1. The act of closing or the state of being closed: closure of an incision.
2. Something that closes or shuts.
3. a. A bringing to an end; a conclusion: finally brought the project to closure.
b. A feeling of finality or resolution, especially after a traumatic experience.



As thinkers, we often seek closure. Perhaps we always seek closure. Perhaps the notion of "the impossibility of closure" is itself a closure.

Most of us assume that reality is singular, that there is one reality, not a reality for each of us. Natural science and practical affairs in general seem to encourage this conception of reality.

But this conception of reality ignores how various are our individual interpretations of this implicitly singular "reality."

Does the denial of the supernatural appeal to us because it simplifies reality? Isn't the idea of one reality predictable by human science is a comfortably small notion. I myself generally deny the supernatural, as a matter of negative-faith.

I just want to open a discussion about this pursuit of closure and how it effects what we proclaim as true. This is connected to the transcendental pretense, but that's another thread.

I just want to open a discussion about this pursuit of closure and how it effects what we proclaim as true.

If you're talking about explanatory completeness, this seems to be false, so, I would class its pursuit as a mistake. But I dont see how explanatory incompleteness impacts truth, unless "truth" is some species of 'theory of everything'.

I would class its pursuit as a mistake.

To class something as a mistake requires a sense at least of temporary closure.

I suspect that there's a better chance of this thread being productive if you rigourise your definition of "closure".

I suspect that there's a better chance of this thread being productive if you rigourise your definition of "closure".

welcome to the forum!

You want me to close in on what I mean by closure? I'm coming from the context of Rorty on Derrida. Rorty said Derrida's great theme was the "impossibility of closure. " It especially applies to meta-philosophy. Many philosophers have tried to limit the purpose of philosophy, to close it. Many have claimed to have solved this closed philosophy game. Think of it as a state of mind that is emotional as well as ideological.

Many philosophers have tried to limit the purpose of philosophy, to close it. Many have claimed to have solved this closed philosophy game. Think of it as a state of mind that is emotional as well as ideological.

The implicit self-love of the above post is a better example of closure. To speak from confidence is a manifestation of closure. To be certain that one's method is correct is an example of closure. . . . . To class something as a mistake requires a sense at least of temporary closure.

You want me to close in on what I mean by closure? I'm coming from the context of Rorty on Derrida. Rorty said Derrida's great theme was the "impossibility of closure. " It especially applies to meta-philosophy. Many philosophers have tried to limit the purpose of philosophy, to close it. Many have claimed to have solved this closed philosophy game. Think of it as a state of mind that is emotional as well as ideological.

This is from the camp for the Impossibility of Closure (as a form of Closure?)



I noted that when seeking to deflate the apocalyptic tendencies of deconstruction, Rorty insisted that we increasingly understand ourselves as resting on a fountain of puns and metaphors. But I also noted that there seems to be an ongoing tendency, in Rorty's universe, for once-molten metaphors to "objectify" or congeal and for human beings, in their metaphysical necrophilia, to
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worship the corpses. So we need to keep showing up and undermining that still-metaphysical tendency. But do the particular metaphors that have in fact resulted-become ours, us-have to be the objects of such misplaced worship? What if we were to experience them as nothing more than what they are, as nothing but history? We would no longer worship them, certainly, but we have seen that new preoccupations intrude as metaphysics fades, as we escape even its shadow.
Fundamental to Rorty's response was the suffocating experience, explored first by Nietzsche, of being always already caught up in a particular history-determined by a past not chosen and confined to a present that is nothing but the haphazard resultant of the whole of that past. With the reduction to history, the anxiety of influence that Bloom explored with respect to poetry becomes general, because everything is wound around metaphor coming to us from a past that threatens our autonomy.[54]
Thus Rorty, still following Bloom, advocated the actively "strong misreadings" that yield new metaphors; the alternative, merely to "read," is to be confined to the particular line of the actual, with the present seemingly encompassing the embryo of any future. More specifically, to seek "truth" as opposed to a disruptive irony is to remain subservient to metaphors now congealed. Our tendency to worship corpses is the other side of the tendency of particularizing history to ensnare us, limiting what we can say, do, even be, in ways we have not chosen. So the premium is on irony, even quirkiness, as opposed to truth or reconnection.
Nothing but History

I need to get some books by Rorty, could you PM me if you have any (pdfs I mean)?

"to see "truth" as opposed to a disruptive irony is to remain subservient to metaphors now congealed"

that says it all now doesn't it... rebellion against status quo may look useless but history teaches us otherwise.

Rorty is great. He's famous but not as famous as he deserves.

But you alluded to the emotional aspect of closure: it's a grave stone. One could argue that the impossibility of closure is evident in the nature of time: maybe in the next moment I won't actually be something new and unique... maybe it will be just another winter me on just another human day.

Does that mean that since you are coming from the context of Rorty on Derrida that you cannot make anything rigorous, or even comprehensible. I am inclined to agree, but I never thought you would admit it so readily. But maybe you don't care about rigor or comprehensibility. I had not thought about that. Perhaps you could walk away from Rorty being on Derrida for a moment, as fascinating as that might be, and deal with the question of what you mean by "closure". For instance, what is it you think is being closed?

We need a book full of quotes. More than a few philosophers have claimed to have solved all the important problems in philosophy. And that must be a beautiful feeling.