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Didymos Thomas
 
Reply Mon 10 Mar, 2008 09:37 pm
@Quatl,
Quote:
Hold it right there! What do you mean "... no one knows", If no one knows it then how could it be justified that it is the truth, is it due to being subjective, passive, or receptive to believing that it is "true" yet no one knows it?? Or rather it could be a point that has not or cannot be justified in the scale of truth??


Either my dog is sitting next to me, or my dog is not sitting next to me. While I cannot establish either to be absolutely true, I can discuss what is more probably true.

Quote:
I cannot decide what is true, truth is objective, it can neither be changed by my preference, desire, or feelings.


Sure, what is absolutely true is absolutely true. We just do not have any means to know that something is absolutely true. If it's any consolation, I think we can get so close that debating some issues can become silly - love hurts. But to think we can absolutely know anything is a great leap to make.

Quote:
I said that it is not possible to know a false proposition. Naturally we can know that (it is true) that a particular proposition is false. But, that's different.

So, I cannot know that 1+1=3 is true, since it is false.
But, of course, I can know that 1+1 is 3 is false (and I do).


So, you cannot hold an untrue belief?

Then what is all the fuss about?

Quote:
Truth can be defined as the proof of facts, simply put.


In any practical sense, yes. But at the same time, whether we are right or wrong about something, I'm assuming, that some claim must be either true or false. As I do not understand how we can empirically establish, with absolute certainty, that something is true, we must admit that knowledge without doubt is not entirely possible.

However, I would argue that my dog is indeed sitting next to me (or was this morning).

Quote:
The only "pure truths" are those that are ultimately founded on decisions. Math includes many of these 1+1=2 because 2-1=1 because 1+1=2.

We have decided that 1 is one, and defined certain operations such that the whole arangement is hung on such decisions.


And from where do these wonderfully useful tools of reason come from if not our experience?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 Mar, 2008 06:49 am
@Didymos Thomas,
Didymos Thomas wrote:




Sure, what is absolutely true is absolutely true. We just do not have any means to know that something is absolutely true. If it's any consolation, I think we can get so close that debating some issues can become silly - love hurts. But to think we can absolutely know anything is a great leap to make.



So, you cannot hold an untrue belief?

Then what is all the fuss about?



In any practical sense, yes. But at the same time, whether we are right or wrong about something, I'm assuming, that some claim must be either true or false. As I do not understand how we can empirically establish, with absolute certainty, that something is true, we must admit that knowledge without doubt is not entirely possible.

However, I would argue that my dog is indeed sitting next to me (or was this morning).



And from where do these wonderfully useful tools of reason come from if not our experience?


Sure, what is absolutely true is absolutely true. We just do not have any means to know that something is absolutely true. If it's any consolation, I think we can get so close that debating some issues can become silly - love hurts. But to think we can absolutely know anything is a great leap to make.

I suppose you mean only that we cannot know for certain that a proposition is true. I have already agreed what certainty is probably unachievable. But that doesn't mean that we cannot have an adequately justified belief which is also true. In that case, we know.

So, you cannot hold an untrue belief?

Of course people believe propositions that are false. I have (alas!) done so many times in the past. But we were talking about knowing, not believing. No one can know a proposition that is false, for to know that p (where p is a proposition) is to know that p is true. (Of course, as I have already pointed out, we can know that a proposition is false, but that, of course is not the same as knowing a false proposition).
 
Quatl
 
Reply Tue 11 Mar, 2008 08:14 am
@kennethamy,
[B wrote:
Didymos Thomas][/B]And from where do these wonderfully useful tools of reason come from if not our experience?

They come from cyclical interaction between pragmatistic observation and rationalization. The structure of mathematics is largely justified via objects and principles of definitions.

kennethamy wrote:
Of course people believe propositions that are false. I have (alas!) done so many times in the past. But we were talking about knowing, not believing. No one can know a proposition that is false, for to know that p (where p is a proposition) is to know that p is true. (Of course, as I have already pointed out, we can know that a proposition is false, but that, of course is not the same as knowing a false proposition).


This illuminates a central issue in our terminology. There is a meaningful distinction between what we believe, and the reality. I usually think of the word Know as referencing the ideas in the mind rather than reality.

The semantics are very important in this area of discussion as the topic is all about meanings.

There is another aspect of truths that is important, that is very similar to the concept of a domain in mathematics. There are statements that are true only in reference to a limited set of things. Many "facts" are also really statistical averages of a kind. We generally however don't say things this way, we rather speak of "facts."

I did this earlier when I said that objects fall at 9.8m/s^2 on earth. This statement is a true fact, which just so happens to be false nearly everywhere on the earth! The real acceleration depends on where you are precisely, as the earth is not of homogeneous density. The actual measured values vary around the average figure.

So here is a "fact" which is not true in any particular place, to which we refer as being true everywhere in the domain. This is a truth that is "good enough" to do useful work.

This style of truthful statement is very common, so common that I'm very tempted to say that most truthful statements are of this sort. Part of what the mind does is try to generalize principles from examples. This is a very good strategy, and works well for a variety of our information needs.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 Mar, 2008 09:10 am
@Quatl,
Quatl wrote:
They come from cyclical interaction between pragmatistic observation and rationalization. The structure of mathematics is largely justified via objects and principles of definitions.



This illuminates a central issue in our terminology. There is a meaningful distinction between what we believe, and the reality. I usually think of the word Know as referencing the ideas in the mind rather than reality.

The semantics are very important in this area of discussion as the topic is all about meanings.

There is another aspect of truths that is important, that is very similar to the concept of a domain in mathematics. There are statements that are true only in reference to a limited set of things. Many "facts" are also really statistical averages of a kind. We generally however don't say things this way, we rather speak of "facts."

I did this earlier when I said that objects fall at 9.8m/s^2 on earth. This statement is a true fact, which just so happens to be false nearly everywhere on the earth! The real acceleration depends on where you are precisely, as the earth is not of homogeneous density. The actual measured values vary around the average figure.

So here is a "fact" which is not true in any particular place, to which we refer as being true everywhere in the domain. This is a truth that is "good enough" to do useful work.

This style of truthful statement is very common, so common that I'm very tempted to say that most truthful statements are of this sort. Part of what the mind does is try to generalize principles from examples. This is a very good strategy, and works well for a variety of our information needs.


You can believe what is true as well as believe what is false. But you can know only what is true. That is a major distinction between believing and knowing.

I don't see why you think that knowing is in the mind. I cannot determine whether I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by "referencing" only my mind. By doing that, I can determine only whether I believe that I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, not whether I know it. In order to determine whether I (actually) know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador I have to "reference" something like latest edition of The World Book of Facts, or Hammond's World Atlas. In other words, I have to look into the world (reality) and determine whether I am correct to believe that I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador.

Now, believing is something different. I can determine whether I believe that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by "referencing" my mind.

But not whether I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Whether I know that Quito is the capital of Ecuador depends on what is going on in Ecuador, not on what is going on in my mind.
 
ogden
 
Reply Tue 11 Mar, 2008 05:10 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
You can believe what is true as well as believe what is false. But you can know only what is true. That is a major distinction between believing and knowing.

I don't see why you think that knowing is in the mind.


Knowing is most certainly in the mind but the reality that we know is not in the mind. The fact that is reality is accessed through memory, when it does not reflect reality then it is false. Going into the world to verify or get information still creates knowing in the mind. The knoledge of my cat is not my cat.

Quote:
Now, believing is something different. I can determine whether I believe that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by "referencing" my mind.


Yes and it will remain a belief until it is validated with sound reason or with observation. That is the problem with unfalsifiable statments, they cannot be validated.

It is the responsibility of the person making the statent to defend it. Likewise, it is the responsibility of the believer to justify thier own beliefs to themselves. Beliefs and faith only need defended when you are trying to convey them to someone else. Passing and accepting beliefs as fact or truth is obscurant to truth and risking dillusion but this is unavoidable. the vast amount of information can not be verified by every person so you decide what to believe and what you think is true. I mean we get knowledge by grasping at what we think is true and sometmes it is and sometimes not. Humans are so prolific in usefull concepts, information, and ideas that it is inevitable that some are false. So we must constanly revise our perception of truth and reality for the best, most usefull, most logical understanding. It is a process.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 Mar, 2008 06:16 pm
@ogden,
ogden wrote:
Knowing is most certainly in the mind but the reality that we know is not in the mind. The fact that is reality is accessed through memory, when it does not reflect reality then it is false. Going into the world to verify or get information still creates knowing in the mind. The knoledge of my cat is not my cat.



Yes and it will remain a belief until it is validated with sound reason or with observation. That is the problem with unfalsifiable statments, they cannot be validated.

It is the responsibility of the person making the statent to defend it. Likewise, it is the responsibility of the believer to justify thier own beliefs to themselves. Beliefs and faith only need defended when you are trying to convey them to someone else. Passing and accepting beliefs as fact or truth is obscurant to truth and risking dillusion but this is unavoidable. the vast amount of information can not be verified by every person so you decide what to believe and what you think is true. I mean we get knowledge by grasping at what we think is true and sometmes it is and sometimes not. Humans are so prolific in usefull concepts, information, and ideas that it is inevitable that some are false. So we must constanly revise our perception of truth and reality for the best, most usefull, most logical understanding. It is a process.


As I pointed out, if knowing were "in the mind", then we could know we know just by looking into our own minds, and detecting some mental state which we could then identify as the state of knowing. But, in fact, we cannot know that we know by looking into our own minds. Therefore, knowing is not in the mind. QED. If you have any objection to this argument, could you state it? Just repeating that knowing is in the mind is not an argument for the conclusion that knowing is in the mind. I don't know what you mean by the "knowledge of my cat", but if you mean that I know that something is my cat, I agree that the cat is not in my mind. But what has that to do with whether knowing is in the mind. The cat is not in my mind, and neither is knowing. You may be confusion whether knowing is in my mind with whether believing I know is in my mind. Believing I know is in my mind (like all other beliefs) but knowing is not in my mind. You may also be confusing believing with knowing. Believing is in the mind. Knowing is not.
 
Quatl
 
Reply Tue 11 Mar, 2008 07:36 pm
@kennethamy,
Kennethamy, I'm sorry but your definition of the word "know" is not compliant with English usage, not even common philosophical.

Here are a few definitions, from Dictionary.com, with my emphasis added:

1. to perceive or understand as fact or truth; to apprehend clearly and with certainty: I know the situation fully.

2. to have established or fixed in the mind or memory: to know a poem by heart; Do you know the way to the park from here?

3. to be cognizant or aware of: I know it.

The concept you're describing has no word that I am aware of in English but could perhaps be defined as: "Possessing thought which corresponds completely to reality" or "Absolute True Knowledge" or something similar.

I do not believe than I possess any of this myself, nor do I believe you have any, nor anyone on this forum for that mater.

However you clearly believe that such exists, so please proceed.

Just don't get upset when folks misunderstand you when you adopt a word for a new or unusual purpose. Language is convention, without convention there is no chance of communication.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 07:50 am
@Quatl,
Quatl wrote:
Kennethamy, I'm sorry but your definition of the word "know" is not compliant with English usage, not even common philosophical.


The concept you're describing has no word that I am aware of in English but could perhaps be defined as: "Possessing thought which corresponds completely to reality" or "Absolute True Knowledge" or something similar.

I do not believe than I possess any of this myself, nor do I believe you have any, nor anyone on this forum for that mater.

However you clearly believe that such exists, so please proceed.

Just don't get upset when folks misunderstand you when you adopt a word for a new or unusual purpose. Language is convention, without convention there is no chance of communication.


I mean the word "know" as it is used in the sentence, "X knows that the capital of Ecuador is Quito". That means that it is true of X that he meets the following conditions: 1. X believes that the capital of Ecuador is Quito; 2. X's belief is adequately justified; 3. The capital of Ecuador is Quito. Those are the truth-conditions for the statement that X knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador.

X cannot determine that those truth-condition obtain only by introspection. Thus, X cannot determine that he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by introspection.

I think that is just how the word "know" is used in the expression, Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Why do you think it is not?
 
Quatl
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 08:38 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I mean the word "know" as it is used in the sentence, "X knows that the capital of Ecuador is Quito". That means that it is true of X that he meets the following conditions: 1. X believes that the capital of Ecuador is Quito; 2. X's belief is adequately justified; 3. The capital of Ecuador is Quito. Those are the truth-conditions for the statement that X knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador.

X cannot determine that those truth-condition obtain only by introspection. Thus, X cannot determine that he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by introspection.

I think that is just how the word "know" is used in the expression, Quito is the capital of Ecuador. Why do you think it is not?


The statement does not contain the justification, the person who states such, holds a belief that the statement is true presumably. "X knows the capital of Ecuador is Alberta" could very well be a true statement. "X" in this case would be mistaken, but "X" would experience the same state regardless of the truth of the proposition. The work know implies a subjective viewpoint and this subjective aspect is of great importance because we must distinguish between what someone knows and what reality is.



I do not actually know if the statement is true, but I know that you assert it's truth. Thus this statement is a proposition about reality. What I am saying is that it is important to separate these aspects.

We have "a proposition as to a reality"
We have an assertion by a person that they believe the proposition.
The person, we presume, has an experience of belief in the proposition.

It is as you say, the truth of the proposition is not "contained" in the proposition, but rather is found in the relationship between the statement and reality.

Since I am in no position to confirm the existence of Ecuador, nor it's capital, in a very strict sense it would be irrational for me to believe that it exists. As a practical mater we must utilize vicarious information, and so I would assume that there is a place called Ecuador on that basis. As I don't know the capital's name myself, I might defer to one or more folks who have experienced Ecuador's capitol as sources of information regarding it.

This isn't just argumentative skepticism for it's own sake. There are often ideas we have about reality that we experience as well justified that later revelation shows to be false. Keeping in mind how tentative a particle of knowledge may be can help prevent fixation of untrue ideas.

Truth and knowledge are not identical.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 10:42 am
@Quatl,
Quatl wrote:
The statement does not contain the justification, the person who states such, holds a belief that the statement is true presumably. "X knows the capital of Ecuador is Alberta" could very well be a true statement. "X" in this case would be mistaken, but "X" would experience the same state regardless of the truth of the proposition. The work know implies a subjective viewpoint and this subjective aspect is of great importance because we must distinguish between what someone knows and what reality is.



I do not actually know if the statement is true, but I know that you assert it's truth. Thus this statement is a proposition about reality. What I am saying is that it is important to separate these aspects.

We have "a proposition as to a reality"
We have an assertion by a person that they believe the proposition.
The person, we presume, has an experience of belief in the proposition.

It is as you say, the truth of the proposition is not "contained" in the proposition, but rather is found in the relationship between the statement and reality.

Since I am in no position to confirm the existence of Ecuador, nor it's capital, in a very strict sense it would be irrational for me to believe that it exists. As a practical mater we must utilize vicarious information, and so I would assume that there is a place called Ecuador on that basis. As I don't know the capital's name myself, I might defer to one or more folks who have experienced Ecuador's capitol as sources of information regarding it.

This isn't just argumentative skepticism for it's own sake. There are often ideas we have about reality that we experience as well justified that later revelation shows to be false. Keeping in mind how tentative a particle of knowledge may be can help prevent fixation of untrue ideas.

Truth and knowledge are not identical.


I don't know what you mean when you say "the statement does not contain justification". What I said is that is is a condition of the truth of the statement that X knows that p (where p is a proposition like Quito is the capital of Ecuador) that X's belief that p be adequately justified. If X claimed to know that Alberta was the capital of Ecuador, then X would be mistaken, since Alberta is not the capital of Ecuador, so X could not know that Alberta was the capital of Ecuador. But of course, X could claim to know that. It is, after all, not up to X whether he knows that p. It depends on, among other things, whether p is true. If p is not true, then X does not know that p, whether of not X claims to know that p, or whether or not X believes that he knows that p.

Of course, truth and knowledge are not identical. Their relationship is as follows: knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. In other words, if p is known, then p is true, but if p is true, p need not be known.

I don't think I ever said that the truth of the proposition is not "contained" in the proposition, since I have no idea what it would mean for the truth of a proposition to be contained in the proposition. Clearly, any proposition may be either true or false.
 
Quatl
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 11:21 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Of course, truth and knowledge are not identical. Their relationship is as follows: knowledge implies truth, but truth does not imply knowledge. In other words, if p is known, then p is true, but if p is true, p need not be known.

And this is the point of disagreement, because you wish to add an implication to the word "knowledge" which is not usually part of that term. The implication is that truth is implied by knowing. This is a silly argument (i don't mean you, i mean arguing about what know means is unproductive.)

Your argument it tautological, unless I misunderstand you, you are saying : "It is logically impossible to be both correct about P and wrong about P at the same time." I agree with this statement.

However this does not help us in any way to determine is a particular proposition P is in correspondence to reality. That is your statement is not relevant to the topic of determining what propositions are true or false. Which is the topic of this thread.

kennethamy wrote:
I don't think I ever said that the truth of the proposition is not "contained" in the proposition, since I have no idea what it would mean for the truth of a proposition to be contained in the proposition. Clearly, any proposition may be either true or false.


P is any proposition.

Group 1
Bob believes P.
Bob disbelieves P.

Group 2
P is true.
P is false.

Pick one from group 1 and one from group 2. Any of these is a valid compound, proposition.
Bob believes P. P is true.
Bob believes P. P is false.
Bob disbelieves P. P is true.
Bob disbelieves P. P is false.

Bob's belief in the proposition does not tell us if the proposition is true. The contents of group 1 does not relate to the contents of group 2.

In order to validate P we must consult reality. In order to validate G1a or G1b we must take Bob's word for it (perhaps if we knew enough about the brain we could dissect Bob, and get a more reliable answer, but that would be very rude.)

The reason I keep arguing about your use of the word know is that I sense a teleological component to your words if I define know the way it is normally used.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 11:54 am
@Quatl,
Quatl wrote:
And this is the point of disagreement, because you wish to add an implication to the word "knowledge" which is not usually part of that term. The implication is that truth is implied by knowing. This is a silly argument (i don't mean you, i mean arguing about what know means is unproductive.)

Your argument it tautological, unless I misunderstand you, you are saying : "It is logically impossible to be both correct about P and wrong about P at the same time." I agree with this statement.

However this does not help us in any way to determine is a particular proposition P is in correspondence to reality. That is your statement is not relevant to the topic of determining what propositions are true or false. Which is the topic of this thread.



P is any proposition.

Group 1
Bob believes P.
Bob disbelieves P.

Group 2
P is true.
P is false.

Pick one from group 1 and one from group 2. Any of these is a valid compound, proposition.
Bob believes P. P is true.
Bob believes P. P is false.
Bob disbelieves P. P is true.
Bob disbelieves P. P is false.

Bob's belief in the proposition does not tell us if the proposition is true. The contents of group 1 does not relate to the contents of group 2.

In order to validate P we must consult reality. In order to validate G1a or G1b we must take Bob's word for it (perhaps if we knew enough about the brain we could dissect Bob, and get a more reliable answer, but that would be very rude.)

The reason I keep arguing about your use of the word know is that I sense a teleological component to your words if I define know the way it is normally used.


I don't understand a lot of what you say. But if someone were to tell me that although he knows that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, he does not believe that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, I would think he had contradicted himself. Wouldn't you.

Suppose A claims to know that p, and you show that p is not true. What would you say if A replied, "I agree that p is not true, but that doesn't mean that I do not know that p"? Would you think that A was using the term "know" it its ordinary sense? Mark Twain (I think) once said that it isn't what people don't know that gets them into trouble; it is what people "know" that ain't so that gets them into trouble. What do you think that Twain meant by that? And why do you think he put the second occurrence of know into scare-quotes (meaning that he was using the term in an unusual sense)?

What I think that what Twain meant was that what got people into trouble was that they (strongly) believe they know what is not true, and he placed know into scare-quotes because in its usual sense, the term implies truth, so that you cannot know when what you claim (or believe) you know is not true.

What do you think?
 
ogden
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 07:00 pm
@kennethamy,
Kenethamy, see if I'm getting any closer to understanding.

Knowledge is reality and reality is not in the mind so then all we have in the mind is belief that has come from reality. Anything in the mind can only be a representation of reality.Surprised
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 12 Mar, 2008 07:03 pm
@ogden,
ogden wrote:
Kenethamy, see if I'm getting any closer to understanding.

Knowledge is reality and reality is not in the mind so then all we have in the mind is belief that has come from reality. Anything in the mind can only be a representation of reality.Surprised


I would prefer to say it just as I did. Knowledge implies truth, and to determine whether the proposition I claim to know is, in fact, true, I cannot determine that by looking inside of my head. Therefore, knowledge cannot be a mental state. Thus, to give an example (and, as Kant wrote, examples are the go-cart of the intellect) if I claim to know that George W. Bush is president of the United States, then to determine whether I do know that, I have to consult some source like a newspaper, or like a book of facts. I cannot determine whether my claim is true just by consulting my mind. For all I can determine by consulting my mind is whether I believe that George W. Bush is president, not whether he is president.

The idea that we can determine whether a proposition is true only by consulting whether we believe it is true is what leads people into thinking that knowledge is subjective. But that is clearly false.
 
trulyhis
 
Reply Thu 13 Mar, 2008 04:29 am
@kennethamy,
I agree with you!!Very Happy
 
Quatl
 
Reply Thu 13 Mar, 2008 01:31 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Thus, to give an example (and, as Kant wrote, examples are the go-cart of the intellect) if I claim to know that George W. Bush is president of the United States, then to determine whether I do know that, I have to consult some source like a newspaper, or like a book of facts. I cannot determine whether my claim is true just by consulting my mind.

Why is the author of a book or newspaper column any more trustworthy that anyone else? What is one to do if everyone else is confused, or wrong too?

What about topics like history, where most of the evidence are stories?

kennethamy wrote:
For all I can determine by consulting my mind is whether I believe that George W. Bush is president, not whether he is president.
True, glad to hear you say that, this whole time your words indicated almost the opposite, I'm glad to have misinterpreted your meaning.

A separate question for you, what word would you like to use for the mental perception of any claim, regardless of it's truth? (Since you want "knowledge" reserved for true perceptions only.)
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 13 Mar, 2008 02:00 pm
@Quatl,
Quatl wrote:


True, glad to hear you say that, this whole time your words indicated almost the opposite, I'm glad to have misinterpreted your meaning.



I do not know what you think I am arguing, but just to make it clear: I am arguing that since to determine whether we know what we believe we know, we have to determine whether what we believe we know is true, we have to consult sources external to our minds, like Encyclopedias, or Atlases, or use our own eyes, and not our own minds. Thus, whether or not we know is an objective, and not a subjective issue as whether we believe we know would be. Now, I was under the impression that you held that knowledge did not have to be true. But I must be wrong about that.

I am sorry, but I do not know what you mean by, "the mental perception of any claim". How could I perceive a claim?
 
Quatl
 
Reply Thu 13 Mar, 2008 02:20 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I do not know what you think I am arguing, but just to make it clear: I am arguing that since to determine whether we know what we believe we know, we have to determine whether what we believe we know is true, we have to consult sources external to our minds, like Encyclopedias, or Atlases, or use our own eyes, and not our own minds. Thus, whether or not we know is an objective, and not a subjective issue as whether we believe we know would be. Now, I was under the impression that you held that knowledge did not have to be true. But I must be wrong about that.

Our central disagreement was semantic and as I said earlier silly.

I don't believe that I have any knowledge under your definition as I now understand it. I do have some strong beliefs that I believe are well supported by evidence, and thus likely have useful correspondence with reality.

I have issues with many forms of evidence in cases more complex that who the president is or what country has which capitol. There are inherent difficulties with the mechanisms of human thought, but I'm not sure this is the place to discuss that.

I don't trust others more than I trust myself, that is not to say that others can't teach me new things, or shed light on my own incorrect belief by any means. I tend to be very critical of several forms of argument and types of evidence things that I observe many others accept readily.

Mechanically speaking I do disagree with you on one of your propositions, which we have argued about before. That argument may be semantic as well. The statement is "or use our own eyes, and not our own minds." My problem with this statement is that when we use our own eyes we are using our minds.

A very large part of our sensory function is re-constructive, and assumptive in nature, and is not factual in the way we'd like to think it is even when it gives us the right answer. I don't want to fill this thread up with an argument about this point however.

Just to be clear I do not believe that reality is subjective.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Thu 13 Mar, 2008 05:37 pm
@Quatl,
Quatl wrote:
Our central disagreement was semantic and as I said earlier silly.

I don't believe that I have any knowledge under your definition as I now understand it. I do have some strong beliefs that I believe are well supported by evidence, and thus likely have useful correspondence with reality.

I have issues with many forms of evidence in cases more complex that who the president is or what country has which capitol. There are inherent difficulties with the mechanisms of human thought, but I'm not sure this is the place to discuss that.

I don't trust others more than I trust myself, that is not to say that others can't teach me new things, or shed light on my own incorrect belief by any means. I tend to be very critical of several forms of argument and types of evidence things that I observe many others accept readily.

Mechanically speaking I do disagree with you on one of your propositions, which we have argued about before. That argument may be semantic as well. The statement is "or use our own eyes, and not our own minds." My problem with this statement is that when we use our own eyes we are using our minds.

A very large part of our sensory function is re-constructive, and assumptive in nature, and is not factual in the way we'd like to think it is even when it gives us the right answer. I don't want to fill this thread up with an argument about this point however.

Just to be clear I do not believe that reality is subjective.


How does "a likely correspondence with reality" differ from "likely to be
true"?

Is it really possible that you think that George W. Bush is not the present president of the United States, or that the capital of Ecuador is not Quito. Why?

I did not say that I thought thought you believed that reality is subjective. I have no idea what that would mean, I said that there are some who think that knowledge is subjective, And that is clearly false.
 
Quatl
 
Reply Thu 13 Mar, 2008 11:59 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
How does "a likely correspondence with reality" differ from "likely to be
true"?
The difference is only one of degree.

An idea may have "very high correspondence with reality" without being completely true. For example: "Objects on earth fall at 9.8m/s^2" this figure is not exact, and the exact value you would measure varies from place to place. This example is fairly trivial, but another example could be newton's laws in regard to gravitation, which work very well for variety of problems, but not for all problems (Mercury's orbit for example, for which Newton does not give the correct orbit.)

kennethamy wrote:
Is it really possible that you think that George W. Bush is not the present president of the United States, or that the capital of Ecuador is not Quito. Why?
I do not doubt "in fact" that GW is president at this time, In principle there is a possibility that he is not (If I am schizophrenic for example, which I could be without being aware of it.)

As for the capitol of Ecuador, I've never before bothered to think about it at all, so far as I recall. I'm prepared to take your word for it tentatively, but I have no knowledge about it at this time beyond your word.

If tomorrow I met an Ecuadorian, and they said to me "The capitol of Ecuador is X, not Quito!" I'd be very inclined to take his or her word for it over yours. The person could be playing a joke on me, or the person could be mistaken. I'm still left with only a foundation for tentative acceptance of one or the other either way. These would both be "appeals to authority" and thus "weak" evidence.

kennethamy wrote:
I did not say that I thought thought you believed that reality is subjective. I have no idea what that would mean, I said that there are some who think that knowledge is subjective, And that is clearly false.
What I believe is that most of the ideas that people refer to as "knowledge", are what you might refer to as beliefs or claims. I also believe that firm belief is often interpreted to come to further conclusions, and that this process is prone to error. Even if our facts are right, we can still be wring in our conclusions.

I think we usually operate on imperfect ideas and that in many cases that is enough to function adequately (imperfect idea = not entirely true.) In other words I think we each carry around a lot of false ideas which we feel strongly are true. For many ideas we may not be able to discern by simple forms of looking (such as going to Ecuador, or reading a book.)
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Your definition of knowledge makes me not want to use the term at all in reference to human beings to tell you the truth. It's usage now must be restricted to the rarest of ideas, or the statements that use it lose their utility. I'm having difficulty phrasing my thoughts here using your narrowed meaning for the word, but I'm trying Smile

I have a question for you. What would it mean if I were to say "I know Biology" or "I know Physics."

Obviously no one knows everything about everything that falls under those categories (your definition of know.) Also under this definition even a physicist who did hold all the ideas in this category can't be said to know Physics.

All scientific Knowledge(colloquial sense) is tentative to some degree. So what are we to do with such non-trivial truth seeking?
 
 

 
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