I read the Tractatus. It's nearly impossible to understand unless one has read some secondary work too and know one's logic. I happen to be good with logic, so it wasn't that hard, though I don't recall much of it. Didn't seem useful to memorize.

That was my original feeling too. I have many more questions about Tractatus at the moment than I do about PI.

Furthermore, Tractatus divides up very nicely Preface and then 1,2,3,4,5,6,7. We could have a thread for each. PI doesn't lend itself to such a nice and neat division. I'm back to advocating for Tractatus.

I'm so decisive.:sarcastic:

I'll be stopping by the library tomorrow as well. I'm still working on getting the Tractatus Group working properly. I must have botched it somehow or there is some minor glich. The PI group is up and working for anyone who want to start with PI. I plan on focusing my energies on Tractatus before moving on the PI but I will be moving on to the PI group when the time comes.

So since Tractatus Group sub-forum is not as yet fully operational I'm asking interested parties to hold off posting until it is. It may have to be deleted and recreated and I don't want to erase anyone's work. Thanks.

1* The world is all that is the case.

Can we say the 'world' is all that exists, instead?

The world is all that is.

He is more likely stating a tautology- that the world is tautological. In a truth-table the world would be all Ts.

There is a line in Prop 2 that says something like 'substance is what there is besides what is the case'. A nod to Spinoza? Without all the metaphysics?

In the opening sections of the Tractatus Wittgenstein sets out his metaphysical view of the world, why we should accept this particular metaphysical view is not apparent at the beginning.

In fact it is quite clear that he is not stating a tautology. Proposition 1.1 States 'The world is the totality of facts not things'. The difference between facts and things can be understood by an analogy between sentences and words. For Wittgenstein the relationship between is much like the relationship between sentences and words. The sentence 'R.Danneskjold is an idiot' is constructed out of words specifically 'R.Danneskjold; idiot; an; is', written like this they are merely a list even though our list consists of the same words. But a sentence is much like a fact as it contains words in relation to one another. Like Wittgenstein's facts which contain 'a combination of objects (things)'(2.01) in relation to one another.

Proposition 1.13 states that the 'The facts in logical space are the world'. Logical Space is the space of possibilities. There are lots of facts which might have existed, such as 'Wittgenstein's family were poor' or 'R.Danneskjold is 6ft tall' these facts are called negative facts by Wittgenstein 'The existence of atomic facts we also call a positive fact, their nonexistence a negative fact' (2.06). Actual facts only account for some of the possible facts in logical space, only some of these possibilities are occupied by what is actually the case. It is in this way that the world is all that is the case.

And it isn't that I disagree with what you said, its just been a bit since I read the TLP. But I am pretty sure that the propositions of the TLP are supposed to be tautological, and that is why he says they are nonsense at the end.

A tautology is not in itself nonsensical.

It is Wittgenstein's rejection of metaphysics and his criterion of meaning that leads him to brand his own work as nonsense. As the rejection of metaphysics is neither a posteriori or analytic. This can be clearly seen in Proposition 6.53 :
'The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - but it would be the only strictly correct method.'

His use of 'Philosophy' means the same as thing as he means by 'metaphysics', which leads him to reject his own work as meaningless.

Others such as Carnap and Hume who have also wished eliminate metaphysics haven't seen this apparent paradox. But Wittgenstein seems to see the problem which is presented by this rejection quite clearly going on to state in Proposition 6.54.
'My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them'.

Well, I just don't see how that contradicts what I said, other than stating W was being metaphysical. Having a negative fact as T doesn't invalidate the tautological notion of the world.

And it isn't that I disagree with what you said, its just been a bit since I read the TLP. But I am pretty sure that the propositions of the TLP are supposed to be tautological, and that is why he says they are nonsense at the end.

Cheers! and Nice Post.

A tautology is not in itself nonsensical. It is Wittgenstein's rejection of metaphysics and his criterion of meaning that leads him to brand his own work as nonsense. As the rejection of metaphysics is neither a posteriori or analytic. This can be clearly seen in Proposition 6.53 :

'The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other - he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - but it would be the only strictly correct method.'

How are we meant to understand "propositions of natural science?"

The propositions of natural science. Like, that Mars is the fourth planet, or water is H20.

"Mars is the fourth planet" is a proposition?

Yes. It is either true or false.

Wittgenstein has two German terms : "sinnlos" and "unsinn". Tautologies are "sinlos", "senseless". metaphysics is "unsinn" "nonsense". Since tautologies are true, they cannot be nonsense. But they have no content.

How are we meant to understand "propositions of natural science?"

As Wittgenstein grew older, he became reconciled to the fact that the difference between chatter and nonchatter was one of degree. As he gradually became reconciled to the fact that he would never see the world as a limited whole, he gradually dropped the notion of the "limits of language." So he turned the Tractatus distinction between saying and showing into the distinction between assertions and the social practices which gave meaning to assertions. He thereby reinvented Heidegger's doctrine that assertion is a derivative mode of interpretation.

---------- Post added 02-20-2010 at 04:35 PM ----------


Good question. To distinguish between kinds of science requires metaphysics?

Eh, the question was, How are we meant to understand "propositions of natural science?" The question was not, how are we meant to understand the propositions of science. Inverted commas mean something. Reading is a skill.

The young Wittgenstein saw, however, what Frege and the young Russell had not seen: that the search for nonempirical truth about the conditions of the possibility of describability raises the self-referential problem of its own possibility. Just as Kant had faced the problem of rendering the possibility of transcendental philosophy consistent with the restrictions on inquiry which such philosophy purports to have discovered, so Frege and Russell had problems explaining how knowledge of what they called "logic" was possible. The problem was that logic seemed to be an exception to the conditions which it itself laid down. The propositions of logic were not truth-functional combinations of elementary statements about the objects that make up the world. Yes "logic" seemed to tell us that only such combinations had meaning.