@ACB,
ACB;156924 wrote:I thought Kennethamy gave you a straight answer in posts #949 and 952. But I'll have a go:
A term is a referring term if and only if:
(a) it refers to something that actually exists;
or
(b) it refers to something whose existence is logically possible, or to a set of properties that are (individually) logically possible.
Of course, (b) will not work if you insist that the only terms that make sense are those that refer to actually existent things. In that case we are back to square one, and the problems you mentioned in post #907 remain. Perhaps only Meinong's jungle, or something similar, can solve them (in which case, being the only available solution, it would not violate Occam's razor).
Thank you so much. Even though I disagree with (b), that's good. I can at least understand that. (a) and (b) would then
each be necessary and sufficient conditions alone for a term to be a referring term. And now we actually have a theory of reference because you are circumscribing quite clearly the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful reference because you specifed "logically possible objects" as referents in (b). And Meinong's Jungle would certainly present those problems you mentioned for this type of theory, so I will leave it be. But I am quite positive Ken doesn't want to hold to Meinongianism.
ken, on the other hand, says that a term is a referring term if and only if,
(a) that term refers to something existent.
or
(b) it is logically possible that term refers to something.
(a) logically implies (b). But does (b) logically imply (a)? It is certainly logically and metaphysically possible that "phlogiston" refers to something since there is nothing intrinsically inconsistent about the concept of phlogiston--so phlogiston is a possible object. But if a necessary condition for something to be a referring term is that that term is possibly referring, then
all terms are referring terms, including "phlogiston" which refers to nothing existent. So phlogiston is a case instance where (b) contradicts (a). So this is a bad theory of reference according to ken's ontology, and no one should hold it (since ken thinks either things exist or don't--I seriously doubt he thinks "phlogiston" refers or phlogiston exists).
---------- Post added 04-26-2010 at 08:29 PM ----------
kennethamy;156927 wrote:Actually, I could, but then, I would have to kill you. And maybe it is because, "you can't handle the truth!". But, tell you what, I'll give you a hint: a referring term is a term can can refer, but may not because that it would refer to if it did refer, does not exist. (Please, tell no one you heard this from me. My life is at stake).
According to your ontology, that presents a contradiction with cases like "phlogiston" and "Santa" as I mentioned in the entry above this one.
Maybe you believe in Meinongianism, then, like ACB believes in non-existent logically possible objects?