Is this any human as in pick a guy in the streets and ask him and he will believe it true given the evidence? Or is this any 'average' human? Or is this any human who has the educational background and experience to comprehend, Or is this all humans period?
Not "all humans" because the ceteris paribus clause rules them out; or it conditions us for which humans, under which circumstances, we wish to concern ourselves with. So it is not an "empirical" condition, where we might say something to the effect "6.7 billion people - X" where X is some arbitrary number. We force
X to be a variable
based on the "rational" and "ceteris paribus" clause and that nothing impedes our evidence to be submitted. Of course, there is some normative evaluation to be given to "rational."
"Average" might cut it, but I think "rational" is a bit more focused. If "a guy on the street" meets our criteria, then yes. The educational background and experience to comprehend would be ground for the judgment of evidence. These things would help the person determine the right judgment, not entail that some particular judgment be made.
"Every human being" is just too broad.
In what way is it stronger?
Is using a comparative, as a "proposition", can it be justified and using what criteria?
Per our definition, belief does not require or presuppose justification or truth. Knowledge is logically stronger. There are more requirements for knowledge. Presumably it takes less to count as believing something.
If I say, "I believe that you are stupid" you will likely take that as just my opinion (belief).
If I say, "I know that you are stupid" you will likely ask, "How do you know this?"
You could say "How do you believe this?"
So imagine what I might say. Does it look like "justification" or "truth"?
I'm not saying that beliefs are weaker and they knowledge is more likely to "move nations and peoples." That's a completely other topic. I'm not saying "religious belief" is weaker than "religious knowledge." That's far into some other social and political topic. Not my concern.
If you have the inclination, could you further explain this, not quite sure I'm getting the usage of presuppostion here. Right now I'm equating it with axiomatic which sense I'm pretty sure is not being used here.
To presuppose is to assume the truth of something, or the positive of it.
Every consequent of every true conditional statement ("If A then B") presupposes the truth of the antecedent. B presupposes (the truth of) A. The status of the consequent, given a value to the overall conditional, presupposes the status of the antecedent.
Presupposition is a "neutral logical relation." When we talk about knowledge, however, "presupposition" takes on a different mode of meaning. Since we're talking about the (positive) definition of knowledge, to count as knowledge or a confirmed knowing, the knower has passed the conditions of belief, justification, and truth. Thus, when I say "I know 2+2=4" it is presupposed that I believe it. Though, I do not presuppose it. The presupposition is implicit.
Presupposition can be implicit or explicit. In knowledge claims, the conditions are positively presupposed implicitly. Thus, it would be absurd to respond, "But do you believe 2+2=4?" If I do in fact know it, it is presupposed, in the positive sense, that I believe it. For how could I know it but not believe it?
Of course, we're concerned with a particular kind of knowledge, dealing with propositional variables.
Cases where one might say, "I know the communist party is wrong but I do not believe it" is a case where either "to know" or "to believe" is used in an idiomatic or colloquial or stylistic or emotive/expressive sense.