numbers vs. words

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Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 12:54 pm
@fast,
fast;156788 wrote:
I wouldn't bet on it.


Step by step, fast. I walked him right through it. Go back and read the posts.

I see you still can't answer my question of what your technical meaning of "referring term" is. If you can't answer my question, then you don't even understand the phrase "referring term" when you use it. That is precisely the problem. You don't have a theory of reference because you don't understand what your own technical meaning of the phrase is. Therefore, no one has to take you seriously because you continue to talk yourself in circles, and you fail to tell me anything at all.

What does it take for a term to be a referring term? What are those necessary and sufficeint conditions?

Very simple question.
 
fast
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:04 pm
@cws910,
One necessary condition is that it may be used to refer.

A woman that takes aim at a target but doesn't shoot hasn't missed the target, yet it's still true she didn't hit the target. A man that takes aim at a target and does shoot but misses the target also hasn't hit the target. Two different people both have not hit the target, but only one has missed the target.

This is analogous to the difference between non-referring terms and referring terms that fail to refer. The non-referring term never shoots. The referring term (in this case) has shot but failed to hit the target.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:22 pm
@fast,
fast;156795 wrote:
One necessary condition is that it may be used to refer.


I actually agree with this. That is one of the necessary conditions I hold, too. (((And Ahab agrees with us. But that is not what is problematic with Ahab's theory.)))

[QUOTE=fast;156795]A woman that takes aim at a target but doesn't shoot hasn't missed the target, yet it's still true she didn't hit the target. A man that takes aim at a target and does shoot but misses the target also hasn't hit the target. Two different people both have not hit the target, but only one has missed the target.[/QUOTE]
fast;156795 wrote:


This is analogous to the difference between non-referring terms and referring terms that fail to refer. The non-referring term never shoots. The referring term (in this case) has shot but failed to hit the target.


But......This is just begging the question. So are not telling me anything.

So what is the other necessary condition? If you can't tell me this, then you don't have a theory of reference at all because the meaning of your techincal words "referring term" is incomplete.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:25 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;156774 wrote:
Even better!...So now we have:

(1) "If a term does refer, then it is a referring term"--S condition. True.

(2) "If a term is a referring term, then it is referring to something existent.--N condition.

Conclusion,

(3) A referring term is a term that refers and refers to something existent.

And I agree. Therefore, terms that don't refer to somthing existent are not referring terms. So there is no such thing as referring term that does not refer and does not refer to something existent. Case closed.

This WOULD be a theory of reference.

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 12:04 PM ----------




.


I do believe I said that a referring term is a term which can refer, not one that does refer. Thus, what I said is that a referring term need not refer to what exists, just as long as it is a term that can refer to what exists. Thus, for instance, "unicorn" is a referring term, but "if" is not a referring term. The reason is that "unicorn" does not, but can refer, but "if" not only does not refer, but cannot refer.
 
fast
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:34 pm
@Extrain,
[QUOTE=Extrain;156806]I actually agree with this. That is one of the necessary conditions I hold, too.[/QUOTE]Yes, but you also think it's a necessary condition for non-referring terms (per your child named Although example), but you shouldn't think that, for although a fluent speaker of the English language might do so, it's not the case that a fluent speaker of the English language may do so.

That distinction (might vs may) may be too subtle, so I'll put it another way: We have no good reason to think that a fluent speaker of the English language would use the word "although" (the one we're using) to refer. It's possible that a fluent speaker could make a mistake (hence, it's true that it might happen--a bare possibility at least), but no infallible English speaker would ever do so. The point is that no non-referring term is correctly used to (to, I say) refer.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:40 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;156675 wrote:
Try again.
No. After continuous avoidance by Fast and Kennethamy, I'm not feeling indulgent towards any other avoidance.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:41 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;156810 wrote:
I do believe I said that a referring term is a term which can refer, not one that does refer.


And I said this is trivially true. Here is what you said which I have just been repeating back to you the entire time:

A term is a referring term if it does refer (sufficient condition) and it is not a referring term unless it is possible for it to refer (necessary condition).

I said:
"This just says a referring term is both actually and possibly a referring term." Possible conditions for something to be something are not necessary conditions for something to be something--that is a contradictions in terms because you are saying a condition for something to be a referring term is both a possible and necessary condition at once. I asked "So what are the necessary conditions?" You retorted with:

[Necessary condition]...That there be something for it to refer to.

So far, then, we have this:

If term actually refers, then it is a referring term. If a term is a referring term, then it refers to something that actually exists. So a term is a referring term if it actually refers, and only if it refers to something really existent. So, a term is a referring term if and only if it refers and refers to something existent.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:45 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;156819 wrote:
And I said this is trivially true. Here is what you said which I have just been repeating back to you the entire time:

A term is a referring term if it does refer (sufficient condition) and it is not a referring term unless it is possible for it to refer (necessary condition).

I said:
"This just says a referring term is both actually and possibly a referring term. Ahab would agree with you." Possible conditions for something to be something are not necessary conditions for something to be something--that is a contradictions in terms because you are saying a condition for something to be a referring term is both a possible and necessary condition at once. I asked "So what are the necessary conditions?" You retorted with:

[Necessary condition]...That there be something for it to refer to.



duh.


All referring terms can refer, but some do not. No non-referring terms can refer.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:49 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;156823 wrote:
All referring terms can refer, but some do not.


That's not right. You are just telling me what you think, without telling me why! All referring terms actually refer to soemthing. yes.

But why do some referring terms not refer? Is non-referring also a necessary condition for something to be a referring term?? That's clearly wrong. But that seems to be what you are saying. So what, exactly, is a referring term according to YOU???? WHY CAN'T YOU TELL ME???????
 
fast
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 01:54 pm
@ughaibu,
[QUOTE=ughaibu;156818]No. After continuous avoidance by Fast and Kennethamy, I'm not feeling indulgent towards any other avoidance.[/QUOTE]

Numbers are abstract. Santa is not. But, Santa is not concrete. See, the categories "Abstract" and "concrete" are mutually exclusive, but the issue of collective exhaustively requires more explanation. Yes, if an object is not one, then it's the other and vice versa, but that is if there is an object. Santa does not exist, so Santa is neither abstract nor concrete.

The question is what would Santa be if Santa did exist. I'll tell you this; the answer is not abstract, and since the categories are collectively exhaustive, the answer is concrete.

Santa isn't concrete, but if Santa did exist, Santa would be concrete. Santa has no properties. Numbers do. Saying Santa has properties doesn't make it so. Saying numbers have properties doesn't make it so either, but what does matter is the fact numbers do have properties and the fact that Santa does not have properties.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 02:00 pm
@fast,
No one can give me straight answer. This is proof you are all confused and don't have a theory of reference.
 
ughaibu
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 02:01 pm
@fast,
fast;156827 wrote:
Numbers are abstract. Santa is not. But. . . . .
But, you haven't met any of the objections to this!! You keep repeating it as if you have some hot line to the truth and are spreading the word to the ignorant. Meanwhile, you position is inconsistent nonsense.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 02:13 pm
@ughaibu,
ughaibu;156818 wrote:
No. After continuous avoidance by Fast and Kennethamy, I'm not feeling indulgent towards any other avoidance.


That's not MY problem. The fact remains you still lack an argument for your belief that there are different meanings of the word "Existence."

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 02:15 PM ----------

ughaibu;156830 wrote:
But, you haven't met any of the objections to this!! You keep repeating it as if you have some hot line to the truth and are spreading the word to the ignorant. Meanwhile, you position is inconsistent nonsense.


Fast just talks sloppily. He means the following is true.

It is not the case that there exists something called "Santa."

So what exactly is your objection? "Santa claus wears black boots" is false since that name "santa" doesn't refer to anything whatsoever.
 
Ahab
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 04:43 pm
@fast,
fast;156827 wrote:


Numbers are abstract. Santa is not. But, Santa is not concrete. See, the categories "Abstract" and "concrete" are mutually exclusive, but the issue of collective exhaustively requires more explanation. Yes, if an object is not one, then it's the other and vice versa, but that is if there is an object. Santa does not exist, so Santa is neither abstract nor concrete.

The question is what would Santa be if Santa did exist. I'll tell you this; the answer is not abstract, and since the categories are collectively exhaustive, the answer is concrete.

Santa isn't concrete, but if Santa did exist, Santa would be concrete. Santa has no properties. Numbers do. Saying Santa has properties doesn't make it so. Saying numbers have properties doesn't make it so either, but what does matter is the fact numbers do have properties and the fact that Santa does not have properties.


If Santa existed he could drive a sleigh through the air with the aid of flying reindeer. That is one of the things the imaginary Santa can do.

How on earth can you plausibly claim that this imaginary Santa could be real? Being 'concrete' is not sufficient. If it were I could build a stature of Santa and say that is the real Santa.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 04:51 pm
@Ahab,
Ahab;156899 wrote:
If Santa existed he could drive a sleigh through the air with the aid of flying reindeer. That is one of the things the imaginary Santa can do.


Imaginary Santas can't drive a sleigh through the air. Imaginary things can't do that simply because imaginary things, if they existed, are not a physical kinds. If imaginary things can do that, then your imaginary Santa is concrete. But no one thinks Santa is concrete except for children. You talk nonsense.
 
ACB
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 06:24 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;156829 wrote:
No one can give me straight answer. This is proof you are all confused and don't have a theory of reference.


I thought Kennethamy gave you a straight answer in posts #949 and 952. But I'll have a go:

A term is a referring term if and only if:

(a) it refers to something that actually exists;
or
(b) it refers to something whose existence is logically possible, or to a set of properties that are (individually) logically possible.

Of course, (b) will not work if you insist that the only terms that make sense are those that refer to actually existent things. In that case we are back to square one, and the problems you mentioned in post #907 remain. Perhaps only Meinong's jungle, or something similar, can solve them (in which case, being the only available solution, it would not violate Occam's razor).
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 06:31 pm
@Extrain,
Extrain;156825 wrote:
That's not right. You are just telling me what you think, without telling me why! All referring terms actually refer to soemthing. yes.

But why do some referring terms not refer? Is non-referring also a necessary condition for something to be a referring term?? That's clearly wrong. But that seems to be what you are saying. So what, exactly, is a referring term according to YOU???? WHY CAN'T YOU TELL ME???????


Actually, I could, but then, I would have to kill you. And maybe it is because, "you can't handle the truth!". But, tell you what, I'll give you a hint: a referring term is a term can can refer, but may not because that it would refer to if it did refer, does not exist. (Please, tell no one you heard this from me. My life is at stake).

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 08:37 PM ----------

ughaibu;156830 wrote:
But, you haven't met any of the objections to this!! You keep repeating it as if you have some hot line to the truth and are spreading the word to the ignorant. Meanwhile, you position is inconsistent nonsense.


Calling what I said, "nonsense" is something I could handle. But calling it "inconsistent" to boot, well, are there no limits to your viciousness?
 
topnotcht121
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 07:00 pm
@cws910,
thanx. b/c i was on a slippery slope.
 
Extrain
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 08:08 pm
@ACB,
ACB;156924 wrote:
I thought Kennethamy gave you a straight answer in posts #949 and 952. But I'll have a go:

A term is a referring term if and only if:

(a) it refers to something that actually exists;
or
(b) it refers to something whose existence is logically possible, or to a set of properties that are (individually) logically possible.

Of course, (b) will not work if you insist that the only terms that make sense are those that refer to actually existent things. In that case we are back to square one, and the problems you mentioned in post #907 remain. Perhaps only Meinong's jungle, or something similar, can solve them (in which case, being the only available solution, it would not violate Occam's razor).


Thank you so much. Even though I disagree with (b), that's good. I can at least understand that. (a) and (b) would then each be necessary and sufficient conditions alone for a term to be a referring term. And now we actually have a theory of reference because you are circumscribing quite clearly the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful reference because you specifed "logically possible objects" as referents in (b). And Meinong's Jungle would certainly present those problems you mentioned for this type of theory, so I will leave it be. But I am quite positive Ken doesn't want to hold to Meinongianism.

ken, on the other hand, says that a term is a referring term if and only if,

(a) that term refers to something existent.
or
(b) it is logically possible that term refers to something.

(a) logically implies (b). But does (b) logically imply (a)? It is certainly logically and metaphysically possible that "phlogiston" refers to something since there is nothing intrinsically inconsistent about the concept of phlogiston--so phlogiston is a possible object. But if a necessary condition for something to be a referring term is that that term is possibly referring, then all terms are referring terms, including "phlogiston" which refers to nothing existent. So phlogiston is a case instance where (b) contradicts (a). So this is a bad theory of reference according to ken's ontology, and no one should hold it (since ken thinks either things exist or don't--I seriously doubt he thinks "phlogiston" refers or phlogiston exists).

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 08:29 PM ----------

kennethamy;156927 wrote:
Actually, I could, but then, I would have to kill you. And maybe it is because, "you can't handle the truth!". But, tell you what, I'll give you a hint: a referring term is a term can can refer, but may not because that it would refer to if it did refer, does not exist. (Please, tell no one you heard this from me. My life is at stake).


According to your ontology, that presents a contradiction with cases like "phlogiston" and "Santa" as I mentioned in the entry above this one.

Maybe you believe in Meinongianism, then, like ACB believes in non-existent logically possible objects?
 
fast
 
Reply Mon 26 Apr, 2010 08:41 pm
@Ahab,
[QUOTE=Ahab;156899]That is one of the things the imaginary Santa can do. [/QUOTE]I do not believe, nor does anyone here believe, nor should you believe that an imaginary entity can do anything. To say that Santa is imaginary isn't an admission that an entity exists. If it doesn't exist, it can't do anything. I do realize that you and I are not referring to the same thing when we use the word "Santa," but not even the thing you're referring to does what you say it does.

I'm still a little shaky on just what you think "Santa" refers to. Kennethamy and I use the term to refer to what would be a concrete object if it exists. I once thought (but was mistaken) that you were referring to a character in fiction, but our previous discussion on this issue revealed that you weren't even referring to that. You have said (I think) that it refers to an imaginary being, but never can it be that an imaginary being do anything. Shoot, technically, not even a character in fiction can do something; they can be depicted as if they are doing something, but that is different.

This reminds me of the mistaken some people make when they say nothing exists. When Uncle Jim used to hear people say that, he took it to mean that they were claiming that something named nothing did exist. You say that Santa isn't real, yet you still say that Santa does stuff.

[QUOTE]How on earth can you plausibly claim that this imaginary Santa could be real?[/QUOTE]Not me. I haven't claimed that. It only appears to you that I am claiming that since we do not use "Santa" to refer to the same thing.

[QUOTE]Being 'concrete' is not sufficient. If it were I could build a stature of Santa and say that is the real Santa.[/QUOTE]The term "a statue of Santa" refers to a statue of Santa.

---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 10:48 PM ----------

Extrain;156834 wrote:
Fast just talks sloppily. He means the following is true.

It is not the case that there exists something called "Santa."

What? Why would you think that he didn't know that?
 
 

 
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