I want to take a closer look at the truth condition of knowledge.

Let's suppose that I do know P. If that's the case, then based on that, then we know that I believe P. Also, we know that I have an adequate justification for the belief. Finally, since I know P, it's also true that what I believe is true. In short, if I know P, then P is true. To write it differently, if I know P, then P is actually true. Of course, I need not be explicit and say that P is actually true, for if P is true, then P is actually true, but I will make it explicit since I will be comparing "P is actually true" to "P is possibly true."

To put what's important in a nutshell, a necessary condition of knowledge is that P is actually true. This should not be confused with "P is possibly true." The relationship between the two is interesting. If P is actually true, then P is possibly true, but just because P is possibly true, that doesn't mean P is actually true. A confusion between the two could lead a person to misunderstand what it means to say we know something.

There's something else about the truth condition of knowledge that is troubling for some folks. Because there are three necessary conditions of knowledge, people intuitively think they need three different methodologies for determining whether they have been satisfied, but I think only two questions need to be answered; however, that is not to say all three conditions don't need to be met.

For example, we need to ask, "Do we believe P (?)," and we need a way to answer the question. Introspection is how that is done. We simply ask ourselves if we believe, and if we say yes, then we do-unless we're deceiving ourselves.

Next, we need to ask if there is adequate justification for our belief, and there needs to be a way to answer that. For example, lots of good evidence for our belief (and little to no evidence to the contrary) would serve as adequate justification

Finally, and this is the important part, once the two questions have been asked and answered; hence, once we know it's true that we have a justified belief, this is where people make the mistake of thinking they need to ask a third question. They don't need to ask whether or not P is true, but (and don't miss this) only if the condition is satisfied is it true that we have knowledge. Note, I am barring the Gettier complication.

Finally, and this is the important part, once the two questions have been asked and answered; hence, once we know it's true that we have a justified belief, this is where people make the mistake of thinking they need to ask a third question. They don't need to ask whether or not P is true, but (and don't miss this) only if the condition is satisfied is it true that we have knowledge. Note, I am barring the Gettier complication.

Why don't we need to ask whether the proposition is true?

Because we already know the answer.

Because we already know the answer.

No but seriously, if P is not true then we don't know the answer. Are you saying that truth is justified belief? You're going to have to respond with more than one sentence before I understand what you're trying to say.

What is the answer?

Well, suppose you did ask the third question after asking and answering the first two questions. How would you go about figuring out the answer to the third question, but more importantly, what would you do that you have not already done?

I want to take a closer look at the truth condition of knowledge.

Let's suppose that I do know P. If that's the case, then based on that, then we know that I believe P. Also, we know that I have an adequate justification for the belief. Finally, since I know P, it's also true that what I believe is true. In short, if I know P, then P is true. To write it differently, if I know P, then P is actually true. Of course, I need not be explicit and say that P is actually true, for if P is true, then P is actually true, but I will make it explicit since I will be comparing "P is actually true" to "P is possibly true."

To put what's important in a nutshell, a necessary condition of knowledge is that P is actually true. This should not be confused with "P is possibly true." The relationship between the two is interesting. If P is actually true, then P is possibly true, but just because P is possibly true, that doesn't mean P is actually true. A confusion between the two could lead a person to misunderstand what it means to say we know something.

There's something else about the truth condition of knowledge that is troubling for some folks. Because there are three necessary conditions of knowledge, people intuitively think they need three different methodologies for determining whether they have been satisfied, but I think only two questions need to be answered; however, that is not to say all three conditions don't need to be met.

For example, we need to ask, "Do we believe P (?)," and we need a way to answer the question. Introspection is how that is done. We simply ask ourselves if we believe, and if we say yes, then we do-unless we're deceiving ourselves.

Next, we need to ask if there is adequate justification for our belief, and there needs to be a way to answer that. For example, lots of good evidence for our belief (and little to no evidence to the contrary) would serve as adequate justification

Finally, and this is the important part, once the two questions have been asked and answered; hence, once we know it's true that we have a justified belief, this is where people make the mistake of thinking they need to ask a third question. They don't need to ask whether or not P is true, but (and don't miss this) only if the condition is satisfied is it true that we have knowledge. Note, I am barring the Gettier complication.

So you are equating justified belief with truth?

Truth is more than merely a justified belief. "P is actually true" is a necessary condition.

---------- Post added 02-15-2010 at 12:10 PM ----------

The answer is yes.

Truth is more than merely a justified belief. "P is actually true" is a necessary condition.

---------- Post added 02-15-2010 at 12:10 PM ----------

The answer is yes.

In other worlds, from a 1st person perspective T is equivalent with J. That's right and it confuses many people. Though I don't find your explanation above very good.

I made a thread about this very topic a year ago or so at FRDB and I think you participated in that thread. Unfortunately forum rules prevent me from linking to the thread and my webhost is down atm, so I cannot link you to my homepage either.

---------- Post added 02-15-2010 at 06:15 PM ----------



From a 1st person perspective, yes.

You'll have to explain how a 1st person perspective makes T equal to J, because I tend to think T disappears from a 1st person perspective...

*EDIT*
And thank you again for the logic book! I'm about a fifth of the way through and am having trouble putting it down.

In other worlds, from a 1st person perspective T is equivalent with J. That's right and it confuses many people. Though I don't find your explanation above very good.

I'm going back to your original question. I misread your question, and let me say that it's perfectly okay to ask if a proposition is true. I wasn't talking about the proposition. I was talking about the truth condition. I'll elaborate shortly.

I'm not rightly sure how the teacher is going to respond, but I have a funny feeling that he isn't going to do anything he hasn't already done. The teacher obviously believes the truth condition has been met, but how does the teacher know; more importantly (and I mean, much more importantly), what is the teacher going to do that he hasn't already?

I think all that fits under the justification heading. Given all the evidence, either my belief is adequately justified or it isn't. Consider the Quito example, and suppose that I believe P and that my belief is adequately justified. Obviously, I do not know P if P is false, but what else can we do to answer the question "is P true" beyond the satisfying of the justification condition?

That my belief is justified doesn't imply that my belief is true! Ya better believe it, but our intuitive inclination to answer the third question "Is P true" is for naught once we've tackled the justification condition.

Consider the following proposition: "The cat is on the table." If I have a justified belief that P is true, then I know that the cat is on the table if it's true, and I don't know that the cat is on the table if it's false.

Actually, I don't think that we agree. What's important is not that we know that the conditions have been satisfied. People make the mistake of thinking that there is no knowledge without knowledge that the conditions have been satisfied. What is important is that the conditions have been satisfied.

For example, if I have a justified belief that P is true, then I have knowledge that P is true if the justified belief is true. But, knowledge that the conditions have been met is not necessary. What's necessary is that they have been met.

Consider the following proposition: "The cat is on the table." If I have a justified belief that P is true, then I know that the cat is on the table if it's true, and I don't know that the cat is on the table if it's false.

So, all you're saying is that the person doesn't need to do, or can't do, anything more to satisfy the third condition. But we still need to ask if the third condition stands, as it is possible one could just have a justified belief.



Right. But it can still be worth it to ask sometimes. Alternatively, you could directly observe the cat on the mat.