@Mr Fight the Power,
Mr. Fight the Power;31632 wrote:This is what I'm asking: What quality can we observe in the material processes of the brain that would denote consciousness? This is the hard question of neuroscience, and I don't think that anyone is positive that this can be solved.
Nah, it's not a hard question, except insofar as there are billions of neurons and some extrapolation is inevitable.
There are clearly voluntary and clearly involuntary actions. Like breathing, which you can consciously control, but can also happen with no conscious input, or coughing which can be an involuntary reflex or a conscious activity. Start with functional imaging and encephalograms and see how different regions behave differently during conscious versus unconscious initiation of this activity. The
motor part of the activity will happen in the same place, but the executive function, reflex loops, etc will likely differ.
Next, we know which neurotransmitters are secreted in different small regions of the brain, we know how they're regulated (in terms of secretion, uptake and metabolism, postsynaptic binding, etc). There are ways of measuring neurotransmitter function in the context of different experimental conditions.
Finally, you can use inhibitors to
block or knock out certain functions. So if I mildly sedate you, it's not going to abolish your coughing reflex if I spray you with an irritant gas. You're not going to be able to exert any conscious control over breathing, but you'll still breath. So we can take the "optional" issue away and demonstrate that the activity and its neurologic basis can still occur involuntarily.
Quote:Also do you also think that science can understand these physical processes in terms of optional or not optional?
Yes. At least many of them. That doesn't mean that the current state of technology allows us to answer these questions to your satisfaction. But then again, all that means is that the problem is technical. It's a matter of understanding physiology. It's not a philosophical question in the sense that this is epistemologically unknowable.