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Have you read any Heidegger? I already said that for me, truth is justified belief. So you can have your Quito. I never brought up the city names and the basketballs. I was aiming my guns at more speculative questions to begin with. Such as the foundation of truth.
And no of course I don't think I can prove my argument, unless prove just means persuade. If you think I'm making unpractical statements, you're attacking a scarecrow. I have no intention of denying practical truth, animal faith, the everyday sense of objective reality.
I'm questioning the theoretical as opposed to the practical validity of the correspondence theory of truth, which is built on a questionable axiom. If truth corresponds to reality, how do we know reality? Facts are sentences, not realities.
Now you have a justified belief that Brasilera is the capital of Brazil.
Ok, it would be better to say prove conclusions, but you obviously knew what I meant.
I think facts are sentences. Or at least sentence phrases. Perhaps you can present an exception? And truth is a property of sentences. (though that's not the only description I could offer of "truth," as you well know.)
The question of practicality is exactly what makes us prefer the correspondence theory of truth. If we did not have a body and an environment that made demands on us, we wouldn't concern ourselves with adjusting our opinions to reality.
I know Heidegger's style is atrocious. I sure as hell wouldn't back him 100%, but he has his virtues.
fact 1. Knowledge or information based on real occurrences:
Unless there is man, there is no knowledge or information. Ergo no facts.
The practical issue is a strange dodge from my perspective. I'm starting to sound like the realist here.
According to the dictionary, facts are knowledge or information. Facts imply consciousness. Of course you are welcome to your idiosyncratic definitions. But I also thought of you as a fan of the dictionary. No offense intended.
Did the moon exist before us? Sure, according to our presently existing mental-models, if we exclude the element of consciousness.
Facts are what we know, not the knowledge of them. Does the dictionary actually say that facts imply consciousness? And, isn't it a fact that the Moon existed before human beings? According to the best of our knowledge (or to use your phrase, "according to our mental models"). And whether we include or exclude "the element of consciousness".
Finally, a good dictionary can be very helpful. And it is an excellent start to thinking about the meaning of a term. But philosophers do more than the dictionary does. They analyze the meaning of the term. The dictionary is a good beginning, but not necessarily a good ending. It does not tell me that knowledge is true justified belief, for instance. I don't expect it to do my philosophical work for me. Sentences, to repeat, express facts, but are not the facts they express. So, to say that the fact that the Moon exists is identical with the sentence, "The Moon exists" seems to me patently false. As false as that, the word, "cat" is, itself, a cat.
I agree that philosophers should analyze the meanings of terms. When the dictionary defined facts as knowledge or information, I thought it was safe to suggest that knowledge and information cannot exist in the absence of consciousness.
In non-philosophical discussions, it may indeed be awkward and redundant to treat facts as sentences, but this is a philosophical point and it's of the essence. I'm accusing you of neglecting the subjective element. Whereas perhaps you would accuse me of over-emphasizing it.
I would say in the practical sense that yes it's a fact "that the moon existed before man." But in a theoretical sense it's no so easy. For facts are the correspondence of knowledge with reality (so says the dictionary) and what correspondence can there be without knowledge, which seems impossible in the absence of consciousness?
No man has ever experienced anything w/o consciousness. This is a belief I describe as justified.
For one thing, what you call the "idealist fallacy" is just something dreamed up by someone. The playbook of fallacies has no authority for me. You may find it persuasive. I find it quaint.
1. "Fallacy" is just one of those concepts that philosophers invent. Then some of them use it like a magical incantation, making a fetish of the word.
2. I already explained to you that for me the word "exist" implies consciousness. As no human being has experienced anything but consciousness.
3. We both agree that the scientific mental-model of the past suggest that the moon was here before us.
4. I emphasize that this mental model is man's creation, and exists by means of his consciousness. And only exists after man.
5. You have failed to provide a single example of existence devoid of consciousness. I assume you admit this is impossible.
6. No one discovers that an argument is fallacious. They describe an argument as fallacious.
7. Whether a conclusion follows a premise is determined by individual human beings. It isn't like math. If it were as simple as math, you and I would not be arguing all these points. You find some conclusions persuasive that I do not. You describe some beliefs as justified that I do not.
Normal view versus twisted view (!) except that he thinks the theoretical sense is the correct view (or philosophical capital 'T' Truth) and the practical sense is our misguided common sense view (or layman lowercase 't' truth).
So, I suspect that he does NOT think that trees were really in fact around before the first humans appeared on the planet (hence, they did not exist) since it's not True in the theoretical sense (since consciousness is purportedly a requirement for Truth), yet he acknowledges our misguided common sense practical view that it's true (lowercase 't') that trees were in fact around before the first humans appeared on the planet.
Awe, but how can it be true that there were no trees before the first humans since trees that produce oxygen is a requirement for human life? Well, it can't, but (how can it be true?) is different than (how can it be True?) such that what is true isn't dependent on consciousness whereas what is True is (purportedly).
The question then is why does he even hold the conjured up view that there is a theoretical sense of Truth that is different than plain ole truth? He is quite obviously in the grip of a theory that can and does lead to his (not necessarily holding but) expression of some quite bizarre views, and I suspect it's going to be a long time coming before we find the key to unlocking and unraveling the mystery that grips him so.
But, if I had to guess, the problem lies in not having a good grasp on just how words ought to be used. If that's cleared up, I suspect that you'll find that in the end our views are not all that dissimilar.
<insert Wittgenstein quote of your choice here>