As I see it, a statement is contingent if it is actually true but could have been false (i.e. it is logically possible for it to have been false). Thus "the capital of France is Paris" is true, but could have been false; the capital could have been (say) Lyon. That is to say, there is one (actual) world in which the capital is Paris, and simultaneously another (possible) world in which it is not. Hence "the capital of France is Paris" is contingently true. Note that this has nothing to do with error.

Now, "water is H2O" and "the atomic number of gold is 79" could logically be false in the actual world (if the physicists are wrong). But that is not the point. The point is: could they be true in the actual world while at the same time being false in a possible world? That, I think, is the test for contingency.

The question to ask is not "Could it logically be false that water is H2O", but "If it is true that water is H2O, could it logically have been false?" And that remains an open question.

Kennethamy - I wrote the above before I saw your post #59.

Yes. I agree. Here, I am nearly betwixt-and-between. But my inclination is to say they are contingent truths.

As I see it, a statement is contingent if it is actually true but could have been false (i.e. it is logically possible for it to have been false).

Thus "the capital of France is Paris" is true, but could have been false; the capital could have been (say) Lyon. That is to say, there is one (actual) world in which the capital is Paris, and simultaneously another (possible) world in which it is not. Hence "the capital of France is Paris" is contingently true. Note that this has nothing to do with error.

Now, "water is H2O" and "the atomic number of gold is 79" could logically be false in the actual world (if the physicists are wrong).

But that is not the point. The point is: could they be true in the actual world while at the same time being false[/i] in a possible world? That, I think, is the test for contingency.

The question to ask is not "Could it logically be false that water is H2O", but "If it is true that water is H2O, could it logically have been false?" And that remains an open question.

It has nothing to do with error, but still, I'm not sure why you introduce "logically possible" here.

For instance, "Water is H2O" is true, but it's not clear that it's not logically possible for it to have been false. It's not clear that it entails a contradiction to disagree with Putnam and Kripke and say that "water is H2O" is a contingent true (it may be an error, but is it a contradiction?).

Right, so here you're not using the definition in terms of logical possibility; rather, what you seem to be saying is that a necessary true statement is one that is true at every possible world (including the actual world), whereas a contingently true statement is one that is true at the actual world, but there is a possible world at which it's false.


The question is, then: what's a possible world?

I think the "logically" is unnecessary. They could be false in the actual world if physicists are wrong (but they're not). It may also be logically possible that it's true at the actual world but not at some other world.

It's not clear at all that it's contradictory to disagree with Putnam, Kripke, etc., and claim that "water is H2O" is contingent. And if it's not contradictory (even if it's false) to claim that "Water is H2O" is contingently true, then it's logically possible for "Water is H2O" to be true at the actual world, but not at some other world.

If that "could" is a "is it logically possible?" then maybe it could. But I think you're actually very close to what Putnam, Kripke and others say (even though I think your introduction of "logically possible", etc., is complicating matters).

If it's "some scenario that could have happened", then we'd have to discuss what that "could have happened" means.

You have slightly misunderstood the concept of (logical) contingency. For any P, that P is contingent does not logically imply that P is true. There is a concept that has this implication though, it is the concept of contingently true. It seems to be this concept you are speaking about, not that of contingency.

This point was also made in Swartz and Bradley (1979). I don't have a page reference since I don't have the work in my possession right now. I think I will order it at my library again just to be able to give better references. The work cited above employs PWS. In PWS contingent may be defined like this:[INDENT]Logical contingent. For any P, P is logically contingent iff (there exists a possible world where P is the case and there exists a possible world where P is not the case).

[/INDENT]And contingently true like this:[INDENT]Logical contingently true. For any P, P is logically contingently true iff (P is the case and there exists a possible world where P is not the case).[/INDENT]

---------- Post added 01-29-2010 at 09:40 PM ----------



I agree with this, but I haven't read Kripke etc.

How could it be that a statement is contingent only if it is true? What mode would its negation be, then?

You have slightly misunderstood the concept of (logical) contingency. For any P, that P is contingent does not logically imply that P is true.

Yes, I did know that. When I said in my post #60 "a statement is contingent if...", I did not mean "only if". I was talking about a contingently true statement. Sorry for misleading you.

Otherwise, I stand by what I said in that post.

Non-contingent and false I suppose, that is, necessarily false.

Why necessarily false? So denying a contingent statement changes the modality of the statement? Hmmm. Magic.

Don't ask me. Besides it was not what he meant. See his post above.

I don't know the post you are referring to. But there are false contingent statements, are there not?

#66. Pretty much his only post just above.

Sure.

How about, if it is false, but could have been true? But why isn't the "could" in "could have been true" a categorical true, and not an hypothetical "could"? No "ifs". The statement that there is a fly in the room could have been false, if it is true, and could have been true, if it is false. And nothing else need be true or false.

As I see it, a statement is contingent if it is actually true but could have been false

How about, if it is false, but could have been true? But why isn't the "could" in "could have been true" a categorical true, and not an hypothetical "could"? No "ifs". The statement that there is a fly in the room could have been false, if it is true, and could have been true, if it is false. And nothing else need be true or false.

A statement (or proposition) is contingent if it is true but could have been false (e.g. "the capital of France is Paris"), or if it is false but could have been true (e.g. "the capital of France is Lyon").

If you refer back to my post #60, you will see that I was responding to earlier posts about such statements as "Water is H2O" or "The atomic number of gold is 79". My point was that the fact that "The capital of France is Paris" is contingent does not prove that "Water is H2O" is contingent. Angra Mainyu was arguing that "Water is H2O" is contingent because it is logically possible that physicists have erred and that it is actually false. But this is not analogous to saying that "The capital of France is Paris" could have been false. Thus the contingency of the "Paris" statement does not prove that the "water" statement is contingent.

Angra Mainyu's argument amounted to saying that any statement that may be wrong is contingent. But that confuses logical with epistemic possibility. Do you agree?

◊P⇒

Good. We are agreed on that. Also, with regard to the point I was making:

1a. That it is epistemically possible that not-P does not logically imply that P is contingent.

Right?

Because contingency/necessity is usually defined in logical possibility. Disregard any metaphysical contingency/necessity whatever that means if anything.

This is confused. To say that it is logically possible that it is true in a possible world is just to say that ◊◊TP.

I think it is your confusion of PWS with TS that complicates matters. Keep to one of them and there will be less confusion.

The latter claim is false. There is not only one possible world where it is true that "Water is H2O". There are infinitely many and only one of them is the actual world.

Angra Mainyu was arguing that "Water is H2O" is contingent because it is logically possible that physicists have erred and that it is actually false.

A statement (or proposition) is contingent if it is true but could have been false (e.g. "the capital of France is Paris"), or if it is false but could have been true (e.g. "the capital of France is Lyon").

If you refer back to my post #60, you will see that I was responding to earlier posts about such statements as "Water is H2O" or "The atomic number of gold is 79". My point was that the fact that "The capital of France is Paris" is contingent does not prove that "Water is H2O" is contingent. Angra Mainyu was arguing that "Water is H2O" is contingent because it is logically possible that physicists have erred and that it is actually false. But this is not analogous to saying that "The capital of France is Paris" could have been false. Thus the contingency of the "Paris" statement does not prove that the "water" statement is contingent.

Angra Mainyu's argument amounted to saying that any statement that may be wrong is contingent. But that confuses logical with epistemic possibility. Do you agree?