numbers vs. words

@Extrain,

Extrain;156206 wrote:

...and you STILL can't answer my question, which tells me you have no theory of reference at all. You are just making up your own definitions merely to accommodate your epistemic confusions.

Again, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a term to be a referring term?

It is possible for a referring term to refer. Thus, any proper name, or any noun phrase. (But not a contradiction, of course).

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156218 wrote:

It is possible for a referring term to refer. Thus, any proper name, or any noun phrase. (But not a contradiction, of course).

ummm....how does this answer my question?

@Extrain,

Another point:

Ahab's theory of Identifiability as being a necessary and sufficient condition for reference just begs the question. No one would identify X, if X did not exist. So since the existence of X is a necessary condition for identifiability, it is also a necessary condition for reference contrary to what he thinks.

Ahab's theory just invents these meaningless conjunctions of words such as "identifiability of non-existent objects" etc., etc., to advance some Wittgensteinian bias.......so this theory is just another instance of a scrambled word salad none of use can make sense of....and that is somehow supposed to be our misunderstanding?

Is not all of this an instance of Ahab violating language usage, himself, if none of us can understand what in the world he is saying?

@Extrain,

Extrain;156329 wrote:

No one would identify X, if X did not exist.

Quite obviously, fictional objects can be identified. If you feel that this commits you to the existence of fictional objects, that's your affair.

Extrain;156329 wrote:

none of us can understand what in the world he is saying?

Speak for yourself, if you cant understand Ahab, that too is your affair. I haven't noticed anybody else expressing difficulties understanding him.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156332 wrote:

Quite obviously, fictional objects can be identified. If you feel that this commits you to the existence of fictional objects, that's your affair.Speak for yourself, if you cant understand Ahab, that too is your affair. I haven't noticed anybody else expressing difficulties understanding him.

Kennethamy and Fast sure don't. Can you explain to me how non-existent things can be identified without simply asserting that they are identified? I don't understand that at all. If I can identify an imaginary being, surely that being must exist since I just identified it. How does one go about identifying non-existent things?

@Extrain,

Extrain;156333 wrote:

If I can identify an imaginary being, surely that being must exist since I just identified it. How does one go about identifying non-existent things?

We can identify fictional objects, just as we can identify imaginary mathematical objects. I'm not really fussy about whether or not one says that these things exist, but in both cases, existence means something different from what it means when I talk about the existence of my computer, for example. The problem for me, is that Fast and Kennethamy have an inconsistent position, that they haven't supported, in so far as they deny the existence of fictional objects but affirm the existence of imaginary mathematical objects.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156338 wrote:

We can identify fictional objects, just as we can identify imaginary mathematical objects. I'm not really fussy about whether or not one says that these things exist, but in both cases, existence means something different from what it means when I talk about the existence of my computer, for example. The problem for me, is that Fast and Kennethamy have an inconsistent position, that they haven't supported, in so far as they deny the existence of fictional objects but affirm the existence of imaginary mathematical objects.

Truly, I struggle with that apparent inconsistency myself, and still have not been able to settle on it for years.

I positively think mathematical objects exist, because I can clearly identify them by the very distinct properties they have such as "being odd, being even", etc.. "Being odd, being even" are abstract properties no physical objects possess, only abstract ones.

But this isn't the case with Santa. Santa wears black boots. But if he is imaginary, does he really wear black boots? Are they fictional black boots? What is a fictional black boot? A boot that is only "kind of" physical, but not totally physical? Black boots are physical kinds of objects. So can imaginary beings wear black boots?

Why does,

"Santa Claus wears black boots," seem true to us outside of any fictional story-telling, but,

"Santa Claus takes his boots off," seem clearly false to us outside any fictional story-telling?

Both verbs are in the present tense, too.

There is much more going on here than people are willing to recognize. There are a lot of problems.

When a mother tells her 6 year old son, "Yes, son, Santa is really coming to town tonight. The weather man just spotted him flying over New York City." The mother is clearly lying (however "innocently") because that is clearly false, and she knows it is false.

But, "Santa Claus wears a red coat" seems true.

And if this is true, "Santa" must refer to something, call it "imaginary" if you like--I don't care. But if "Santa" refers to Santa, then Santa MUST exist since I just referred to him.

But if he exists, how the hell does he wear boots since he is not the kind of physical object that can wear boots??

@Extrain,

Extrain;156345 wrote:

I positively think mathematical objects exist, because I can clearly identify them by the very distinct properties they have such as "being odd, being even", etc.. "Being odd, being even" are abstract properties no physical objects possess, only abstract ones.

But this isn't the case with Santa. Santa wears black boots.

Take the case of Euclidean hypercubes, they're physically impossible, so if they exist, they exist as abstract objects. However, they have a set of properties which are the same as those of concrete cubes. So, your first point isn't universally applicable. Consider Superman, he has an imaginary property of being allergic to kryptonite, so your second point too, isn't universally applicable.

@Extrain,

Extrain;156345 wrote:

But, "Santa Claus wears a red coat" seems true.

Of course it does. There are so many stories in which Santa wears a red coat. How shouldn't it seem true? I dreamed of a person who wore a red coat. And in the dream it seemed true to me too. But no person wore a red coat.

I see that ughaibu still uses, "different sense of 'existence'" just as if he could tell us what that different sense was, and how it was a different sense.

---------- Post added 04-25-2010 at 09:37 AM ----------

ughaibu;156373 wrote:

Take the case of Euclidean hypercubes, they're physically impossible, so if they exist, they exist as abstract objects. However, they have a set of properties which are the same as those of concrete cubes. So, your first point isn't universally applicable. Consider Superman, he has an imaginary property of being allergic to kryptonite, so your second point too, isn't universally applicable.

What you mean, of course, is that if they exist, they are abstract objects (not 'exist as abstract objects'). And since self-contradiction don't (and can't) exist, they have no properties. And imaginary properties, whatever they are, are not properties, anymore than imaginary objects are objects, so what is your point. (The adjective "imaginary" does not qualify the noun it adjectivizes in the same way as "red" does, any more than "intellectual" qualifies "dwarf" the way that "intelligent" does.

Surface grammar is not a mirror of deep grammar. Otherwise, it would not be surface grammar.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156378 wrote:

Of course it does. There are so many stories in which Santa wears a red coat. How shouldn't it seem true? I dreamed of a person who wore a red coat. And in the dream it seemed true to me too. But no person wore a red coat.

You haven't answered any of my questions. Why does,

"Santa Claus wears black boots" seem true,
"Santa Claus takes his boots off" seem false, and

"Santa Claus just flew over New York at 2am" seem false, and
"Santa Claus just flew over Atlanta at 2am" seem false?

So you can invent stories about fictional objects that are not true? Why are they not true? Why are some true, some false? What are the truth-makers?

I just don't know how to spell the truth-conditions for statements made about fictional characters.

kennethamy;156378 wrote:

I see that ughaibu still uses, "different sense of 'existence'" just as if he could tell us what that different sense was, and how it was a different sense.

...I know, as if existence were something an object did or did not do like run.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156378 wrote:

Surface grammar is not a mirror of deep grammar. Otherwise, it would not be surface grammar.

It is always possible to misunderstand and misuse words. Even very competent uses of English make mistakes from time to time.

But what words mean must in general be transparent to their users. We do not have to wait for philosophers and scientists to discover what we really mean by the words we use and the sentences we utter.

@Extrain,

Extrain;156445 wrote:

You haven't answered any of my questions. Why does,

"Santa Claus wears black boots" seem true,
"Santa Claus takes his boots off" seem false, and

"Santa Claus just flew over New York at 2am" seem false, and
"Santa Claus just flew over Atlanta at 2am" seem false?

So you can invent stories about fictional objects that are not true? Why are they not true? Why are some true, some false? What are the truth-makers?

I just don't know how to spell the truth-conditions for statements made about fictional characters.

...I know, as if existence were something an object did or did not do like run.

I can but speculate why false statements seem true to some people. I don't think those statements seem true. I think they are (and seem) false.

If statements made about fictional characters imply that fictional characters exist, than clearly, such statements are false. So (in my view) a necessary condition for a statement to be true is that it does not imply the existence of fictional characters. But, since statements about fictional characters entail they exist, such statements are false. QED

Stories about fictional characters are not true because they are stories about fictional characters. Of course, even if they are stories about real people, it does not follow that they are true. It is a necessary condition that true stories be about real things, but not a sufficient condition, since there can be false stories about real things.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156332 wrote:

Quite obviously, fictional objects can be identified. If you feel that this commits you to the existence of fictional objects, that's your affair.Speak for yourself, if you cant understand Ahab, that too is your affair. I haven't noticed anybody else expressing difficulties understanding him.

Exactly right. When I referred to Molly Bloom and her husband in an essay, my professor knew who I was referring to.

And I wasn't pretending to refer to Molly Bloom; if I had been I would have been acting deceitfully.

When people refer to an imaginary being they don't think it commits them to the existence of that being. That is why when asked, after they have made a reference to Santa Clause, if Santa Claus exists they will respond with, "Certainly not." They know they are referring to an imaginary person.

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156454 wrote:

I can but speculate why false statements seem true to some people. I don't think those statements seem true. I think they are (and seem) false.

If statements made about fictional characters imply that fictional characters exist, than clearly, such statements are false. So (in my view) a necessary condition for a statement to be true is that it does not imply the existence of fictional characters. But, since statements about fictional characters entail they exist, such statements are false. QED

That certainly seems right. That accounts for difficulty above.

But how about this borderline case?

"Santa is nicer than Dick Cheney." True or false? To me it seems true because it doesn't seem to imply the existence of Santa. But to you it seems false because it does imply that?

kennethamy;156454 wrote:

Stories about fictional characters are not true because they are stories about fictional characters.

Ok, then is the truth maker the writer? The people's imaginations? Can someone be wrong about Santa Claus if they are talking fictionally? Presumably, the answer is "everyone is saying something false about Santa Claus, because anything statement implying his existence is literally false."

But what stories of Santa Claus that conflict with each other, Ken. There are many stories written about santa. Some say his reindeer fly by the new and improved jet-power 2000, some say they fly by fairy dust. Are they all about the same fictional character? Or are there now many fictional Santa Claus' and everyone is correct?

kennethamy;156454 wrote:

Of course, even if they are stories about real people, it does not follow that they are true. It is a necessary condition that true stories be about real things, but not a sufficient condition, since there can be false stories about real things.

Yes,

@kennethamy,

kennethamy;156378 wrote:

I see that ughaibu still uses, "different sense of 'existence'" just as if he could tell us what that different sense was, and how it was a different sense.

If I claim to have (only) a causally inert computer, which has no location in space or time, it should be clear to you that I haven't got a computer. In other words, the computer that I claim to have wouldn't exist, causal inertia and lack of location being sufficient to establish that it doesn't exist. So, if abstract objects exist, the qualities of their existence are sufficient for them to not possibly exist. It is blindingly obvious that two entirely different notions of existence are being presented.

@ughaibu,

ughaibu;156482 wrote:

If I claim to have (only) a causally inert computer, which has no location in space or time, it should be clear to you that I haven't got a computer. In other words, the computer that I claim to have wouldn't exist, causal inertia and lack of location being sufficient to establish that it doesn't exist. So, if abstract objects exist, the qualities of their existence are sufficient for them to not possibly exist. It is blindingly obvious that two entirely different notions of existence are being presented.

This is false. Cauality is not sufficient to distinguish "two types" of existence.

Also, physical objects exist contingently just as mathematical objects exist contingently. Surely you might not have existed--so you exist contingently. Assuming there is a difference between mathematical and physical object with respect to necessity and contingency, if nothing else, it seems mathematical objects exist necessarily and physical objects exist contingently. But I'm not even sure that's right. It is an irrelevant point anyway.

"Existing contingently/existing necessarily" is not sufficient to identify two types of existence between mathematical and physical objects at all. Either you exist or you don't. Period. Either mathematical objects exist or they don't. Period. Existence is an "all or nothing" notion. Existence doesn't come in degrees and it is not found on the basis of differences in kinds; nor is it to be found in the difference between necessity and contingency which are purely modal notions, not ontological notions. Physical Chairs and Mathematical Objects, if they exist, would only differ in kind, not in existence.

@Ahab,

Quote:
Originally Posted by north

http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/PHBlue/buttons/viewpost.gif

the essence of numbers is the existence of physical objects

Quote:

This is decidely false whatever it means. How is one supposed to go about proving that 2+2=4 is true if and only if I add two oranges and two oranges together to make four oranges?

well it equals four does it not ?

no mathematical abstractions necessary

Quote:

What if I don't add those oranges together? Does that make "2+2=4" false? I doubt it, because I can add any two objects together to make four objects. So the truth of "2+2=4" is not dependent on the existence of any objects.

think about what you just stated

@north,

north;156523 wrote:

Quote:
Originally Posted by north
the essence of numbers is the existence of physical objects

well it equals four does it not ?

no mathematical abstractions necessary

So numbers are those oranges I just grouped together?:rolleyes:

2+2=4 is necessarily true. All emprical judgments are only contingently true. So what you believe is false. This is precisely why no scientist has ever "proved" anything--we simply have not observed all possible empirical cases in the universe to constitute the strong proof that we need to establish a scientific claim as necessarily true. "Proof" is a property of formal languages such as first order logic and mathematics; "proof" is not a property of the physical world. Can you prove to me that the sun will rise tomorrow? No, since you haven't observed it. For all you know an asteroid can hit the earth off course tomorrow and freeze the earth's rotation.

@Extrain,

Quote:
Originally Posted by north

Quote:
Originally Posted by north [URL="http://www.philosophyforum.com/images/PHBlue/buttons/viewpost.gif"]http://www.philosophyforum.com/image...s/viewpost.gif[/URL]
the essence of numbers is the existence of physical objects

well it equals four does it not ?

no mathematical abstractions necessary

Quote:

Extrain;156526 wrote:
So numbers are those oranges I just grouped together?:rolleyes:

what do you mean by this

Quote:
2+2=4 is necessarily true.

I should certainly hope so

otherwise we are in trouble

Quote:
All emprical judgments are only contingently true.

contigent on what ?

Quote:
So what you believe is false.

explain this , falsness , that I have

Quote:
This is precisely why no scientist has ever "proved" anything--we simply have not observed all possible empirical cases in the universe to constitute the strong proof that we need to establish a scientific claim as necessarily true. "Proof" is a property of formal languages such as first order logic and mathematics; "proof" is not a property of the physical world.

then prove without the physical world that we can live without any source of water for a month

@north,

north;156530 wrote:

what do you mean by this

What do you mean by "2+2=4 is true because the physical world says it is"?

north;156530 wrote:

contigent on what ?

In logic, "contingent" means "could have been otherwise." That the sun might not rise tomorrow is certainly possible. So it is contingently true that it will rise tomorrow. "2+2=4" could not be otherwise, 2 and 2 cannot make 3. So it is necessarily true.

north;156530 wrote:

explain this , falsness , that I have

You seem to think mathematical truths are dependent on the physical world to be true. This is false. If this is NOT what you are saying, then you need to start making sense, because, so far, you are not making any sense at all.

north;156530 wrote:

then prove without the physical world that we can live without any source of water for a month

You can't. Like I said, nothing can be proved empirically, and that is an empirical claim. It is a claim that is most likely true, of course, but that doesn't mean it is necessarily true. It could so happen that some scientist invents a pill that allows you to survive without water for a month. That's certainly possible with the advances in technology.

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