@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;155358 wrote:Is it the crux that the "mind" experiences the body as an object? But when it tries to experience itself as an object, the cord gets tangled? We can imagine having no arms, no eyes, etc., but can we imagine having no minds? It does seem to lead right into idealism/materialism.
The "mind-body problem" is maybe unfortunately named because it seems to just be talking about the body and not also sensory stimuli. If our bodies were completely numb, deaf, blind etc we wouldn't know we had bodies. There might be a body-world problem as well where world in this case means everything except my body. Where does my body end, and the outside world begin? If my finger gets cut off does it become part of the world and no longer part of my body? If I get a prosthetic finger is that finger part of my body? Enter the cyborg. The mind-body problem is the mind-outside world problem is the idea vs. matter problem. Is the frontier the body with all its sensory apparatus or is the frontier the mind's experience of this frontier? Our bodies occupy a strange place in the story. Is the frontier of the mind where the body begins or where our bodies end or is there a gray area?
When we talk about contemporary science exploring the mind-body problem we are usually talking about the mind-brain problem. Does the mind-body problem reduce then to the mind-brain problem? Most contemporary cognitive scientists are not idealists and believe that the brain is a material thing. Many of these scientists are strict materialists. Others may think the mind is something immaterial that is sort of inside or produced by the brain. However, Berkeley would tell these scientists that the brain is just an idea in the mind.
kennethamy;155211 wrote:No, Idealism and Materialism are logical contraries. They cannot both be true, but, of course, they can both be false. E.g. Monism. So they are not logical contradictories. But I don't see what that has to do with your original query.
Ken, I'm a little confused about monism. I consider idealism and materialism to be two types of monism. Is it possible to have a monism that is neither materialistic nor idealistic? I guess I've been assuming that there are only two choices for the monist (idealism or materialism). Can you provide an example of a third choice? Even the word "monism" is defined in contradistinction to dualism or pluralism.
I am trying to imagine an idealist who has never heard of materialism or a materialist that has never heard of idealism. I think I met such a materialist once but she struck me as naive and I don't think she knew what the word "materialist" meant. Which of course makes sense, since materialism only has meaning in contradistinction to idealism.
@Reconstructo
Is the idea that idealism and materialism cannot exist in
ignorance of each other somehow Hegelian? You know the corresponding negation as being somehow present in any assertion. Being brings with it Nothingness. You can't be
conscious of one without being
conscious of the other.
I'm not sure if I know what I'm getting at here and I can't tell if it's tangential or central to my OP.
Sorry for the prolixity; I'm having trouble articulating this stuff concisely.