. For instance, is it a fact (is it true) that the attack on Dresden was an act of terrorism? That is where the controversy arises.

All propositions are falsifiable, if by that you mean that they can be false. I'm not sure what you mean by your question, though. Can you try again?



Yes you are right. I shouldn't have said that. I was referring to the true proposition reported by the fact.

As I said, "terrorism" has an emotive meaning of disapproval based on its descriptive meaning, because terrorism is an evil action. Therefore, when someone calls a person a terrorist he is indicating disapproval of the person who perform terrorist actions. The same thing is true of the word, "rude". It is a term of disapproval, as well it should be since rude behavior ought to be disapproved of.

---------- Post added 05-25-2010 at 08:14 PM ----------



You would have to give an example of of a claim that is true under one set of criteria, but not true under another. And, when you did, it we would then have to discuss which set of criteria is the correct set of criteria. Of course, it is possible that one term is ambiguous, and thus it may be applied differently depending on which set of criteria. But then, we are talking about ambiguity.

The criteria for whether a king in chess has been checkmated are: the king has been checked, and the king has no legal move. You may, I suppose, offer other criteria for checkmate. But, so what?

Lets try this. Is there a statement to be made about a fact that isn't based somehow on a presupposition? For example, in this case we have the fact (X person did the act of bombing) is statement that somehow describes this that is not based on a presupposition. Or is there a statement that places a truth value on this that can do anything besides say that (X person bombed) without referring to arbitrary definition of that truth?

Lets try this. Is there a statement to be made about a fact that isn't based somehow on a presupposition? For example, in this case we have the fact (X person did the act of bombing) is statement that somehow describes this that is not based on a presupposition. Or is there a statement that places a truth value on this that can do anything besides say that (X person bombed) without referring to arbitrary definition of that truth?

So when I asked if you were stating that there are moral absolutes, you could have just said: yes.

Exactly. We can verify through interrogation that the bomber intended to create terror. We can look at that sort of thing the way a sociologist might... without condemning or praising. We can look at it amorally.

Most folks I know use the word terrorist in a way that's bound to condemnation. To suggest that this roots the condemnation in a known correct criteria makes sense only... subjectively.

The beauty of chess is that it's a mathematical system. In principle, it's ideally precise. And this ideal conceptual precision, highly abstract, is easily managed by a finite body of rules. If only human existence were this simple...but then we would get bored.

In other words, the moment we make a statement about the fact, we are departing from the fact and are no longer using the fact as something Real, but rather supportive and anecdotal. To see my point quite easily, think about a fact that nothing could be said about, and think about how factual such a fact would really be.

No, I could not have said yes, unless I did not care whether I understood your question. What has my chess example to do with whether there are moral absolutes (whatever those are) I cannot imagine.

Of course we can ask the factual question whether the bomber was a terrorist (which does not mean only "intended to create terror") and this is apart from a moral judgment about terrorism. But, as I just pointed out, when someone is called a terrorist what is meant is not only that he intended to create terror. What that also means is that he also intentionally targeted defenseless people. Now, most people would tend to make a moral judgment about intentionally targeting defenseless people. It would be negative. Don't you agree?

Most people do make moral judgments about intentionally targeting defenseless people. It's not always negative. Note those who deny any immorality in the bombing of Hiroshima.

So you aren't supporting moral absolutes. In that case you've answered your original question. A man acts in a certain way in a class room. The facts of the case are: he made noise and ignored the professor.

"Rudeness (also called impudence or effrontery) is the disrespect and failure to behave within the context of a society or a group of people's social laws or etiquette.These laws have already unspokenly been established as the essential boundaries of normally accepted behavior. To be unable or unwilling to align one's behavior with these laws known to the general population of what is socially acceptable is to be rude." -- wiki

The man was rude. Problem solved!

Those who deny the that the bombing of Hiroshima (not only those who deny the immorality of the bombing of Hiroshima!) is immoral are, of course, making a moral judgment. Namely that the bombing of Hiroshima was immoral.

What problem is solved?

Oh, but I am making a moral judgment, since judging that someone is rude is certainly making a moral judgment. You may have to reconcile yourself to the fact that a judgment may be both a factual and a moral judgment. It is a fact that the student was rude, and that is a moral judgment.

I think you meant that those who deny immorality in the intentional targeting of defenseless people in the case of the Hiroshima bombing are saying that it was moral.

I appreciate that moral judgment is inextricable from our assessments of events. I wish everybody realized that. This world would be a better place to live in.

"Moral" has two meanings: it can be contrasted with immoral. It can also be contrasted with amoral. l

Hi All,

Ice-cream? Rape? Fish? None of these have opposing values. The spectrum for usage of my silly (wise) subjectivisms MUST have a valid opposing value. As in Newton's third law of motion. "Every action MUST ..............". These subjectivisms are ONLY used to stress that an opinionated label is relative to the observer depending on their point of view. If you stood face to face with me, my left would be your right. Both statements are FACT, and both statements are correct, equal too.

Anyway, Have a fantastic day, Gentlemen,

And remember "One man's wisdom is another man's folly".

Mark...

As a skeptic, I've found it useful to view examples in their Praxeological context, in order to prevent every conversation I get into regarding human action from sliding into the abyss of nihilistic futility.

View the scenario in the context of the individual actor's means and ends using "if/then" statements.

Let's try it using the "Rude Student" example from earlier in this thread.

Without knowing the student's most pressing goal, it's difficult to really determine if what the student was doing advanced him towards that goal or not.

Considering his action as objectively rude is perhaps the oddest concept I've read all week. I'm sure most of us consider cutting in line to be rude, but lines don't even form in East Asian cultures, just a bunch of shoving and jockeying for first dibs. I don't think that means that Eastern Asians are all rude, it just means that they have been indoctrinated with a different set of cultural and aesthetic values. To consider our collective Anglo-European culture as the objective meter by which behavior of all humans is measured is ignorant at best and arrogant at worst.

Considering his action as objectively rude is perhaps the oddest concept I've read all week.

As a skeptic, I've found it useful to view examples in their Praxeological context, in order to prevent every conversation I get into regarding human action from sliding into the abyss of nihilistic futility.

View the scenario in the context of the individual actor's means and ends using "if/then" statements.

Let's try it using the "Rude Student" example from earlier in this thread.

Without knowing the student's most pressing goal, it's difficult to really determine if what the student was doing advanced him towards that goal or not.

Considering his action as objectively rude is perhaps the oddest concept I've read all week. I'm sure most of us consider cutting in line to be rude, but lines don't even form in East Asian cultures, just a bunch of shoving and jockeying for first dibs. I don't think that means that Eastern Asians are all rude, it just means that they have been indoctrinated with a different set of cultural and aesthetic values. To consider our collective Anglo-European culture as the objective meter by which behavior of all humans is measured is ignorant at best and arrogant at worst.