Absolute certainty

@Anthrobus,

Anthrobus wrote:

Unicorns do not exist, but can't we refer to unicorns?...UNICORNS exist in our imagination: they therefore have an imaginary existence. There is such a thing as the appearance without the substance...a mirror image for instance...or the phantasmagoria...

I don't think that unicorns exist in our imagination. Maybe imaginary unicorns do, but imaginary unicorns are no more unicorns than a painting of a unicorn is a unicorn. Unicorn do not exist in paintings either, although there are paintings of unicorns.
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@Stormalv,

Semantics. Space is nothingness until something fills it. Non-existence is potentiality...I'm afraid you do not know what you're talking about...you think that space is nothing until something fills it...you think that until it is filled it has unfulfilled potential...but that which fills it grants it its unfulfilled potential, and therefore that which fills it has already been actualised...therein you contradict yourself...the non-existence of which you speak has no potentiality except for that which has already been actualised...therein you contradict yourself again...you would empty space yet would not claim to empty an empty...and therein contradict yourself again...and indeed make yourself look foolish..

@Stormalv,

I don't think that unicorns exist in our imagination. Maybe imaginary unicorns do, but imaginary unicorns are no more unicorns than a painting of a unicorn is a unicorn. Unicorn do not exist in paintings either, although there are paintings of unicorns...I can think of Pigs with horns, and dogs with horns, and hedgehogs with horns, and I can think of the same with balloons a coming out their ****, but I know they don't exist, except in my imagination...

@Anthrobus,

Why are unicorns not called unihorns?
Was it simply a typo someone made sometime ago that was passed on like so much of the uncertain or untrue history that is passed on to us today?
And what is the absolute certainty or truth of history anyway, has it been written or spoken correctly, can it be?
Who or what do you believe?

=
MJA

@Anthrobus,

Anthrobus wrote:

I don't think that unicorns exist in our imagination. Maybe imaginary unicorns do, but imaginary unicorns are no more unicorns than a painting of a unicorn is a unicorn. Unicorn do not exist in paintings either, although there are paintings of unicorns...I can think of Pigs with horns, and dogs with horns, and hedgehogs with horns, and I can think of the same with balloons a coming out their ****, but I know they don't exist, except in my imagination...

But in that case, they don't exist at all. If unicorns existed they would be animals prancing around. Tell me this: suppose someone did find a unicorn or two prancing around. Would you still be willing to say that unicorns exist in your imagination? If not, then why do you do so now?
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@kennethamy,

Unicorns are what we conceive of them to be. They are limited to our conception of them. They are the totality of all which is named unicorn and all which we perceive to be sufficiently within the confines of what a unicorn is defined to be. As the definition is relative, it is also adaptive. It is relative to say that something is a unicorn. It is also adaptive. Were I to see a creature which fit the visual conception that I have named unicorn, then I would be implicitly be expanding my definition of unicorn by claiming that such a beast is indeed a unicorn. My visual conception might match up with it, but what if it were to roar instead of whinny? Then should it still be a unicorn? But what if another creature satisfied the same parameters of visual similarity but it neighs instead of roaring? Is it anymore a unicorn? Only if my initial definition took into account those parameters. If they did not then either a new parameter must be added a posteriori or we must define the unicorn to be a set of possible creatures. Therein is the essence of definition.

That the beast has the quality of being 'extant outside of my mind' is another parameter added in calling the beast a unicorn, a parameter which negates a former parameter 'imaginary', hence the subtlety of the adaptive aspect of definition is easy to miss when it is there. The question then comes into play; what of what once was my perception of a unicorn? How does this interact with my shifting definition?

@Stormalv,

That the beast has the quality of being 'extant outside of my mind' is another parameter added in calling the beast a unicorn, a parameter which negates a former parameter 'imaginary', hence the subtlety of the adaptive aspect of definition is easy to miss when it is there...reconsider: is this true, and does the rest therefore follow?..

@Anthrobus,

Anthrobus wrote:

That the beast has the quality of being 'extant outside of my mind' is another parameter added in calling the beast a unicorn, a parameter which negates a former parameter 'imaginary', hence the subtlety of the adaptive aspect of definition is easy to miss when it is there...reconsider: is this true, and does the rest therefore follow?..

It is a name reassignment that occurs rather than a shift in definition, thus the name unicorn is reassigned to a new set of parameters which retains the common aspects of the two parameter sets choosing between the two parameters which are in conflict. 'imaginary' and 'extant outside of my mind' are not p and -p explicitly, there is some synthetic a priori interchange here. I think that this interchange though, is analogous to a bachelor being an unmarried man being the negation of a married man. One is true synthetic apriori;a bachelor is not a married man, and the other is analytic a priori. This can be tested though.

What do we mean when we say that something is not imaginary? In order that we consider this, we must consider the definition of imaginary which is intended here. We might say that what is meant is that the sense of the unicorn is manifest not directly from external stimuli, but an amalgamate of memory of separate sense experiences. This condition is clearly necessary, but is it sufficient? It is clear that something which satisfies that condition is necessarily extant 'within one's mind' taking the state of being within the mind to be what is commonly conceived(a poor definition, I know, but I hope that it suffices). It is also clear that if the sense of the unicorn has not come from any single external stimuli that we could say that the amalgamate conception is not necessarily extant 'outside of one's mind' though the possibility that it could be is not denied by the definition. This is necessary for the definition not to restrict beyond its scope.

I would say that the condition is sufficient, perhaps you disagree and have a better condition, but I will say that henceforth that; in order that a unicorn be imaginary it is sufficient and necessary that the sense of the unicorn is manifest not directly from external stimuli, but an amalgamate of memory of separate sense experiences. Thus the negation should be that the unicorn be manifest from some singular experience of an external stimuli, ie, your conception of a unicorn must be derived from; seeing, smelling, touching, hearing,tasting, a single being that fits the parameters of the definition of a unicorn. I would say that this negation fits the parameter of 'extant outside of my mind', thus I would conclude that the statement is indeed true. An object cannot both have the property of being extant outside of the mind and imaginary. The imaginary object still exists, but it is a seperate entity.

This is flawed though. The unicorn 'becomes' extant outside of my mind and if my conception was totally in line with what I experienced of the unicorn, so the imaginary unicorn is necessarily replaced by the one which is not imaginary. What do you think AnthroBus?

@Zetetic11235,

Absolute certainty is as truth is, it just is.

=
MJA

@Stormalv,

What do you think Anthrobus?...a good reply I think, but more problems are raised here. The IMAGINARY can be considered to be the 'APPEARANCE' of the UNICORN, while the 'extant outside of my mind', can be considered to be the 'SUBSTANCE' of the UNICORN, and in the sense that the UNICORN exists, and but is remembered as an 'APPEARANCE', and in the mind of the subject. The question is just how the UNICORN is remembered as an 'APPEARANCE' in the mind of the subject, and when it has never existed in the first place. The solution perhaps would be to state that the UNICORN 'extant outside of my mind', is an imaginary creature, one never expects to sense it, one just imagines its existance as substance: the appearance of the UNICORN is the 'extant inside my mind', while the appearance of the appearance of the UNICORN is the 'extant outside my mind'. This solution preserves the imaginary existance of the UNICORN, and requires no negations, or reassignments, or shifts, or re-imaginations...and no a priori analytics or synthetics or somesuch...I should think...but I'm just speculating on your behalf: what do you think ZETETIC?

@Anthrobus,

Anthrobus wrote:

What do you think Anthrobus?...a good reply I think, but more problems are raised here. The IMAGINARY can be considered to be the 'APPEARANCE' of the UNICORN, while the 'extant outside of my mind', can be considered to be the 'SUBSTANCE' of the UNICORN, and in the sense that the UNICORN exists, and but is remembered as an 'APPEARANCE', and in the mind of the subject. The question is just how the UNICORN is remembered as an 'APPEARANCE' in the mind of the subject, and when it has never existed in the first place. The solution perhaps would be to state that the UNICORN 'extant outside of my mind', is an imaginary creature, one never expects to sense it, one just imagines its existance as substance: the appearance of the UNICORN is the 'extant inside my mind', while the appearance of the appearance of the UNICORN is the 'extant outside my mind'. This solution preserves the imaginary existance of the UNICORN, and requires no negations, or reassignments, or shifts, or re-imaginations...and no a priori analytics or synthetics or somesuch...I should think...but I'm just speculating on your behalf: what do you think ZETETIC?

When we speak of the appearance of the appearance, lets shorten it up and call it the meta-appearance of the unicorn. The problem I see in your solution is that it seems that you are using appearance to denote two distinct states. The appearance of which you speak is not clearly defined, and as such I can't really scrutinize the difference in usage accurately.

I think that there is sloppy reasoning present here. You suggest the question: How might the unicorn be remembered as an appearance when it has never existed in the first place? Your answer to this seems vague. I think this is a result of the vagueness of the question.

The concept of the unicorn does indeed exist. One can assign sense values to the concept such as smell and sound and taste as they are not already general parameters of the unicorn. One could even 'experience' this conception in, say, a hallucination. Then one would have a 'memory' of the unicorn from which to draw, though they have never encountered an external 'substance'. The existence of the unicorn is not necessarily dependent upon external stimuli as such. Should a mass hallucination occur, how might one distinguish between what was 'imagined' in the hallucination, and what has 'substance'?

If one's conception of the unicorn having never been exposed to the substance of the unicorn is precisely the same as their memory of the substance after having been exposed to it, we have two distinct conceptions. That which was the original having the property of not having a verified 'substance', and the new conception which includes the property of 'substance'. The old conception remains and so does the new one. The old conception is still based in imagination and the new based in experience of substance. Further, the memory of the imagined conception and the substantive conceptions are distinct and thus preserve the old and new conceptions as distinct entities.

You do not speculate on my behalf and more than I do on yours or the thread starters. Smile

@Stormalv,

The concept of the unicorn does indeed exist...NO: this might be an error, and as concepts are very strictly drawn from the world of phenomenon. If the UNICORN did not exist as SUBSTANCE in the first instance, there could or would be no conception of them. I think this thread has a different basis altogether, and I should like to mention it, essentially the Logical Positivists have placed us all in a type of Prison, and in that, if you can think of something, then it must exist somewhere. The role of the imagination is not alone constrained but eliminated. The solution to our Prison breakout lies in a renewed attack on the notion of Infinity. The notion of Infinity is weak and dilute, and allows everything, everywhere to exist in some form or other. But I think a renewed definition, not alone of Infinity but Existence itself is required, or at least the requirements for the establishment of Existence. I am saying that every weak Thinker uses Infinity to justify the existence of everything. Therefore I am deeply suspicious...I think that the Hallucination of the Unicorn would have to come under APPEARANCE, and not SUBSTANCE. The APPEARANCE and the SUBSTANCE could or would never be the same, therefore, and nor could or would the said memory. It is just the imagined Unicorn that is remembered, and nothing else besides...we just give ourselves back the notion of an Imaginary Existence, and one stolen from us by the logical positivists...OOPS I was just about to speculate on your behalf again...

@Anthrobus,

Can you and will you specify the meaning of SUBSTANCE and APPEARANCE?

I think that simply due to a name thence an object exists. What is not specified is what properties the name denotes. That we have a name precludes the possibility of there being no conception linked to said name. Similarly, this conception precludes the possibility that there is no definition, which precludes the possibility that there is no property derived from some experience which is ultimately liked to the name. That the name unicorn exists precludes the possibility that there is no amalgamate of experiences derived from an amalgamate of substances from which each parameter of the definition of a unicorn is derived.

I would further say that imagination is indeed combinatorial, insofar as that our ability to imagine is dependent on our ability to experience. Logic is unusual in that it seemingly has no physical parallel, a logical sequence is not the same as a sequence of colored squares the likes of which exist or potentially exist, in real life. I would say intuitively that logic seems to be derived from the form which things take. I think that logic is physically manifest in some way in which we are not aware. That our minds are sensitive to patterns and that patterns are there to be found suggests some degree of simplicity. That some sequences are irreducible suggests complexity. I should think that since the very same tools with which we probe the universe are part of the universe, we cannot probe beyond certain depths. We can only ascertain relations, and only from relative perspectives.

I am not a reductionist. I was once, but no longer. I do however believe that there are degrees of reduciblity, but I have no criterion to rate them. That there are superficial patterns that we can use to our advantage is obvious, but how deep those patterns run is not.

@Stormalv,

QUOTED BY ZETETIC: Can you and will you specify the meaning of SUBSTANCE and APPEARANCE?

A BILLIARD BALL IN THE DARK: partakes of SUBSTANCE and not of APPEARANCE.

A BILLIARD BALL IN THE LIGHT: partakes of SUBSTANCE and of APPEARANCE.

Therefore I deduce that SUBSTANCE is different from APPEARANCE, and that APPEARANCE is different from SUBSTANCE...

I have not proved anything: I can speculate though that it is conceivable that the HALLUCINATION of the UNICORN is pure APPEARANCE, and in that, the HALLUCINATION is concerned entirely with notions of LIGHT: that the HALLUCINATION has no SUBSTANCE, and that therefore the HALLUCINATION of the UNICORN is purely of LIGHT, and of HALLUCINATION, and therefore of IMAGINATION...

@Anthrobus,

Having trouble with absolute certainty?

http://lilymichaud.files.wordpress.com/2007/09/unicorn.jpg

Unreal!

=
MJA

@Zetetic11235,

Zetetic11235 wrote:

I think that simply due to a name thence an object exists. What is not specified is what properties the name denotes. .

So you think that if I simply make up a name now, say, "Gotsham" there must be a Gotsham, and if I add an 's" and make it, "Gotshams" then there are more than one Gotshams? How many would you say there are? Gee, I feel like God.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

So you think that if I simply make up a name now, say, "Gotsham" there must be a Gotsham, and if I add an 's" and make it, "Gotshams" then there are more than one Gotshams? How many would you say there are? Gee, I feel like God.

You should, because you are.

Humans have imaginations and can invent with that tool. Hence the existence, in some way or another, of unicorns.

@Stormalv,

ZETETIC11235: I'm going to throw a horrible SPECULATION into the pot here: what, and, in fact, if there was no such a thing as absolute DARKNESS, what if, substance and appearance were inseparable: then the UNICORN would not be, purely and solely, allied to LIGHT, or HALLUCINATION, or somesuch, but, and in some manner, must have substance, and must exist, and must be conceptual...

@kennethamy,

kennethamy wrote:

So you think that if I simply make up a name now, say, "Gotsham" there must be a Gotsham, and if I add an 's" and make it, "Gotshams" then there are more than one Gotshams? How many would you say there are? Gee, I feel like God.

Gotsham does exist. If you have a conception of it, then it is that conception, if not, it is just the sound made upon pronunciation of the word and the arrangement of letters. By adding an 's' to the string, you do not necessarily imply a multitude of some object unless you shift your conception to the plural, in which case, yes, the conception you have created corresponding to the string of letters and possibly the sound produced by them does indeed exist. A small aside; If you are put of by playing with definitions I wonder how it is beneficial that you carouse the logic section(though in actuality this is a metaphysical discussion).

Anthrobus:

As to the intertwined actuality of substance and appearance, I would agree. I would say that the appearance is caused by physical a stimulus in the sense that it is caused by chemical reactions in the brain. Sense is intertwined with that which is sensed. The appearance of the object might be the only sensual aspect of it, but it has a physical manifestation of the chemical process which produces your conception of it. Thus it is indeed physical and has bearing on other physical objects. Thus though the substance of the conception of a unicorn and the substance of an 'actual' unicorn are distinct, both still have substance.

I want to note also that difference in substance can be measured in various ways. For example: What if I had hallucinated the unicorn? Well, then I will not receive any confirmation of its existence from those who should have been able to see it. Also, there should be no physical irregularities such as say, a gravitational pull indicating a massive object where I see the unicorn. If there is physical or personal confirmation of the unicorn, then it may not fit within the parameters of 'imaginary' or a 'hallucination', but it still may not fit into the parameters of 'real' like a table would.

I understand that I am taking a very physicalist approach to this, but I don't see any sense in not doing so, since the only distinction between the 'spiritual' and the 'physical' is a set of nebulous definitions.

@Anthrobus,

Anthrobus wrote:

QUOTED BY ZETETIC: Can you and will you specify the meaning of SUBSTANCE and APPEARANCE?

A BILLIARD BALL IN THE DARK: partakes of SUBSTANCE and not of APPEARANCE.

A BILLIARD BALL IN THE LIGHT: partakes of SUBSTANCE and of APPEARANCE.

Therefore I deduce that SUBSTANCE is different from APPEARANCE, and that APPEARANCE is different from SUBSTANCE...

I have not proved anything: I can speculate though that it is conceivable that the HALLUCINATION of the UNICORN is pure APPEARANCE, and in that, the HALLUCINATION is concerned entirely with notions of LIGHT: that the HALLUCINATION has no SUBSTANCE, and that therefore the HALLUCINATION of the UNICORN is purely of LIGHT, and of HALLUCINATION, and therefore of IMAGINATION...

Your deduction is flawed. Why does a billiard ball in the dark not "partake" in appearance? Just because our eyes cannot see in the dark, does not mean it has no appearance. Ask a lion which can see at 10x better clarity than us in pitch black.

I wouldn't exactly recommend that last line if you value your life in some way.

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