Is mind/body problem the idealism/materialism problem?

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Deckard
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 01:08 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;153788 wrote:
I know it sounds strange. I think a negative ontology is necessary.


Lost me there a bit although I can pick up on some of it intuitively I think there is much that still needs to be articulated and perhaps you are trying to squeeze too much into this one post. Perhaps the topic of negative ontology deserves it's own thread.

Negative ontology makes sense enough especially with reference to negative theology...the former a secular form of the later? I do wonder how much of what you are calling negative ontology will ultimately arrives at the positive anti-metaphysical method of just not asking the questions or dismissing such problems as nonsense.

I have brought up the question of which is more fundamental mind/body and idealism/materialism...Is there some question that is more fundamental than both...perhaps the most fundamental question of all such as "Why is there something rather than nothing?" or "Is there anything that I cannot doubt?"

I just wanted to take one baby step back from thinking about idealism/materialism to thinking about the mind/body problem. It is a matter of retracing steps not so much historically but, can't find the right word, developmentally? I want to say that questions about idealism/materialism arise from questions about the mind body problem.

Yet this may not always be the case...idealism seems to have another wing besides mind...something called spirit...though the German geist is a bit of both at once.

Is a (supposed) spiritual substance just the (supposed) mental substance in fancier more mysterious clothes? A "yes" to that question would support (though not prove) my statement that mind/body is the more fundamental question.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 01:20 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;153865 wrote:

I have brought up the question of which is more fundamental mind/body and idealism/materialism...Is there some question that is more fundamental than both...perhaps the most fundamental question of all such as "Why is there something rather than nothing?" or "Is there anything that I cannot doubt?"

Yes, I was trying to say too much at once. Because I do think there is a more fundamental question. But first I should agree that the mind-body seems more natural and more fundamental of a question than idealism/materialism. I should have responded to that first. It seems that the body is an object, and the mind is thought of as a subject. And from here, perhaps, the idealism/materialism question invades. Because the mind is apparently "in" the brain. But the brain is apparently "in" the mind. A moebius strip?
And doesn't this tie into the self-concept? Because a man can lose his hand and still "be him." But if his mind is gone, his identity is only the same in a bodily "objective" sense. It seems to me that all of these tricky dualities are related.

---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 02:24 AM ----------

Deckard;153865 wrote:

Negative ontology makes sense enough especially with reference to negative theology...the former a secular form of the later? I do wonder how much of what you are calling negative ontology will ultimately arrives at the positive anti-metaphysical method of just not asking the questions or dismissing such problems as nonsense.

I suppose negative ontology is more secular, but perhaps it subsumes negative theology. If beings are unified by/as concepts, then "god" would be just one more. Still, one could use the god in a new way and not be absurd. I think that would be a matter of taste. God as the negative one. Or god as the unnameable set of all sets. I honestly don't think it resolves to the dismissal, as I find it quite valuable.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 01:58 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;153868 wrote:
Yes, I was trying to say too much at once. Because I do think there is a more fundamental question. But first I should agree that the mind-body seems more natural and more fundamental of a question than idealism/materialism. I should have responded to that first. It seems that the body is an object, and the mind is thought of as a subject. And from here, perhaps, the idealism/materialism question invades. Because the mind is apparently "in" the brain. But the brain is apparently "in" the mind. A moebius strip?

There is such a thing as objective idealism as well as subjective idealism though I think the former is manufactured as an escape from the later and solipsism. Leibnitz and Plato examples of objective idealism...I am thinking of objective idealism as a sort of idealism that is trying to forget where it came from. But is my thinking darkened too much by the shadow of Descartes?
Reconstructo;153868 wrote:

I suppose negative ontology is more secular, but perhaps it subsumes negative theology. If beings are unified by/as concepts, then "god" would be just one more. Still, one could use the god in a new way and not be absurd. I think that would be a matter of taste. God as the negative one. Or god as the unnameable set of all sets. I honestly don't think it resolves to the dismissal, as I find it quite valuable.

Of course the negative theologian would say that God is not a concept.

There are many ways to dismiss. One can dismiss things by making them into metaphors, filters, reality tunnels etc.

I'm not sure what you mean by negative theology...Does the negative ontologist go about saying "being is not x, being is not y...ad infinitum" But this method eventually leads to the zen koan moment of "Wait a second, why am I even thinking about this! Why am I so obsessed with what Being is! or is not!" which I equate with dismissal of all ontological questions and an anti-metaphysical stance. Similarly negative theology can lead to atheism and then maybe, if you're lucky, nirvana...But I'm not sure if we are talking about the same things.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 02:42 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;153874 wrote:
...I am thinking of objective idealism as a sort of idealism that is trying to forget where it came from. But is my thinking darkened too much by the shadow of Descartes?

I think of "absolute idealism" as an idealism that ate itself.

---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 03:48 AM ----------

Deckard;153874 wrote:

Of course the negative theologian would say that God is not a concept.

Ah yes, of course. But that is just writing being under erasure, in my book, and negative ontology is basically writing the Concept under erasure. "All is concept " is a monism. "All is 'concept' " is closer to nonism. It's really not far from Rorty, who insists on the continual possibility of re-description. To stress contingency is key in both cases.

I have this strange interpretation of the trinity that would put God (the Father) in the slot of infinity/sensation/feeling. The holy ghost plays the role of the form of forms, the negative one that scribbles positive ones (cuts the father into beings/concepts). Of course the son would just be the union of these, and the father and the holy spirit would not exist outside the son. "In the beginning was the Logos, and the logos was with God, and the logos was God." Of course that's just me assimilating the trinity for my own crooked purposes.

---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 03:50 AM ----------

Deckard;153874 wrote:

There are many ways to dismiss. One can dismiss things by making them into metaphors, filters, reality tunnels etc.

True. Derrida argues that metaphor is itself a metaphysical concept. And this makes sense. If the intelligible structure of the world is logos (including what I now consider its subset mathematics), the metaphor is going to be metaphysical. What do you mean by filters? tunnels? Sounds interesting.

---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 04:01 AM ----------

Deckard;153874 wrote:

.Does the negative ontologist go about saying "being is not x, being is not y...ad infinitum" But this method eventually leads to the zen koan moment of "Wait a second, why am I even thinking about this! Why am I so obsessed with what Being is! or is not!" which I equate with dismissal of all ontological questions and an anti-metaphysical stance. Similarly negative theology can lead to atheism and then maybe, if you're lucky, nirvana...But I'm not sure if we are talking about the same things.


Well, it's important to understand that I'm after the proto-logic, the "form of form." Actually I feel like I'm on to it, so it's more about elaboration, refinement, etc. This ties in with the number 1, the concept of unity. I suppose I'm composing a "transcendental" analytic. But if the "real is rational," it is better called an absolute analytic. I always liked those color field painters and conceptual art.

For me, being is "conceptual." But this particular word is not of the essence. And "concept" may be too associated with idealism. We could just say intelligible form. But this intelligible form changes. Still, do aspects of the "intelligible form" of experience not change? For instance, the concept behind a word like "not." Is negation an essential part of thought. Seems to be. Is the variable also like this? For instance, "x" in math or "what" in English. It's definition is that it's undefined. To speak loosely.

Thanks for the feedback. It helps me evolve my "system."
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 05:17 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;153780 wrote:
If there was no mind/body problem then there would be no theories of materialism nor theories of idealism. No one would reach the conclusion or posit the theory without first struggling with the mind/body problem.


I wonder how you know that.

To say that X is "fundamental" to Y, is to say that Y logically presupposes X, but not conversely. I don't think that is true is this case. If you think it is, argue it.

---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 07:26 AM ----------

Reconstructo;153884 wrote:

For me, being is "conceptual." "


Why does it matter what being (whatever that is) is for you? All that means is that you think 'being is "conceptual" (not even, conceptual). But the question is whether it is conceptual or not. Not what you happen to believe it is. And if that means that the Moon is in your mind, then what you believe is obviously preposterous. Of course, since you place the term conceptual between inverted commas, who knows (including you) what you believe? For all I know, you may believe that the Moon is made of cream of wheat.

---------- Post added 04-19-2010 at 07:51 AM ----------

Reconstructo;153884 wrote:

For me, being is "conceptual." "


Why does it matter what being (whatever that is) is for you? All that means is that you think 'being is "conceptual" (not even, conceptual). But the question is whether it is conceptual or not. Not what you happen to believe it is. And if that means that the Moon is in your mind, then what you believe is obviously preposterous. Of course, since you place the term conceptual between inverted commas, who knows (including you) what you believe? For all I know, you may believe that the Moon is made of cream of wheat.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 06:40 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;153920 wrote:
I wonder how you know that.

To say that X is "fundamental" to Y, is to say that Y logically presupposes X, but not conversely. I don't think that is true is this case. If you think it is, argue it.


It's more of a hunch than anything else at this point. Can you point to a counter-example?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 06:58 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;153944 wrote:
It's more of a hunch than anything else at this point. Can you point to a counter-example?


A counterexample to what? For there to be a counterexample, there has to be a generalization of the form, All X is Y, or No X is Y. What is the generalization?
 
Deckard
 
Reply Mon 19 Apr, 2010 10:27 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;153949 wrote:
A counterexample to what? For there to be a counterexample, there has to be a generalization of the form, All X is Y, or No X is Y. What is the generalization?


All forms of idealism and all forms of materialism are offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Such schools of thought have no purpose wholly independent of their respective claims to be solutions to the mind/body problem.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 06:04 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;154300 wrote:
All forms of idealism and all forms of materialism are offered as solutions to the mind/body problem. Such schools of thought have no purpose wholly independent of their respective claims to be solutions to the mind/body problem.


Well that's certainly not true. People discuss idealism quite independently of mind/body. See, for example, David Stove's sustained attack on Idealism. He does not mention (as I recall) mind/body. Of course, it may have such implications, but, it is not Stove's goal to deal with it.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 20 Apr, 2010 08:38 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;154410 wrote:
Well that's certainly not true. People discuss idealism quite independently of mind/body. See, for example, David Stove's sustained attack on Idealism. He does not mention (as I recall) mind/body. Of course, it may have such implications, but, it is not Stove's goal to deal with it.


But he is attacking the ideas of people like Berkeley and Berkeley offered up his idealism as a solution to the mind/body problem.
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 04:33 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;153692 wrote:
It seems that no one would bother to propose materialism or idealism unless they were first confronted with the mind/body problem or some variation thereof.
It seems to me we are still dealing with flawed metaphysical assumptions or philosophical speculations from a few hundred years ago.

One is Cartesian dualism; that mind and body or the ideal and the material are separate substances and that some explanation for their interaction is needed. God was the explantion Descartes gave. Some form of neutral monism seems more appropriate in the modern age.

The second is the notion that "being" material existence is the primary reality as opposed to "becoming" change or process. It is better to think of reality in terms of events (all events have mental and material aspects) than to split the world into the ideal/material, mind/body.

Cartesian dualism and Newtonian mechanics still dominant worldviews in the 21st century even though modern science does not support the metaphysical conclusions commonly drawn from either.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 04:46 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;154705 wrote:
But he is attacking the ideas of people like Berkeley and Berkeley offered up his idealism as a solution to the mind/body problem.


I never knew that. Where did you find that out? I always thought that B. motive was to prove that God exists.

---------- Post added 04-21-2010 at 06:47 PM ----------

prothero;155005 wrote:
It seems to me we are still dealing with flawed metaphysical assumptions or philosophical speculations from a few hundred years ago.

One is Cartesian dualism; that mind and body or the ideal and the material are separate substances and that some explanation for their interaction is needed. God was the explantion Descartes gave. Some form of neutral monism seems more appropriate in the modern age.

The second is the notion that "being" material existence is the primary reality as opposed to "becoming" change or process. It is better to think of reality in terms of events (all events have mental and material aspects) than to split the world into the ideal/material, mind/body.

Cartesian dualism and Newtonian mechanics still dominant worldviews in the 21st century even though modern science does not support the metaphysical conclusions commonly drawn from either.


I don't think that science supports metaphysical conclusions.
 
prothero
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 05:03 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155009 wrote:
I don't think that science supports metaphysical conclusions.
.Not directly perhaps but the facts of science should be taken into account in making metaphysical assumptions or philosophical speculations.

For instance special creationism or young earth creationism would both seem to be assumptions or speculations that are in conflict with science and therefore unjustifed as any sort of rational speculation, metaphysical, philosophical or otherwise.

Laplace's demon type of hard determinism would seem less justified in the era of quantum physics than in the era of newtonian mechanics.

The pineal gland as the seat of soul seems to be unjustified in the era of modern biology whereas it might have been rational speculation for Descartes.

So although science does not directly deal with metaphysics. Metphysics which is ignorant of science probably can not justifiably be called rational speculation or philosophy.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 05:35 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155009 wrote:
I never knew that. Where did you find that out? I always thought that B. motive was to prove that God exists.

How do you know that?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 05:41 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;155024 wrote:
How do you know that?


He says so several times.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 06:38 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155025 wrote:
He says so several times.

Where? Is he responding to some argument against the existence of God?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 07:02 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;155039 wrote:
Where? Is he responding to some argument against the existence of God?


Sorry. Don't remember. But the point is that he holds that the belief in the existence of matter is what creates atheism, for if it was realized that there was only spirit, we would recognized that God exists, for only He could created our ideas. Spirit can cause only spirit. So, the belief in matter is the work of the Devil, for it separates Man from God. So, B. is not responding to any argument against God. He is arguing only that materialism is the enemy of God.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 07:08 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155047 wrote:
Sorry. Don't remember. But the point is that he holds that the belief in the existence of matter is what creates atheism, for if it was realized that there was only spirit, we would recognized that God exists, for only He could created our ideas. Spirit can cause only spirit. So, the belief in matter is the work of the Devil, for it separates Man from God. So, B. is not responding to any argument against God. He is arguing only that materialism is the enemy of God.


Spirit creates ideas as opposed to matter creating ideas...and the question of whether or not and how matter can generate ideas is essentially the mind-body problem.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 07:15 pm
@Deckard,
Deckard;155050 wrote:
Spirit creates ideas as opposed to matter creating ideas...and the question of whether or not and how matter can generate ideas is essentially the mind-body problem.


Berkeley thinks there is no matter, and he argues that it would be impossible for matter to create ideas. Only like can create like. But, that is not what we are discussing. B's motive is to destroy atheism, and to show that the world (namely ideas) could come only from Spirit. B. has no mind/body problem. For the body, for him is the Devil's illusion. Matter does not merely not exist. It is impossible for it to exist. And there is no good reason to believe in matter. The mind/body problem is the problem of how mind and body interact. There is no such problem for Berkeley.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Wed 21 Apr, 2010 08:18 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;155052 wrote:
Berkeley thinks there is no matter, and he argues that it would be impossible for matter to create ideas. Only like can create like. But, that is not what we are discussing. B's motive is to destroy atheism, and to show that the world (namely ideas) could come only from Spirit. B. has no mind/body problem. For the body, for him is the Devil's illusion. Matter does not merely not exist. It is impossible for it to exist. And there is no good reason to believe in matter. The mind/body problem is the problem of how mind and body interact. There is no such problem for Berkeley.


Well yes, but again there would be no reason to develop such an idealistic theory unless the mind-body problem was already on the table. It's a trivial point for me to keep on stating it. You think I'm making a bigger claim than I am.

Berkeley's Idealism is offered as a solution to the mind-body problem though the motive may have been to battle materialism for the sake of God.

Mind-body problem is the question
Berkeley's answer is idealism. His answer may have been motivated by his desire to preserve God against the Devil of materialism
But his answer was prompted by the mind-body question.
 
 

 
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