Process views of reality generally declare that reality ultimately consists of events (moments or droplets of experience) and that each event is dipolar (possesses a mental and a material aspect depending on how it is viewed). There is one underlying reality (becoming) events with two aspects. Mind and matter are not separate as in Cartesian dualism but inseparable aspects of each event. Because there is a mental as well as a physical aspect to each event; process views of reality are in some sense inherently "panexperiential" or "panpsychic" It really is the anti thesis of classical Cartesian dualism.

Process views offer an interesting way of viewing some of the strange behaviors in the "quantum world" and many theoretical physicists view quantum observations as "events" not "particles". There are also quantum theories of gravity and space time where even space time is discrete and quantitfied not continuous. It is speculative but so is the physicalist alternative.

Nagel thinks that it is importantly true that science describes the world that exists independently of us. But this central case should not lead us to believe that understanding a subject matter is better simply if it is more objective. Importantly, the objective viewpoint is fundamentally unable to help us fully understand ourselves. Taking the proper methods of an objective scientific understanding and applying it to the mind leaves out something essential. It cannot describe what it is to be a thinker who conceives of the world from a particular perspective.

Some phenomena are not best grasped from a more objective perspective. The standpoint of the thinker does not present itself to him: he is that standpoint. One learns and uses mental concepts by being directly acquainted with one's own mind. But any attempt to think more objectively about mentality would abstract away from this fact. It would, of its nature, leave out what it is to be a thinker. And that, Nagel believes, would be a falsely objectifying view. Being a thinker is to have a subjective perspective on the world; if you abstract away from this perspective you leave out what you sought to explain.

Nagel thinks that philosophers over-impressed by the paradigm of the kind of objective understanding represented by modern science tend to produce theories of the mind that are falsely objectifying in precisely this kind of way. They are right to be impressed - modern science really is objective - but are wrong to be over-impressed. The kind of understanding that science represents does not transfer to everything that we would like to understand. Mapping out, for different areas of inquiry, whether they are better understood in a more or less objective way is the central aim of Nagel's philosophy.

Conscious experience is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life, though we cannot be sure of its presence in the simpler organisms, and it is very difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it. (Some extremists have been prepared to deny it even of mammals other than man.) No doubt it occurs in countless forms totally unimaginable to us, on other planets in other solar systems throughout the universe. But no matter how the form may vary, the fact that an organism has conscious experience at alllmeans, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism. There may be further implications about the form of the experience; there may even (though I doubt it) be implications about the behavior of the organism. But fundamentally an organism has conscious mentalstates if and only if there is something that it is to be that organism-something it is like for the organism.

We may call this the subjective character of experience. It is not captured by any of the familiar, recently devised reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing. It is not analyzable in terms of the causal role of experiences in relation to typical human behavior-for similar reasons. I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced. If the analysis leaves something out, the problem will be falsely posed. It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character.

A challenge to the notion that the "consciousness" form of mind emerges from the complex arrangement of elements which themselves have no inherent form of experience or properties of mind whatsoever.

Rocks are simple aggregates; concretions as such as "rocks" have no form of integrated or unified experience whatsoever. The assertion of the more extensive forms of "panpsychism" is that the elementary particles in the rocks do have some primitive form of individual experience of the world around them.

It seems your sample size is a bit biased in reference to your population. I don't see the logical leap to say that since humans and most vertebrates are conscious, that rocks and elementary particles are as well. The inference from premise to conclusion doesn't seem valid to me.

Yes, I would agree that we 'co-construct' our realities, but that doesn't make the experience of them any less individual or private. We can speculate, as we are now, that our experiences are the result of our interactions with the world and each other (as external objects), but our experiences themselves are in no way 'interactive' or shared. We cannot truly escape our subjectivity, though we can speculate on 'objective' reality (but this speculation is still individual experience: i.e. thought experienced by me privately, not shared).

units of experience

In fact the notion that the primary constituents of reality are "events, moments or occasions or experience" does make fundamental reality much more complex than the notion that the primary elements of reality are without experience (inert and insensate).

It is the notion that mental properties can arise from elements which have no mental properties that is objected to.

Of course there is no physicalist answer either

"Given the undeniable reality of experience, Why insist that physical stuff in itself, in its most basic nature, is essentially non experiential?"

There are no 'units of experience'. There are moments of experience; a unit is an object of measurement but a moment exists within perception. So there is a difference between a 'unit' and a 'moment'. A unit is something that can be observed, but a moment is something that can only be experienced.

What I am considering is that 'science presumes order.' The question of the origin of order is beyond science, but science can only proceed on the basis that it already exists.

Exactly what would a physicalist explanation of love entail almost by definition it would have to exclude the actual experience. It would be "misplaced concreteness" a "fallacy of composition".

That the universe is self organizing and that novel properties emerge from complex chaotic systems is not at issue. It is the nature of underlying reality itself that is at issue. Is ultimate reality composed of physicalist entities entirely devoid of interiority and experience (inert and insensate)?.

It is not however as "absurd, silly, foolish, or preposterous" as it may appear on first glance. Panpsycism also offers benefits in the ecological and spiritual realms of contemplation.

... to a reductive physicalist, you and I are both absurd, silly, and foolish ...

I am trying to keep my cool but if you continue this route then I will no longer reply.