Perception and the Physical World

Get Email Updates Email this Topic Print this Page

Fido
 
Reply Mon 12 Nov, 2007 05:57 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean wrote:
Fido, kennethamy,

An essential property of the physical world would be a necessary proposition. Those who believe in the reality of essential properties are implicitly asking us to believe in 'universals'. Those who refuse to believe in universals are pragmatists (or positivists, or language and logical analysts) who however, must accept the incompleteness theory of logic and mathematics. And more importantly the incompleteness of the physical sciences. Pragmatism implicitly priviledges the perceiver without due grounds of justification upon a non-theoretical, anti-intellectual frame-work.

A non-pragmatist who accepts the inherent incompletness of the physical sciences while maintaining that necessary propositions (or essential properties) about the world are not a priori 'universals' are called naive realists with good reason.

Philosophically speaking, there can be no essential property that is also a material property unless you have a proof of the Theory Of Everything.

--

I generally consider myself to be pragmatic, very moralistic, but generally in the sense of problem solving, pragmatic person. Now I accept universals, but not in the sense of Plato perhaps. I will say in talking of something we perceive, but also a thing having a common conception like 'leaf', that the leaf will have something, its essence, universally in common with all other things classified as leaves. It is by way of universals that we know, and recognize common reality.

When we see a phenomenon that we see only once, or once seeing cannot recognize; it is because we have no conception of what it is. Even when we do not have a name or a conception of a formal nature for a phenomenon, when it reoccurs, we instantly can form a conception of it as being what we saw before. Some things are unitary. There is nothing like our individual life. There is no universal life. Even while we sense there is a concept of life, and a universal called life we cannot really begin to describe it with a defintion, or a form, or idea, or draw from it an ideal life, because our life is phenomenal, unique, and always new to us. Life is like time or God in being an infinite. So, I don't see the contradiction between being pragmatic and relying upon universals. The limits are the same.

Here again, if I am reading Hildegger right on Kant is the point of transendental imagination. Once we have a concept in mind, which I would agree is a universal, then we can recognize things without having all of their parts together. A leaf, whithered and brown can still be recognized as a leaf even if far out of place. A drawing of a leaf can still be recognized as a leaf without color, context, or even accuracy. It is through senses that we perceive, and concepts that we know; but through transendental imagination that we recognize what we see when what we see is not complete, or is other wise different from what we expect. If universals are a sum of all the shared qualities of a thing, it does not mean we have to see each quality to know what. Imagination can supply any number of missing qualities, so we don't actually have to see the thing itself to know. If we see green we think leaf even if green is not an essential property of a leaf. We know green as a common property of a leaf, so common in fact, that the leaf can be out of sight, and is still brought to mind by the color.
 
Fido
 
Reply Mon 12 Nov, 2007 05:59 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I did not claim that there are essential properties. However, it seems to me that an essential property of gold, for instance, is an atomic number of 79, and an essential property of water is H20. Nothing could be water which was not, H20.

But all this is irrelevant to whether objects like leaves are green. I suppose you agree, then, that leaves are green?


H3O is water. Leaves are commonly green and not essentially green.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 12 Nov, 2007 06:34 pm
@Fido,
Fido wrote:
H3O is water. Leaves are commonly green and not essentially green.


I did not say that being green is an essential property of a leaf. Even if H30 were water, it would not follow that only H30 was water. Gold must have the atomic number, 79, and mammals must be warmblooded. That is why whales are mammals, and not fish.
 
Fido
 
Reply Mon 12 Nov, 2007 08:38 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I did not say that being green is an essential property of a leaf. Even if H30 were water, it would not follow that only H30 was water. Gold must have the atomic number, 79, and mammals must be warmblooded. That is why whales are mammals, and not fish.


Am I wrong to believe we are making progress?
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Tue 13 Nov, 2007 12:50 pm
@Fido,
Fido, Kenneth, etc.:

As long as the scales upon which we rest our determinations remain human scales, then that which presses its claim to be the ultimate interpretation of things will remain open to question. Empiricists can still claim that a priori notions put forward by theologians or other philosophical rationalists are wrong and incorrect. Empiricists can argue that God does not exist, for example, because no theologian can or has proven objectively the existence of God. It seems to be an imperative of philosophy, which seeks to know the true nature of things, to recognize the seemingly impossible task of proving the existence of universals. Especially since whoever wishes to maintain the existence of universals must remain so consistent as to produce at least a worthy argument to that effect. Just as theological orientations must depend upon regular and timely prayer and rituals, so too must a philosophical argument rely upon a consistent and relevant standard of application.

My argument is that in order to make a claim of knowledge regarding a material object it is necessary to refer to yet another object as a relation, so that we can never say what a given object is in itself apart from our perception. Objects in themselves, like the colour 'green,' are appearances by which we appeal to construct yet more and other appearances in a living, subjective chain which posesses no independent point of identity. We can not prove that any particular coordinates in space and time posess independent existence. We may construct a church, however, in space and time and call it a sanctuary of true being, or we may create theoretical, geometrical 'universals' etc. Only if we can 'prove' absolutely or rather 'deify' for example, a 'circle' as being a 'universal' object, then we could apply its form to the form of a penny and only then would there exist a justification that the penny objectively posesses an indepdendent shape.

The green colour of a leaf is a subjective quality which could be represented more pointedly within a mathematical notation of a specific wavelength of light. The colour we call 'green' could be 'read' by a scientific instrument whose output would be a mathematical expression. But only if we deify or privelidge a certain point within the chain of recognition of the colour of a certain leaf would we be able to posess certain knowledge of it. Whose position is correct for example, a scientist who is on the moon who is reading the mathematical output or the painter in his garden who is making a different representation, or the spy who is currently photographing it? Even if they all get together and make a composite their composite must exist at a point within a chain of reasoning. Objects remain identified as an organization of subjective or living human standards. The standards are attributes of nature in time and space which have been given subjective values or names by living finite humans in order to provide 'goods' (such as orientation) within a human environment.

Reality appears as a 'medium' in which knowledge of particular states of being can only be 'verified' relatively, by yet other states of being. The finest measurements of states of being that science 'posesses' reveal that reality is discreet and discontinuous: that our points of measurement are but summations, or probabilities. The longer the durations in time and space in which we remain un-aware of certain states of being, the greater will be the probability that upon our next measurements the state of being will posess a variance. The scientific quanization of matter and light reveals that it is indeterminate.

--Pyth
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 13 Nov, 2007 07:46 pm
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean wrote:
Fido, Kenneth, etc.:



The green colour of a leaf is a subjective quality

--Pyth


What sort of quality is a subjective quality?
 
Pythagorean
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 09:17 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
What sort of quality is a subjective quality?


Any quality that can not be absolutely grounded or proven would seem to me to be a subjective quality. If you can't provide truly independent grounds for the existence of some knowledge then it's truth remains relative only to the methods and aims of the subjective perceiver(s).


Only knowledge which is assigned a universal validity or postulated as 'innate' in the mind can be said to posess an independent validity.

Rationalists believe that there is such a thing as a universal reference point by which we come to truly know things in nature. Theologians, of course, believe in universals too, but they base their beliefs upon religious foundations.

The key question seem to be, if we do know things then how do we come to know things as they are in themselves? Empiricists, such as David Hume and Bishop Berkeley, believe that knowledge arises from sense experience alone, while rationalists, such as Plato and Leibnitz, believe that knowledge arises from 'innate' ideas which correspond to an external state of affairs.
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 09:41 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
What sort of quality is a subjective quality?



I would not say color is subjective because as far as most colors there is general agreement and it is measurable. Now, the measure of color involves reliance upon some thing external to perception and to the people perceiving. But knowledge is something apart from verification. Our knowledge is our reach which will always exceed our grasp of what we can prove. What we prove after all is what we know, or think we know. Even while we do this as a negative, by trying to disprove what we think we know the actual result is the same: certainty.
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 09:54 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean wrote:
Any quality that can not be absolutely grounded or proven would seem to me to be a subjective quality. If you can't provide truly independent grounds for the existence of some knowledge then it's truth remains relative only to the methods and aims of the subjective perceiver(s).


Only knowledge which is assigned a universal validity or postulated as 'innate' in the mind can be said to posess an independent validity.

Rationalists believe that there is such a thing as a universal reference point by which we come to truly know things in nature. Theologians, of course, believe in universals too, but they base their beliefs upon religious foundations.

The key question seem to be, if we do know things then how do we come to know things as they are in themselves? Empiricists, such as David Hume and Bishop Berkeley, believe that knowledge arises from sense experience alone, while rationalists, such as Plato and Leibnitz, believe that knowledge arises from 'innate' ideas which correspond to an external state of affairs.


We do not know things as absolutes, or with any absolute certainty. Senses give us an impression of things, and investigation helps to reveal their underlying structure or reality, and we build up concepts out of sense and data that are never in any senses complete, but have instead, greater or lesser levels of certainty (truth) -as an emotional sense attached to them. The thing is, that the world works for us whether we can explain it fully or not, and very often our presumptions and measurments prove accurate as much as they can be proved. The ultimate test of knowledge is not in veracity, but in utility.
 
boagie
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 10:13 am
@Fido,
Hi Everybody

Smile Is not apparent reality relational reality, the object is relative to the subject in that, the subjects perception of object is how the said object effects the subjects biology. So apparent reality is biologically based, biologically determined, biological precieved as certain effects upon the subjects biology, apparent reality is a biological readout. The object is information of which a individual organism as subject knows only part of the totality of the language.

"The ultimate test of knowledge is not in veracity, but in utility."

It is a coevolution of subject and object, relative always relative to ones biology.
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 10:35 am
@boagie,
boagie wrote:
Hi Everybody

Smile Is not apparent, reality relational reality, the object is relative to the subject in that, the subjects perception of object is how the said object effects the subjects biology. So apparent reality is biologically based, biologically determined, biological precieved as certain effects upon the subjects biology, apparent reality is a biological readout. The object is information of which a individual organism as subject, knows only part of the totality of the language.

"The ultimate test of knowledge is not in veracity, but in utility."

It is a coevolution of subject and object, relative always relative to ones biology.


Are you not confusing meaning with being? Meaning is what value we give to reality in relation to our own lives, and it will always seem subjective to others, and objective to ourselves.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 11:53 am
@Pythagorean,
Pythagorean wrote:
Any quality that can not be absolutely grounded or proven would seem to me to be a subjective quality. If you can't provide truly independent grounds for the existence of some knowledge then it's truth remains relative only to the methods and aims of the subjective perceiver(s).


Only knowledge which is assigned a universal validity or postulated as 'innate' in the mind can be said to posess an independent validity.

Rationalists believe that there is such a thing as a universal reference point by which we come to truly know things in nature. Theologians, of course, believe in universals too, but they base their beliefs upon religious foundations.

The key question seem to be, if we do know things then how do we come to know things as they are in themselves? Empiricists, such as David Hume and Bishop Berkeley, believe that knowledge arises from sense experience alone, while rationalists, such as Plato and Leibnitz, believe that knowledge arises from 'innate' ideas which correspond to an external state of affairs.


It would be nice to have an instance or two of a subjective quality so that we have a fixed target to discuss. As Kant wrote, "examples are the go-cart of the intellect".
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 12:02 pm
@Fido,
Fido wrote:
I would not say color is subjective because as far as most colors there is general agreement and it is measurable. Now, the measure of color involves reliance upon some thing external to perception and to the people perceiving. But knowledge is something apart from verification. Our knowledge is our reach which will always exceed our grasp of what we can prove. What we prove after all is what we know, or think we know. Even while we do this as a negative, by trying to disprove what we think we know the actual result is the same: certainty.


Well, some people (on this board, I think) have said that "colors are in the head" and that objects "really" have no color. So that is why a suggested a color as an instance of a subjective quality. But if you would not say that color is a subjective quality, then why not give me an example or two of an subjective quality. It would make matters much simpler if we knew the kind of thing we were talking about. Philosophy is abstract enough. Most of the time when we philosophize we are far above the Earth (as Aristophanes pointed out in his spoof on Plato in, The Clouds) Sometimes even in the stratosphere. A few examples help to tie us to Earth. As Wittgenstein once put it, "Back to the rough ground!" So, if color is not a subjective quality, what is?
 
boagie
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 12:54 pm
@Fido,
Fido wrote:
Are you not confusing meaning with being? Meaning is what value we give to reality in relation to our own lives, and it will always seem subjective to others, and objective to ourselves.



Hi Fido,Smile

All organisms have a standing relation to the physical world. Meaning is simply a biologically based evaluation of the relation between subject and object. The perception of something involves something as object, its qualities are biologically determined by the sense apparatus of the subject. When something is said to be hot, it is hot only in relation to a biological state, biological body . If something is said to be true or false, it is not true or false in and of itself, it is true or false of the relation/relationship to a senseing, knowing body/subject. Meaning is an evaluation of the relationship of subject and object. I am unsure that I have answered your concerns about meaning and being. Perhaps it is enough to say, subject and object in fact are not separate entities, they are one. Our senses are not only enabling but limiting as well. We are only capable of deriveing meaning from the objective world though our senses [limiting as that is] and what is true or false, is true or falsehood of a particular relation/relationship, not of the object itself.
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 03:46 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
It would be nice to have an instance or two of a subjective quality so that we have a fixed target to discuss. As Kant wrote, "examples are the go-cart of the intellect".


Kant had a go-cart? What did it go on?
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 04:02 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
Well, some people (on this board, I think) have said that "colors are in the head" and that objects "really" have no color. So that is why a suggested a color as an instance of a subjective quality. But if you would not say that color is a subjective quality, then why not give me an example or two of an subjective quality. It would make matters much simpler if we knew the kind of thing we were talking about. Philosophy is abstract enough. Most of the time when we philosophize we are far above the Earth (as Aristophanes pointed out in his spoof on Plato in, The Clouds) Sometimes even in the stratosphere. A few examples help to tie us to Earth. As Wittgenstein once put it, "Back to the rough ground!" So, if color is not a subjective quality, what is?


First; knowledge of colors is in the head. Monkeys may see the same qualities we do without the name, or the knowledge, to speak of it after seeing it. Knowledge is not just cause and effect. Sure, what colors an object absorbs and refects has something of cause and effect to it; but knowledge that is, on the one hand, passive recognition -on the other hand allows active intervention by letting us cause effects, which we can begin to do when we talk as though outside of our reality . The same is true of imagination in that it allows us passively to recognize what we know without seeing all of the object, but actively to reconstruct, and so re-create our reality out of sight of the object. I think if we are to suggest a truely subjective quality it is one that arises from imagination. An example of this is any thing we conceptualize without an object. Infinities large and small, existence, and God are examples. We cannot demonstrate these things as things. We have no certainty that if you say the words, even an approximation of the same meaning of the word comes to mind as when I say them. God is subjective, and only people give God reality.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 04:14 pm
@Fido,
Fido wrote:
First; knowledge of colors is in the head. Monkeys may see the same qualities we do without the name, or the knowledge, to speak of it after seeing it. Knowledge is not just cause and effect. Sure, what colors an object absorbs and refects has something of cause and effect to it; but knowledge that is, on the one hand, passive recognition -on the other hand allows active intervention by letting us cause effects, which we can begin to do when we talk as though outside of our reality . The same is true of imagination in that it allows us passively to recognize what we know without seeing all of the object, but actively to reconstruct, and so re-create our reality out of sight of the object. I think if we are to suggest a truely subjective quality it is one that arises from imagination. An example of this is any thing we conceptualize without an object. Infinities large and small, existence, and God are examples. We cannot demonstrate these things as things. We have no certainty that if you say the words, even an approximation of the same meaning of the word comes to mind as when I say them. God is subjective, and only people give God reality.


I wrote that some say that colors are in the head, not that knowledge of colors is in the head. But, what is "knowledge of colors"? What does that mean? Are we talking about whether we know that the ball is red. That was my example. (And, by the way, you still have not given me an example of a subjective quality. Have you forgotten about that?)

I am not sure what you mean when you tell me that knowledge is in the head. Belief, I suppose is "in the head" in the sense that I can tell whether I believe some proposition is true by introspection. But why is knowledge in the head. I cannot tell whether I know by introspection. I can tell whether I believe I know, for instance, that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by introspection. But I cannot tell whether I know that Quito is the capital by introspection. To tell whether I know whether Quito is the capital, I will have to look it up in some authoritative source like the World Book of Facts. That is why belief is a subjective state, but knowledge is not a subjective state.
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 04:22 pm
@boagie,
boagie wrote:
Hi Fido,Smile

All organisms have a standing relation to the physical world. Meaning is simply a biologically based evaluation of the relation between subject and object. The perception of something involves something as object, its qualities are biologically determined by the sense apparatus of the subject. When somethings is said to be hot, it is hot only in relation to a biological state, biological body . If something is said to be true or false, it is not true or false in and of itself, it is true or false of the relation/relationship to a senseing, knowing body/subject. Meaning is an evaluation of the relationship of subject and object. I am unsure that I have answered your concerns about meaning and being. Perhaps it is enough to say, subject and object in fact are not separate entities, they are one. Our senses are not only enabling but limiting as well. We are only capable of deriveing meaning from the objective world though our senses [limiting as that is] and what is true or false, is true or falsehood of a particular relation/relationship, not of the object itself.


Hibackatcha.

I think I get what you are saying about the corespondence between senses as determined, and reality as perceived. I am not saying subject and object are necessarily different, but in our case, we have a consciousness, and today presume that what we sense has none. This was not always the case. Animists or naturalists believed nature and animals had spirits. Why? It is only because to presume otherwise was no gain. Now we think we see the deer and the deer sees us. Primitives once talked about deer and presumened upon their own abilities and observations that deer talked about them. Deer are intelligent enough, and extra sensitive to their environment. But they have evolved to their environment as have we. I do not expect that they have other senses than we because if there were something beyond sensation that were substancial it would often kill people and deer for seemingly no cause. If there is something beyond our senses it is not particularly dangerous; but that does not mean it is not fatal. Perhaps our senses are lagging behind our ability to creatively destroy ourselves. Perhaps we need to evolve geiger counters and chemical detectors.
I hope this tangent does not take you too far from your point.

Look, even though we can only be informed through our senses does not mean what we know is false. Sure, senses are limited, but for that we can compensate. Sense is the beginning of science, and science builds ever more sensitive devices that are no more than better eyes, ears, touch, taste, smell, etc. Philosophy has come to deal with realities that cannot be sensed, and are thought of as subjective even while they have objective effects arrising from them.
 
Fido
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 05:00 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy wrote:
I wrote that some say that colors are in the head, not that knowledge of colors is in the head. But, what is "knowledge of colors"? What does that mean? Are we talking about whether we know that the ball is red. That was my example. (And, by the way, you still have not given me an example of a subjective quality. Have you forgotten about that?)

I am not sure what you mean when you tell me that knowledge is in the head. Belief, I suppose is "in the head" in the sense that I can tell whether I believe some proposition is true by introspection. But why is knowledge in the head. I cannot tell whether I know by introspection. I can tell whether I believe I know, for instance, that Quito is the capital of Ecuador by introspection. But I cannot tell whether I know that Quito is the capital by introspection. To tell whether I know whether Quito is the capital, I will have to look it up in some authoritative source like the World Book of Facts. That is why belief is a subjective state, but knowledge is not a subjective state.

Oh, please quito ready.


Here are some subjective qualities, and not a complete list: Infinites, existence, God, justice, social and political equality, freedom, loudness, intelligence, and ambivalence. If a thing is an object, even like the moon in the sky it is an object of sense. Sense tells us that it is, and knowledge tells us what it is, and its relationship to our own life gives it its meaning.

What do you consider the difference is between belief and knowledge. I trust it is certainty and veracity. But knowledge is never complete, and belief seeks completeness without knowledge. Still one can know a thing short of being able to prove a thing. Before it was possible for a monkey to know a lion as an objective reality, to give any precision to its beliefs regarding those jaws of death, or to be able to describe it in detail, or talk about it; it still knew what a lion was. Knowledge is judgement and we can often judge a thing without consciously or critically doing so. If you know a leaf is green no amount of consequential knowledge to the opposite will sway you. So what if colors are green? We look at vegetation and see green. The conclusion can then be made that all that is green is vegetation, and since that means life to us we like it.
 
boagie
 
Reply Wed 14 Nov, 2007 08:55 pm
@Fido,
Fido wrote:
Hibackatcha.

I think I get what you are saying about the corespondence between senses as determined, and reality as perceived. I am not saying subject and object are necessarily different, but in our case, we have a consciousness, and today presume that what we sense has none. This was not always the case. Animists or naturalists believed nature and animals had spirits. Why? It is only because to presume otherwise was no gain. Now we think we see the deer and the deer sees us. Primitives once talked about deer and presumened upon their own abilities and observations that deer talked about them. Deer are intelligent enough, and extra sensitive to their environment. But they have evolved to their environment as have we. I do not expect that they have other senses than we because if there were something beyond sensation that were substancial it would often kill people and deer for seemingly no cause. If there is something beyond our senses it is not particularly dangerous; but that does not mean it is not fatal. Perhaps our senses are lagging behind our ability to creatively destroy ourselves. Perhaps we need to evolve geiger counters and chemical detectors.
I hope this tangent does not take you too far from your point.

Look, even though we can only be informed through our senses does not mean what we know is false. Sure, senses are limited, but for that we can compensate. Sense is the beginning of science, and science builds ever more sensitive devices that are no more than better eyes, ears, touch, taste, smell, etc. Philosophy has come to deal with realities that cannot be sensed, and are thought of as subjective even while they have objective effects arrising from them.



Fido,Smile

I find nothing to disagree with in the above---excellent! I do think in my previous post though it is important to acknowledge that, apparent reality is a conditioned reality, first limited by the senses then conditioned by the faculties of the understanding. It is also important to remember that truth or falsehood is NOT really about said object, but is always a statement about the relation of said object to its subject.
 
 

 
Copyright © 2024 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.06 seconds on 12/22/2024 at 09:59:54