I wish I could.





.

---------- Post added 01-26-2010 at 05:15 PM ----------


Cool. Wasn't this the intro to For Whom the Bell Tolls also?

No.

I thought I just explained Fatalism. It is that human action is inefficacious. That is, it makes no difference to what will occur what anyone does. And that is obviously false. And, no one really believes it. This is one more of those things that some philosophers sincerely say they believe, but do not believe. They claim to believe that Fatalism is true, and they are not lying, but they really don't believe it is true. Agains, actions speak louder than words. For example, the servant might have claimed to be a Fatalist (he did not, in fact claim to be one) but he was obviously not a Fatalist, since he tried to avoid death.

Hmm. I was sure I first read this on the frontpiece for my edition of For Whom the Bell Tolls. Well, it matters not. What does matter, is that you have stuck "Che Sera, Sera" in my head, where it is now looping endlessly.
Curse you, kennethamy.
Top 10 Songs Stuck in Your Head

The not-so-wise man (the fatalist):
I'm hungry, and I can choose to eat if I want to, but why bother, for what difference could it possibly make? After all, it's not as if doing so will or will not curb my hunger, for what will happen will happen, and what will happen is beyond my control, as all that happens only happens by fate. Clearly, fatalism is true.

His wife:
Yes, you are hungry, and yes, you can choose to eat if you want to, but doing so will curb your hunger, and yes, what will happen will happen (how could that not be true?), but you confuse the idea that what will happen will happen with the idea that what will happen must happen, so it's not so that what will happen is beyond your control. Clearly, fatalism is false.

Me:
What I noticed is that both the husband and the wife agree on something-that the husband can choose to eat or not eat. What they disagree on is whether or not doing so is pointless. Although I agree that fatalism is false, I do not necessarily agree that it's not compatible with free will. Where am I going wrong?

Well, to have free will is to be able to do otherwise if you choose to do otherwise. But, according to Fatalism, choosing to do otherwise makes no difference, since what will happen, will happen, whether or not you choose.

Speaking abstractly, of course, we cannot see this. But when we see what the concrete implications of Fatalism are, we see that Fatalism is simply false.

This could be interpreted in either of two ways. Suppose you choose to perform action A in order to achieve goal G, but you are fated not to achieve G. Which of the following is the case according to fatalism?

1. You cannot perform A, i.e. your choice is ineffective from the outset.

2. You can perform A, but this will not achieve G.

The Appointment in Samarra suggests (2). The servant succeeds in performing A (riding to Samarra) but not in achieving G (escaping Death).

If free will means the freedom to perform the actions we choose, then (if (2) is correct) fatalism is compatible with free will. Of course, if free will means the guaranteed ability to achieve our goals, then fatalism is incompatible with it. But the latter interpretation of "free will" would be absurd, wouldn't it? The fact that someone fails an exam does not negate the fact that they entered it of their own free will.

So I think fatalism and free will are compatible.

The servant performed what he chose to perform, but it was ineffective, since the choice made no difference to what would happen. In other words, it is a futile choice. All choices are futile, according to Fatalism. The examinee did choose to take the exam, but to say that someone has free will is to imply that he could have done otherwise. By that we mean, could have done otherwise, if he had chosen to do otherwise. But if Fatalism is true, he could not have done otherwise even if he had chosen to do otherwise. Therefore, if Fatalism is true, no one could have done otherwise" period. And therefore, Fatalism is incompatible with free will. The fact that the person chose otherwise is quite irrelevant, since his choice is futile.

But is it possible that someone could have done otherwise, but that their choice is nevertheless futile? For example, the servant could have remained in Baghdad, but if he had, fate would have conspired to detain Death there also, so they would still have met? Does "his choice was futile" (fatalism) really imply "he could not have done otherwise" (lack of free will)?

Death expected him to be in Baghdad.

So, it made no difference whether he chose to stay in B. or go to S.

. . . fate would have contrived to detain Death there also, so they would still have met? Does "his choice was futile" (fatalism) really imply "he could not have done otherwise" (lack of free will)?

I wouldn't think that fate could contrive to do anything, as this seems to me to imply fate is somehow sentient, with deliberate motivations.

I thought Death expected him to be in Samarra ("I was astonished to see him in Baghdad"). But never mind.



What does "chosen otherwise" mean in this context? Does it mean (1) chosen to be in a different place, or (2) chosen to avoid Death? We have established that he could have chosen (1) but not (2). And surely (1) is the criterion of free will. Being in a different place is the actual thing that is freely chosen; avoiding Death (or not) is a consequence of the action chosen, not the action itself. The consequences of an action are a separate matter from whether the action itself is free.

"Avoiding person X" does not denote a distinct action that I can choose to take. All I can choose to do is to be in a particular place. Whether I avoid person X as a result is not wholly up to me, since X may be in an unexpected place, even if fatalism is untrue. So how can "I could have chosen to avoid person X" (be it 'Death' or a real person) be the criterion of free will? Clearly it cannot. The proper criterion is "I could have chosen to be elsewhere".

So, since the servant could have chosen to be elsewhere, he had free will. But he was fated to meet Death wherever he was. Thus, I would argue, free will is compatible with fatalism.

Yes, and that is why I think fatalism is implausible.

Yes, and that is why I think fatalism is implausible.

And God as well? Perhaps?

What would the implausibility of Fatalism (and, indeed, its falsity) imply anything about God?

I was merely wondering what would change if one were to
substitute the word "God" for the word "Fate," as discussions
of free will or the lack thereof often seem to involve theological
considerations, ie. "How can we be free if God knows in advance
everything we are going to do?"

Perhaps I should not equivocate such things.

By knowing in advance whatever we will do, God, in no way forces us to do it. To use Leibniz's example, God knew in advance that Judas would freely sin, but that, in no way is a reason to think that Judas did not freely sin. I may know in advance that you will have breakfast tomorrow, but that does not mean that it was not up to you to have breakfast tomorrow.

I guess this is where things get a bit muddled for me though. Let's say God knows I am going to have breakfast tomorrow, and indeed knows that I'm going to have eggs over easy, two strips of crispy bacon and a nice bagel. However, I am planning on having buckwheat pancakes. Unbeknownst to me now, I am going to discover tomorrow morning that I don't have all the ingredients for buckwheat pancakes, and so will have to have eggs, bacon and a bagel instead.

God knew this was going to be the case. In fact, if He is the omnipotent God many theists are always going on about, He knew from the beginning of creation that I was going to have eggs, bacon and a bagel tomorrow. In addition, he may also know that I am going to cut my thumb slicing my bagel and wind up with a scar that's going to serve His purpose of reminding me to be more careful in the future.

So, is my choice then, irrelevant? And, if freedom to make choices is irrelevant, what, really, is the point of free will at all? Is it just an illusion to make us feel better about our time here while we're waiting to see if there's anything on the other side?

I thought I had a point when I started writing this, but looking back now, I'm unsure what it may have been. I suppose I've had too much coffee, and am just a glutton for punishment on this forum.


.