@kennethamy,
kennethamy;158744 wrote:Maybe (although I am not sure how you do that). But Russell thought that we had to make a scopic distincition. Otherwise, we allow for truth gaps. And Russell was not a fan of truth gaps (no more than was Quine).
I am not a fan of Russell's description theory of proper names, like I've said--precisely because it does allow for truth-gaps. If proper names are disguised definite descriptions as Russell thought they were, then anything can satisfy that description, and hence make that proposition true or false.
So I personally don't think those sentences express propositions at all. I am much more at ease construing those sentences as embedded within truth-valuable claims about which sentences occur in which stories, not about claims allegedly involving Sherlock Holmes.
---------- Post added 05-01-2010 at 03:15 AM ----------
ughaibu;158751 wrote:Read my recent posts again, if it's still unclear, then you're out of luck.I just did that. If you lack background, "Google it online".
That's lame. You don't even know what you're talking about. It's not my job to make sense of what you don't even understand....lol. You're just lazy.
Different set-theories that prove contrary results regarding sets does not prove that numbers are not sets. It just shows that there are two different set-theories about sets. I am not even committed to the view that numbers are sets....but I am committed to the view that whatever they are, they exist, and they are not concepts, not ideas, not words, and not apples..but they are abstract.
I've told you my own reason for believing numbers exist. They are indispensible for our scientific theories about the world to be true. They are indispensible for any statement involving numbers to be true. That is a good enough reason for me to believe they exist.