My position is that a proposition acquires meaning or substance if it is at least able to verified to begin with.

---------- Post added 02-26-2010 at 07:13 PM ----------



You're misunderstanding me. I'm saying that a sentence can only serve as a substantial (or meaningful) proposition if it is able to be verified. I'm not saying that it only becomes meaningful after it has been verified.

For example: If someone were to say that "there is a tenth planet", and yet they could not prove that such a statement were true, then their proposition serves no meaningful function as a proposition because it cannot be proven to be true. Of course such a statement would have to either be true or false in reality, but my argument is not metaphysical. My argument is epistemic and semantic.

My position is that a proposition acquires meaning or substance if it is at least able to verified to begin with.

---------- Post added 02-26-2010 at 07:13 PM ----------



You're misunderstanding me. I'm saying that a sentence can only serve as a substantial (or meaningful) proposition if it is able to be verified. I'm not saying that it only becomes meaningful after it has been verified.

For example: If someone were to say that "there is a tenth planet", and yet they could not prove that such a statement were true, then their proposition serves no meaningful function as a proposition because it cannot be proven to be true. Of course such a statement would have to either be true or false in reality, but my argument is not metaphysical. My argument is epistemic and semantic.

Sounds like the verification principle of logical positivism. A notion that excludes the most interesting philosophical questions from the realm of "meaningful statements". Really the most interesting questions are those which can be rationally speculated upon but not empirically verified (free will, god, determinism, panpsychism, mind, beauty, justice, truth).
Statements are true or false and meaningful even if not currently verifiable. Philosophy is precisely rational speculation about matters of ultimate concern which are not scientifically or empirically demonstrable.

Sounds like the verification principle of logical positivism. A notion that excludes the most interesting philosophical questions from the realm of "meaningful statements". Really the most interesting questions are those which can be rationally speculated upon but not empirically verified (free will, god, determinism, panpsychism, mind, beauty, justice, truth).
Statements are true or false and meaningful even if not currently verifiable. Philosophy is precisely rational speculation about matters of ultimate concern which are not scientifically or empirically demonstrable.

You are correct. I am positing the verification principle as a guideline for sentences that have truth value. When I say that the statement must be verifiable in order to be meaningful, I mean that the statement must be verifiable in order for it to have truth value.

Axiological sentences (justice, good, bad, beautiful, ugly, etc) are something entirely different in regards to meaning or value. Axiological sentences express subjective sentiments. They are meaningful in a sentimental sense but not as propositions.

Philosophy, in my view, is about the logical clarification of thoughts and concepts as well as the critical examination of human values.

I understand why you say that unprovable statements do not serve a meaningful function. But what I do not understand is what it means for a statement to serve (or not to serve) a meaningful function. Can you explain what that means?

OK. The way I see it, a statement can serve a meaningful function in two different ways. In regards to language there are two senses of meaning. One sense of meaning refers to truth value. In order for a statement to have truth value it must be verifiable. In the second sense a statement can also serve a meaningful function in an axiological sense, as a sentiment.



Here are some examples:

1. The earth revolves around the sun and the moon revolves around the earth.

2. The sunrise is beautiful.

Sentence number one has value as a proposition because it can be verified by empirical study. Sentence number two has value as a sentiment because it expresses a subjective point of view based on sensual pleasure.

So 2 has, or has not, a "meaningful function"? And, what about 3., There are ETs? Does that SMF? Or, the number of stars in the universe is an odd number. Does that SMF?

Sentence number 2 serves a meaningful function in a sentimental sense. There are ETs serves no meaningful function as a proposition if it has not been proven to be truebut it can be altered to present a meaningful question or strictly a belief. It should instead be altered to say "ETs may exist" or "I believe that ETs exist". "The number of stars in the universe is an odd number" serves no function as a proposition if it has not been verified or if there aren't any means by which to verify it at this time.

The way sentences are stated is very important here. Both of the sentences you gave are declarations. In other words, they are being stated as if they have already been verified and yet they have not.

I guess we have returned to the question, what does it mean not to serve a function as a proposition. What function does it not serve? It is either true or false that the number of stars in the universe is odd, isn't it? So, in the sense that it has a truth value, it does SF. What function doesn't it serve? (I did not, in any way, say that it is verified that that number or stars is odd. I said only that the statement has a truth value. Not one we know, of course, but that's different).

I would jump in and add that verification need only be possible in principle, not actually having been carried out.

well, of course.

When you say the number of Stars is X you must clarify to what time frame you refer...and from a relativistic point of view that would be hard to apply considering the entire Universe...

I'm sorry if I've said something painfully obvious but the discussion about counting stars seems to have missed that point. The fact that we currently don't know how many stars there are does not mean that, given enough time and energy, they couldn't be counted. In this case, the phrase "there are X number of stars" or "the number of stars is even" is verifiable in principle.

Not in relative terms...considering the distances and space/time deformations

Well, since your objection is specific to only this example we should probably move on to talking about grains of sand or something else so that we can side-step this irrelevant issue.

In physics, the Planck time, (tP), is the unit of time in the system of natural units known as Planck units. It is the time required for light to travel, in a vacuum, a distance of 1 Planck length.[1] The unit is named after Max Planck, who was the first to propose it.
The Planck time is defined as:
[2] where:
is the reduced Planck constant (sometimes h is used instead of in the definition[1])G = gravitational constantc = speed of light in a vacuums is the SI unit of time, the second. The two digits between parentheses denote the standard error of the estimated value.

I'm sorry if I've said something painfully obvious but the discussion about counting stars seems to have missed that point. The fact that we currently don't know how many stars there are does not mean that, given enough time and energy, they couldn't be counted. In this case, the phrase "there are X number of stars" or "the number of stars is even" is verifiable in principle.

I don't know whether or not it is verifiable in principle, since I am not clear about what that phrase means. But what I don't understand is how that makes a difference to whether the proposition that the number of stars is odd has a truth value. So it seems to me just irrelevant. There is a confusion between whether a sentence has a truth value, and whether its truth value can be known.

There is a confusion between whether a sentence has a truth value, and whether its truth value can be known.