What can we say her? For me, Nietzsche's general thesis in this section is that there is a tendency to believe that our grammar, the structure of our langauge, faithfully reflects the structure of the world.

This idea can be seen most strongly in the aphorisms 16 to 19. By the time we get to 20, I think N is raising the suspicion that our entire grammar, its structural features I pressume, along with our own internal psychological-cultural dispositions, directs the very possibility of our thinking and the possibility of ideas within it.

N attacks the idea of a self-contained res cogintan 'I' (16), the atomic view - self-contained irreducible units of matter - of the world (12), Kant's faculties (11) as either trivial expressions of a grammar or useful tools to support psychological drives. By the time we arrive to aphorism 4 we see a general picture forming: certain fundamental beliefs are useful 'logical fictions', that is, the necessary truth of such propositions ( such as, every event has a cause) is a result of the structure of language which then leads him into that short discussion of truth.

What can be said here in relation to what Reconstructo has been suggesting? Stemming from N's attack on opposites (aphorisms 2) and how banal and trivial they come to be, he argues that falsehood is probably of more value to humans than truth, or their sloppy definitions-theories (how many is it today?) on what exactly is truth. Perhaps the search for truth is something useful, pragmatic, helpful to creatures like ourselves, rather than having anything to do with some fundamental objectivity. N then claims that certain fundamental beliefs are nothing more than convenient "fictions" (every event has a cause; all colored objects have some spatial extent), which are not something which can be objectively founded. They are universally accepted, according to N, only because they are "indispensable" to our way of life, psychological dispositions, and grammar. It follows that for N, "untruth" and our seeking of untruths wrapped up in the langauge of truth is a "condition of life." (should be enough polemic here to get our conservative anal-lytics hot under the collar :devilish:)

Thanks a lot for the post, attano. I won't have time to reply to it all today (exam time for the students is coming up and it's always the busiest time of year), but I will try to make a little inroad.

The language interpretation I claim is Nietzschean is more an amalgamation of ideas tweaked out from his essays and books, for clearly, N didn't give a singular theory in anyone book. Nevertheless with that said, we could, as you have suggested, go into BG&E and try to wean out some of his ideas on language here. There isn't that many, but I think the first 23 aphorisms are a good place to start.

What can we say her? For me, Nietzsche's general thesis in this section is that there is a tendency to believe that our grammar, the structure of our langauge, faithfully reflects the structure of the world.

This idea can be seen most strongly in the aphorisms 16 to 19. By the time we get to 20, I think N is raising the suspicion that our entire grammar, its structural features I pressume, along with our own internal psychological-cultural dispositions, directs the very possibility of our thinking and the possibility of ideas within it.

N attacks the idea of a self-contained res cogintan 'I' (16), the atomic view - self-contained irreducible units of matter - of the world (12), Kant's faculties (11) as either trivial expressions of a grammar or useful tools to support psychological drives. By the time we arrive to aphorism 4 we see a general picture forming: certain fundamental beliefs are useful 'logical fictions', that is, the necessary truth of such propositions ( such as, every event has a cause) is a result of the structure of language which then leads him into that short discussion of truth.

What can be said here in relation to what Reconstructo has been suggesting? Stemming from N's attack on opposites (aphorisms 2) and how banal and trivial they come to be, he argues that falsehood is probably of more value to humans than truth, or their sloppy definitions-theories (how many is it today?) on what exactly is truth. Perhaps the search for truth is something useful, pragmatic, helpful to creatures like ourselves, rather than having anything to do with some fundamental objectivity. N then claims that certain fundamental beliefs are nothing more than convenient "fictions" (every event has a cause; all colored objects have some spatial extent), which are not something which can be objectively founded. They are universally accepted, according to N, only because they are "indispensable" to our way of life, psychological dispositions, and grammar. It follows that for N, "untruth" and our seeking of untruths wrapped up in the langauge of truth is a "condition of life." (should be enough polemic here to get our conservative anal-lytics hot under the collar :devilish:)

If I may... Truth may be a moral form, and an infinite; but it is also an essenttial in every life... And if you agree with me, that culture is knowledge then you must ask: Why would a culture deliberately deliver false ideas to its subscribers when, for the culture to survive all individuals must survive... Clearly, some people deliberately suck the meaning out of their cultures and social forms... They stretch the truth to the breaking point... Others recognize that we can only address the truth by way of analogy, so they suggest the truth as fiction, and that may be the best way we have of expressing truth, because the more scientific, and theoretical we become the further we get from truth as an absolute...

I - and probably Qualia too - wanted to focus on the fact that objective truth is an idol.

N. presented the thesis that moral truth (i.e. the affirmation of the values of one culture) precedes and influences "objective" truth - even logic axioms would be the reflection of moral values.
(Btw, don't believe that N.'s statements in this respect are of the kind of those made by some trends of PostmodernismPlatonism for the masses) has brought the West to some unhealthy condition where its culture generates/endorses ideas that are damaging its subscribers, inasmuch these ideas foster conditions damaging the expression and the exertion of vital instincts, impulses, forces.
One of the most harmful ideas, possibly the most harmful of all - but that's debatable, has been the idea of truth itself, the idea that knowledge is seeking the truth and not to empower life.
This is not in contradiction with your say that truth is essential in every life, it rather follows the same line.

Some other elements that may help to have a better understanding of N.'s position.
- Christianity has not started as an evil plot against humanity. N. never maintained that. Incidentally, N. had no hatred for Jesus Christ, most probably quite the opposite. The problem didn't start with Christ, but with Socrates. He's the corrupter... He corrupted Plato, and hence the problem started.
- The search for truth has been harmful for Christianity itself, as it has led to the death of God and the implosion of the Christian faith.
- Finally, N. repeatedly affirmed that the knowledge acquired trough our senses is probably the most reliable knowledge that we have.

So your remark is not an objection to N.'s position, but rather a good start for understanding it.

kennethamy;160761 wrote:

It is? As an explanation of what?

Of killing of God... When your father, dead and in Heaven has the distant and powerful qualities of a god without the ability to actually be killed, then killing with philosophy is the next best thing...It was Nietzsche trying to get out of his own particular trick bag, and so was his general attack upon morality... These are the sorts of things children do in order to put themselves apart from their families and be recognized as having distinct identities...Individualism is immorality, and nietzsche never found a better method than the one all children use, of denying family, denying God, denying morality, denying sin... He just never grew out of it, but was trapped in puberty forever...He is like a bug trapped in amber, thanks to his volumes.

We must keep in mind the danger of reading Nietzsche's metaphors