[quote=Ahab]There doesn't seem to me to be anything awry with the expression "The tiger is fierce". If, the context of where it is used there is uncertainty over what the speaker is trying to say with that expression, then we simply have to ask them.

Just as in the "If you can read this, then you are not using public transportation like you should be."

And:
Ahab: Which tiger do you believe is so fierce?
Speaker: I wasn't using 'the tiger' to refer to a tiger.
Ahab: Don't you know that 'the tiger' in the sentence you uttered is to be used to refer to something?
Speaker: Oh, yes. I know that is how it is supposed to be used.
Ahab: Then you used it to refer to something else?
Speaker: No. Actually I wasn't using it to refer to anything else.
Ahab: Then how were you using it?
Speaker: I was just uttering it.
All I can conclude is that the speaker did not intend to say anything meaningful by uttering the sentence he did.

What is being violated is the need to be using one's is that people should be using their language in a coherent way when they intend to express something. I can't accuse him of breaking any grammatical rules. That would be like accusing someone who wasn't engaged in a game of chess of breaking a rule because they were playing around with moving chess pieces randomly across a chessboard.

There are many different kinds of propositions: empirical, legal, logical, mathematical, religious, etc.
Do your tools of analysis take into account these differences?

But he wasn't just "uttering it," or "mentioning it." Mentioning a sentence is way different than using it to try to ASSERT something. He was intending to say something truth-valuable by uttering it, knowing the referring term he is using fails to pick anything out. So his intentions are inconsistent with how the term "the tiger" is actually used in everyday discourse. That's how I understand that context.



Right, and in my last post, I surrendered this point to you. You take rules of language to be grammatico-syntactical rules. Strictly speaking, I think that's right. I went ahead and said that no grammatical or syntactical rules are being violated at all, in this case. Rather, someone is failing to be using his language sensibly, intelligently, or wisely. When people make declarative statements about the world such as "abortion is wrong," they intend to say something, not only meaningful, but also truth-valuable. That "something" is the proposition that gets expressed in declarative utterances. But if you know that the referring term in the sentence you are using fails to pick anything out, then you are not using your language sensibly or intelligently, and you fail to express a proposition. Someone is just being dumb.



I don't think "Hamlet exists" has any meaning. Do contradictions have meaning? hmmm...



But that's not how I set it up the example. Look, I hear people all the time trying to make statements they think have a truth-value, but are really not.

E.g., "Being is not nothing," or "Unicorns exist as an idea," or "Hamlet exists," or "Time is subjective." Statements like these are not truthvaluable. They don't pick anything out. These statements either assert what they deny exists (which is a contradiction), or the person simply doesn't know what he or she is trying to say. And it's an irresponsible way of making use of language.



...which is precisely why I think advertisements screw up the sensible use of language...and I don't respect advertisements at all in many cases--especially those which abuse language--or speak illogically.



Of course, these are all different contextual uses of language. But if someone is not using his or her language intelligently at all, then he or she is not using his or her language like it ought to be used.

But that's not how I set it up the example. Look, I hear people all the time trying to make statements they think have a truth-value, but are really not.

E.g., "Being is not nothing," or "Unicorns exist as an idea," or "Hamlet exists," or "Time is subjective." Statements like these are not truthvaluable. They don't pick anything out. These statements either assert what they deny exists (which is a contradiction), or the person simply doesn't know what he or she is trying to say. And it's an irresponsible way of making use of language.

Gee, if this is what you were trying to say, why didn't you use a sentence like "It is 3 pm on the sun"? or 'rocks have experiences'?

The sentence "The tiger is fierce' is perfectly fine. It doesn't violate any logico-grammatical rules. And, as the kung fu example illustrated, someone could assert it meaningfully if 'the tiger' referred to a particular move in kung fu.

I hope you don't hold the position that language essentially is used to make assertions about the world we live in. That we should analyze all sentences as if they were assertions.

There are many uses for words and sentences.

Ahab wrote:

Gee, if this is what you were trying to say, why didn't you use a sentence like "It is 3 pm on the sun"? or 'rocks have experiences'?

The sentence "The tiger is fierce' is perfectly fine. It doesn't violate any logico-grammatical rules. And, as the kung fu example illustrated, someone could assert it meaningfully if 'the tiger' referred to a particular move in kung fu.

If the student meant "the kung fu move of the tiger is fierce," that would be fine. Anything else is very problematic.

So don't you think there are rules concerning how we should and should not be using language? I mentioned in the beginning the kind of rules I was talking about were analogous to "moral" rules...remember? I never said they were syntactic/grammatical rules anyway. But I just now realized that's exactly what you were talking about.

I think both of us were being a little "thick in the head."

Ahab wrote:

I hope you don't hold the position that language essentially is used to make assertions about the world we live in. That we should analyze all sentences as if they were assertions.

There are many uses for words and sentences.

Of course, no one would make exclamations, make promises, command others to do things, etc., if there weren't.

I think you are having the similar trouble that mickalos was having--that just because I was analyzing the sentence of an advertisement on the back of a bus, that somehow I was not able to recognize these different purposes of language use. But which purpose you have in conveying an implied message is an altogether different question whether or not the sentenced used to convey that message is intelligible or not. In the case of the bus, it is not. Call me "meticulously one-sided," it doesn't matter. Philosophers do this all the time.

You know how when students take an exam, a professor will often silently put *the time* on the chalk board in order to tell students how much time remaining they have left on their exam?

I remember as an undergraduate this scenario:

5 minutes before class started when all the students were finding their seats, our professor began erasing the chalk on the chalk board made from the previous class. Apparently, the students from the prior class had an exam, because my professor erased a chalk time-indication that said "Time:12:45." But as he erased it, he mumbled to himself "I am erasing this falsehood,"--and he was right. The time indicated was false. But everyone thought it was funny. You probably don't want to be good friends with a guy like that, because he is weird after all, but that doesn't mean he wasn't correct.

I don't see why. Certainly I can see situations in which it would be problematical to use the sentence 'the tiger is fierce'. But that doesn't mean there is a real problem with this particular sentence. Any sentence can be misused.

That is not exactly what I was talking about. I'm not limiting myself to syntax. Rather I'm extending the use of 'grammar' to refer to any sense- or meaning-determining rules for the use of words. Sorry, I didn't make that clear from the beginning.

I think language is a public, rule governed practice. It is partly constitutive of the form of life and culture of its speakers.
The meaning of a word is what is given by an explanation of meaning and an explanation of meaning is a rule for the use of the word explained, a standard of correct use.

"If you can read this, then you are not using public transportation like you should be."

The meaning of the sentence appears to me to be quite intelligible.
Are you saying that you really don't understand the meaning of the sentence? I'm not talking about how it is being used but merely what it means.

I see no violation of grammatical rules as in this sentence : "It is 3 p.m. on the sun." I don't know what that sentence means, do you?

But why do you think he was correct? I think what he expressed by his mumbling is a wrongheaded view of language. I hope he didn't teach philosophy.:eek:The meaning of a sentence or expression is not true or false. What is said by the use of the sentence can be true or false.

Why would one think that what was expressed by the use of 'Time:12:45' : you only have until 12:45 to complete the test, was a falsehood?

...then where, exactly, is our disagreement???

Ahab wrote:

I see no violation of grammatical rules as in this sentence : "It is 3 p.m. on the sun." I don't know what that sentence means, do you?

That depends on your view of time. If Special Theory of Relativity is true, then that sentence doesn't make any sense.

That's not even what was expressed by that sentence.

What was expressed was: <the time is now 12:45>.

And that IS false, if the time is now 12:55.

Yes!

No, that's not what I am saying. I am saying (like I've said many times now) that I can't determine what proposition the sentence literally expresses, even though I can easily gather what the author intended to express. We come to know what that implied proposition is, namely that, "all car-drivers should be using public transportation," but the sentence itself doesn't express this proposition because it flouts the proper use of the meaning (or semantic content) of "you." The rule of use for "you" is: the function that maps the speaker to the person (or the value of the indexical "you") in a given context of discourse. The problem is that there is no speaker, hence there is no "speaker context." So, the context has to be filled in by our knowledge of background conditions, such as our knowledge of the fact that that sentence occured on a bus.


.

I am jumping into this late, but isn't the speaker who ever it is that runs the bus company, and the audience who ever is reading the notice (presumably also riding the bus)? Isn't is exactly like a memo, or a letter beginning with, "To whom it may concern"?

It appears to me that despite your acknowledged recognition of language being used in many different way, you want to treat every sentence you analyse as if it were an assertion.

The sentence on the back of the bus is not being used to express a belief that drivers should ride in buses. It presupposes that belief.

No it doesn't depend on my view of time. It depends on what rules have been given for the use of the words in that sentence. Those rules are set by convention. No scientific theory is going to give that sentence a meaning. The only way it can have a meaning is if we change the rules for the use of '3 p.m'.

And what I intended to say by that sentence is irrelevant to determining its meaning. And whether it is true or not is irrelevant to determining its meaning.

Did I misunderstand what you were saying? I thought the professor would write down the time that the test would end in order that the students would know how much time they had left.:perplexed:

Originally Posted by Ahab
Because it is not the name of a real coyote. It is the name of an imaginary coyote.
Isn't the basis for the claim of reference failure that "Wile E. Coyote" is the name of a real coyote but there is no such coyote?

No. To say of a proper noun or a noun phrase that it fails to refer is to say of it that it is a referring term, but that what it allegedly refers to does not exist. So there need not be a referent. "Abraham Lincoln" is a referring term that succeeds in referring. But "Wile" is a referring term that fails to refer. "The first man on Mars" is a referring term, but we do not know whether or not it succeeds in referring or not.

First of all, only some terms are referring terms. Those that succeed in referring refer to what exists. What else? But there are no fictional objects. So, referring terms cannot succeed in referring to them. One of your premises is false namdly, there are terms which refer to fictional objects. "Refer" is a success term. Like the term, "win (the race)". It is not a process term like, "run (the race)". Unless there is a finish line, no participant can win a race. And, unless there is an object, no term can succeed in referring".

Ken, my apologies for breaking this topic open again, but I still find problems with how you are approaching it.

I am not sure why you say this in bold above, but then....



...say this in bold here. Your view is an explicit contradiction.

Since "refer" is a success term--a transitive verb--then, (contrary to your repeated contention) necessarily "Wiley E. Coyote" is not a referring term. It therefore is not a name, since all names successfully refer.

This same error kreeps up everywhere among students. In fact, I had to explicitly articulate in detail this contradiction to Fast earlier in this thread because you had (unknowingly) misled him.

Yes, I admit that the second sentence in bold needs fixing up. But I did not say that "Wiley E. Coyote"is not a referring term. I said that it fails to refer. And why do all names successfully refer? Isn't "Wiley E. Coyote" a name? What is the error that students keep making?

The error is to think referring terms can fail to refer. To think this would be a contradiction because then the term both does and does not refer, so the term both is and is not a referring term. Contradiction. On the contrary, referring terms never fail to refer.

"Referring" is not a static predicate, it is dynamic--just as "kicking," "shopping," and "pointing" are dynamic predicates. I am sure this is where the confusion often lies.

Notice, how can I be pointing while failing to point, or be shopping while faling to shop? Or how can a term be referring while failing to refer? So long as I am shopping, I am a shopping person. So long as I am pointing, I am a pointing person. So long as a term is referring, it is a referring term.

So names must always successfully refer, because that is just what names do. That is their sole function. If a word does not refer, then that word is necessarily not a name.

Therefore, since "Wiley E. Coyote" does not refer to anything, it is not a referring term.

I don't agree.

Names are words we use to refer.
Names do refer or names do not refer.
Vulcan is the name given to 'that planet which accounts for the unusual orbit of Mercury within the context of Newtonian physics'.
Vulcan does not refer to anything because there is no such planet..by observation. Vulcan is a non-referring name.

The name 'Wiley E. Coyote' refers to the fictional character within the context of the cartoon/story.
Wiley E. Coyote is a Coyote, is true within the context of the cartoon/story, but it is false in reality.

Santa wears black boots, is also (confirmed) true only within the context of the Santa story, but it is false within the context of reality.

Pegasus flies, is true within the Pegasus story, and it implies 'Pegasus exists' within the context of the story, even though Pegasus does not refer to anything in reality.

It is not the case that (the present king of France is bald), is true, ..even though the present king of France does not refer or exist in the present world.

(the present king of France) is a referring description that does not refer.
(the whole number between 1 and 2) is a referring description that does not refer, etc. etc.

Fair enough. I can agree. Nevertheless, I still contend that no referring term is non-referring, and all non-referring names are empty names. To think otherwise is to assert a contradiction.

"Richard Nixon" still refers to Richard Nixon, even though Nixon is dead. The past and future are no less-real than the present. "Richard Nixon" doesn't suddenly stop referring to Nixon once Nixon dies.

I disagree. What is true and false is not dependent on linguistic frameworks. Existence, Truth, Reference, and Reality have univocal meanings across all English-like linguistic contexts, not a plurality of meanings, since the following semantic principle I hold to be true:

(T) For a sentence of the form "F(a)", of any language, to be true, the singular term "a" must refer to something existent.

Take, for instance, the token statement:

(S) "Sherlock Holmes is a detective."

There is only one reality, and all things that exist are parts of that reality.

So if (S) is false in the physical world, then (S) is also false within the context of the story. If, however, this is true within the story written by Arthur Conan Doyle, then it is also true in the physical world. Let's suppose, as you say, that "Sherlock Holmes" refers only to a fictional character in the story written by Arthur conan Doyle, but not to any flesh and blood person. Though not referring to any flesh and blood person, then by truth of the semantic principle (T), "Sherlock Holmes" is a singular term purportedly referring to some existent object, however abstract that object is. And if "Sherlock Holmes is a singular referring term, then "Sherlock Holmes" necessarily refers to Sherlock Holmes the abstract object. But if Sherlock Holmes is an abstract object, and not a physical object, then Sherlock Holmes cannot possess ordinary physical properties. So "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is still false, even if Sherlock Holmes refers to an abstract object.

So (S) is false both inside and outside Arthur Conan Doyle's story because either it is a statement purportedly about a non-existent entity, or a statment about a really existent abstract entity, but for which that abstract entity fails to possess the property of being a detective.

So the most one can salvage with respect to preserving the intuitive truth-value of (S) is to paraphrase it to say,

(S') "Sherlock Holmes is a detective" is found in, or implied by, the story written by Arthur Conan Doyle.

But (S') is not about Sherlock Holmes at all, but only about the story. So, (S') is true, and (S) is false. Therefore, one cannot say anything literally truth-valuable about Sherlock Holmes if Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist.

This is false. "Santa wear black boots" is true or false irrespective of the linguistic framework within which this statement is found.

Though actual contexts affect the truth-values of propositions, linguistic contexts don't affect truth-values, if the English words mean the same thing across different linguistic frameworks.



No. Like Quine before me, I contend that "existence" is univocal, and one is committed to the existence of said entities if and only if one is willing to quantify over these entities in order for one's statements about these entities to be true.



Right, because "the present King of France" is a Russelian definite description (not a name) and nothing satisfies the quantified statement now in which this assertion is embedded.



These are contradictions since definite descriptions that are purportedly referring cannot simultaneously not-refer.

Definite descriptions do not refer, at least not according to Russell. The role of reference-fixing is taken over by Quantifiers. And "the present" acts as indexical description which determines the referent of the description in any given present time.

The past and future are just as really existent as the present. So once a name refers, it always refers. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, can be satisfied by a multitude of objects. Only quantification guarantees that the definite description is satisfied by one and only one object, so long as there are no other entities satsifying the quantified statement.

Vulcan is a name (a referring term) and Vulcan does not refer.
The present king of France, is a referring term that does not refer.

"Richard Nixon"stops referring when Richard Nixon is not alive.
~(Richard Nixon is alive) -> Richard Nixon exists...is false.
There is no thing that Richard Nixon is, at the present time.

E!x <-> Ey(x=y).

The names: Santa, Sherlock, Pegasus, Vulcan, etc. are not values of the individual variable at all...because they don't refer.
Perhaps a 'free' logic would be more suitable to deal with non-referring names.

Truth is that which can be shown to be the case within some context.[/COLOR]

If Sherlock is a detective, is quoted verbatum from the story then it is true within the story.

E!(the x:Fx) <-> EyAx(x=y <-> Fx).
E!(the x:Fx) <-> Ey((the x:Fx)=y).
E!(the x:Fx) <-> (the x:Fx)=(the x:Fx)
E!(the x:Fx) <-> F(the x:Fx).
E!(the x:Fx) <-> EG(G(the x:Fx)).
etc.

Russell also claims that E!a has no meaning in philosophy, but...
E!(the x=a) <-> EyAx(x=y <-> x=a)
E!(the x=a) <-> Ey(y=a)
E!(the x=a) <-> a exists.

(the x=a)=a -> (E!(the x=a) <-> E!a), by Leibniz's Law.

I disagree. What is true and false is not dependent on linguistic frameworks. Existence, Truth, Reference, and Reality have univocal meanings across all English-like linguistic contexts, not a plurality of meanings, since the following semantic principle I hold to be true:

(T) For a sentence of the form "F(a)", of any language, to be true, the singular term "a" must refer to something existent.

Take, for instance, the token statement:

(S) "Sherlock Holmes is a detective."

I don't happen to share your concept of reference. Reference does not presuppose reality or existence. It presupposes identifiability.

So it must be possible to specify what we are talking about, either through a name or description or by ostension. Whatever we can identify, we can refer to and quantify over.

And that, of couse, includes fictional characters.
So it is true that Sherlock Holmes was a detective and that he lived at 221b Baker Street. And it is aso true that Sherlock Holmes is not a real person. Fictional characters are representations of imaginary persons.

Pace Quine, not everything exists, nor is everything real.

Then you would be wrong. "To refer" is a success term. So to be a referring term, necessarily something must exist to which the term is referring. If a term does not refer, then necessarily, that term is not a referring term. To think otherwise, is to involve yourself in a contradiction.(I am pretty sure we already went over this once before.)

I've replied to this same remark before in my discussion with Fast on this thread: The context in which the name-type "John," for instance, has to be identified before one knows whether the speaker is using the token-name "John1" or token-name "John2." But given the context, necessarily. "John" refers to John and no one else named by that same name-type.

Unfortunately, you're being sloppy here. Don't confuse the notion of satisfaction with the notion of reference. And don't confuse the notion of reference with the notion of denotation.

Descriptions don't refer. Ostension refers. Names refer.

The description "the present King of France" could be satisfied by any of the French Kings in history when this very same description is uttered at different times in history. So, "the present King of France" is not a referring term. Only names are referring terms.

"Pace Quine"? Everything you just said would be considered anti-Quinean.

If we can identify what we are referring to then we can successfully refer to it.

And that includes fictional characters.

You presuppose existence. I presuppose identifiability.

You seem to be missing the point that we are dealing with different conceptions of reference.

No. I'm not being sloppy. I never claimed that every description would enable us to identify what is being referred to. I could say I saw the present Queen of England on the tube and others would know to whom I was referring because that description does enable others to identify the referent: Queen Elizabeth II.