dispositional/categorical distinction The world consisting of only mind.

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Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 01:26 pm
A) Read about dispositional and categorical properties here: Dispositional and Categorical Properties - Bibliography | PhilPapers

B) Also listen about dispositional/categorical distinction here :The Mind and the World

The definition given from B by Howard Robinson is the following:

CP) categorical properties of an object are the properties of an object independent of it` s effect with other things.


DP) Dispositional properties of an object are the properties of an object in relation to other objects.


K) According to kant, there are what things appear to us, and there are what things are in-them-self( Immanuel Kant -- Metaphysics [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]).
The latter is unknownable.


According to Howard Roberson( in 2), his argument is of the following form:

1) There are what things appear to us, and there are what things are in-them-selves( From K).

2) Science tells us only the dispositional properties of things, and not the categorical properties of things( From B). As Roberson say, science only tell us what things do in relationship to one another, but not on what the intrinsic properties of things really are.

3) All we know from science is the dispositional properties of things as it appear to us( From 1 and 2).

4) We do not know the intrinsic properties of things in themselves, or the categorical properties of things( from 3).

5) According to Robertson, we ought not to accept things are in-themselves. He call it: "this mysteries thing working behind daily experience". He claim that are there is is the world of experience, thought patterns( from B according to 1,2 ,3, 4).


What do you guys think?
 
Holiday20310401
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 01:51 pm
@vectorcube,
So are there really any 'things' at all then? Wink

If this is a topic that you are interested in I'd be happy to discuss it with you. The only problem is, what exactly is there to 'know' about this.

I don't think there is anything in-themselves. How can categorical properties exist within an object if the object itself is a dispositional quality. So what exactly is it that is dispositional.

This is why I feel "be's" and "is's" are obsolete if one is to go further in this train of thought.
 
Zetetic11235
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 03:07 pm
@Holiday20310401,
Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

There may be certain subjective qualities that are not subject to being accurately communicated, such as the context in which you perceive an object or the qualitative aspects such as color or smell, which are only communicated in a relational context with no way to verify if the correct sense object has been communicated or not.

Think about this, I see red like you see blue. I see blue like you see red. When they mix the still make the same purple for both of us, but I see orange as green ect. We can still communicate in respect to color, and when you say 'look at that orange cat!' and point at a tabby, I will know what you are talking about, but the qualitative aspects remain untouched. You can't verify how I experience a color, only that the relational framework between my colors is consistent with yours. If it is inconsistent, I am either color blind or I have some odd condition where I might look at a green stool one minuet and then I see it as purple, but this shift is entirely internal, so that it happens only for me(no clue why this would be).

So the distinction is primarily linguistic, the object you experience is different that the aspects of the object that can be accurately communicated in a verifiable way. The size of the object can be communicated, the relational aspect of its color can be communicated, it can be compared to other objects that you and another person have a shared experience of. Every aspect of the object is still relational, however, but aspects such as the qualitative aspect of color are totally internalized and totally inconsequential.
 
Holiday20310401
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 03:26 pm
@Zetetic11235,
Dispositional properties are entirely relative and subjective.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 03:33 pm
@Zetetic11235,
Zetetic11235;73745 wrote:
Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

There may be certain subjective qualities that are not subject to being accurately communicated, such as the context in which you perceive an object or the qualitative aspects such as color or smell, which are only communicated in a relational context with no way to verify if the correct sense object has been communicated or not.

Think about this, I see red like you see blue. I see blue like you see red. When they mix the still make the same purple for both of us, but I see orange as green ect. We can still communicate in respect to color, and when you say 'look at that orange cat!' and point at a tabby, I will know what you are talking about, but the qualitative aspects remain untouched. You can't verify how I experience a color, only that the relational framework between my colors is consistent with yours. If it is inconsistent, I am either color blind or I have some odd condition where I might look at a green stool one minuet and then I see it as purple, but this shift is entirely internal, so that it happens only for me(no clue why this would be).

So the distinction is primarily linguistic, the object you experience is different that the aspects of the object that can be accurately communicated in a verifiable way. The size of the object can be communicated, the relational aspect of its color can be communicated, it can be compared to other objects that you and another person have a shared experience of. Every aspect of the object is still relational, however, but aspects such as the qualitative aspect of color are totally internalized and totally inconsequential.


I wonder how, then, when we identify something as red, and then, a little later, we identify another object as red, we know that we mean the same thing by "red" the second time, as we did the first time. For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.
 
Holiday20310401
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 03:36 pm
@kennethamy,
Kenneth, when we call something red or orange, we are calling a dispositional property red or orange. We are not attempting to label a categorical property, so what's the point.
 
nameless
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 03:38 pm
@vectorcube,
vectorcube;73716 wrote:
According to kant, there are what things appear to us, and there are what things are in-them-self

The latter is unknownable.

What 'appears to us' is a feature of the complete 'thing', one Perspective.
The only way that a 'thing-in-itself' can be delivered from the 'fantasy zone', is if 'translated' in the context of the complete 'thing';

"The complete Universe (or any feature ('thing') of it) can be defined/described as the sum-total of all Conscious Perspectives!" - Book of Fudd (4:20)

The complete Universe (or any feature (thing) thereof) is unknowable (un-perceivable) to any single (inherently limited to one extent or another) Perspective.
 
Holiday20310401
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 03:58 pm
@nameless,
nameless;73755 wrote:


"The complete Universe (or any feature ('thing') of it) can be defined/described as the sum-total of all Conscious Perspectives!" - Book of Fudd (4:20)

The complete Universe (or any feature (thing) thereof) is unknowable (un-perceivable) to any single (inherently limited to one extent or another) Perspective.


Nameless, are these absolutes??!:Not-Impressed:

And where can I pick me up one of those book of Fudd's.Smile
 
Zetetic11235
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 04:17 pm
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;73752 wrote:
I wonder how, then, when we identify something as red, and then, a little later, we identify another object as red, we know that we mean the same thing by "red" the second time, as we did the first time. For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.


So, considering that I addressed what you are bringing up, you basically either did not read or did not understand this: You can't verify how I experience a color, only that the relational framework between my colors is consistent with yours. If it is inconsistent, I am either color blind or I have some odd condition where I might look at a green stool one minuet and then I see it as purple, but this shift is entirely internal, so that it happens only for me(no clue why this would be).

remember, I said 'Think about this; I see red like you see blue. I see blue like you see red. When they mix the still make the same color, purple, for both of us, but I see orange as green ect. We can still communicate in respect to color, and when you say 'look at that orange cat!' and point at a tabby, I will know what you are talking about. This is meant to illustrate that as long as the way that I view colors is consistent, there is no difference that can be communicated if my perception of two colors is switched like in the above example. So the quality of the color is not something that can be communicated, only its relation to other colors or as an indicator such as 'that black cat' as opposed to 'that white cat'.

kennethamy;73752 wrote:
For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.


If we were seeing two different wavelengths as red, we could know it by simply looking at one beam of light with a known wavelength and run a beam through the visable spectrum for comparison. If there is repetition, we will know. This could be ruled out in a relational way.

Hopefully you now better understand where I am coming from.
 
vectorcube
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 04:37 pm
@Holiday20310401,
Holiday20310401;73724 wrote:


I don't think there is anything in-themselves. How can categorical properties exist within an object if the object itself is a dispositional quality. So what exactly is it that is dispositional.


If you read the link from B. Roberson seems to think there are no "things" at all, but just a series of sensations or patterns of sensations. Since all we know are dispositions of things, and never the thing itself. One can ask why we need "something" behind the world of sense experience.
 
Holiday20310401
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 04:42 pm
@vectorcube,
And this is where we get a paradox, because now we are left with the question, do we need an actuality to have this reality we perceive, something I feel deserves a bit more thinking.

Does consciousness require actuality, and could looking at this in such a causal manner be reason for why the paradox has arisen, and should we think about this differently, if so, then how so.

With causal paradoxes, how does one think differently in order to overcome them. One way, is to monize the system, but this is like saying "how could all this come to be, I'll just say God made it", it's silliness now that I think about it. Holism is much the same way, it doesn't really solve the problem, but more so attempts to ignore it.
 
vectorcube
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 04:42 pm
@Zetetic11235,
Zetetic11235;73745 wrote:
Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

There may be certain subjective qualities that are not subject to being accurately communicated, such as the context in which you perceive an object or the qualitative aspects such as color or smell, which are only communicated in a relational context with no way to verify if the correct sense object has been communicated or not.

Think about this, I see red like you see blue. I see blue like you see red. When they mix the still make the same purple for both of us, but I see orange as green ect. We can still communicate in respect to color, and when you say 'look at that orange cat!' and point at a tabby, I will know what you are talking about, but the qualitative aspects remain untouched. You can't verify how I experience a color, only that the relational framework between my colors is consistent with yours. If it is inconsistent, I am either color blind or I have some odd condition where I might look at a green stool one minuet and then I see it as purple, but this shift is entirely internal, so that it happens only for me(no clue why this would be).


Well, the experience of blue, and red would be what kant consider" things that appear to us" for Kant. The thesis from roberson in B of the thread is to say that all we have are pattern of experiences, and nothing more. There is no object behind the experience, just the experience of daily life.

---------- Post added at 05:45 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:42 PM ----------

kennethamy;73752 wrote:
I wonder how, then, when we identify something as red, and then, a little later, we identify another object as red, we know that we mean the same thing by "red" the second time, as we did the first time. For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.



The only solution is to invoke universals, but to do so would invoke universal realism. I don ` t like it, because it is not my taste.

---------- Post added at 05:47 PM ---------- Previous post was at 05:42 PM ----------

nameless;73755 wrote:
What 'appears to us' is a feature of the complete 'thing', one Perspective.
The only way that a 'thing-in-itself' can be delivered from the 'fantasy zone', is if 'translated' in the context of the complete 'thing';

"The complete Universe (or any feature ('thing') of it) can be defined/described as the sum-total of all Conscious Perspectives!" - Book of Fudd (4:20)

The complete Universe (or any feature (thing) thereof) is unknowable (un-perceivable) to any single (inherently limited to one extent or another) Perspective.


This perspective collapse to idealism. If you really belive experience determines the whole of a thing, why do we even need the thing behind sense experience? Idealism!
 
Zetetic11235
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 05:19 pm
@vectorcube,
I said this :Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

I also say that an object is simply a bundle of occurrences.

That view assumes this:

We have patterns of experience.

However, I reject this:

vectorcube;73782 wrote:
There is no object behind the experience, just the experience of daily life.


What does it mean when we say that there is an object behind our experience of it? What we can say is this: We gain the sum total of our knowledge from experience and tautologies. Of course, this does not imply idealism, but rather ignores it along with realism and neutralism (which are virtually indistinguishable ideas), since these ideas are not verifiable, that is, they are neither empirically testable nor tautological. It is a big dance around what is really there that gives a conclusion that cannot be shown to be either true or false, and really gives us nothing but a new way to state what we already knew.

We cannot verify that there is an object beyond our experience of it, for any verification would simply be the verification of our experience of the object. The very idea precludes the possibility of its verification.

I would say of Roberson that his ultimate assertion just as wrong as what he is attacking. 'objects behind experience' certainly aren't something verifiable. Really, he should be saying that 'objects behind experience' are not verifiable, they are not deducible, and therefore they are ontologically undecidable.
 
Holiday20310401
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 05:37 pm
@Zetetic11235,
And therefore they are not objects. Actuality transcends understanding.

Can there be such a thing as categorical particles?
 
nameless
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 08:43 pm
@vectorcube,
vectorcube;73779 wrote:
Since all we know are dispositions of things, and never the thing itself. One can ask why we need "something" behind the world of sense experience.

A) Many are intterested in the 'reality' beyond the superficial.
B) When we understand a 'reality' beyond yesterday's reality, the world-view becomes/is different also. With understanding, the Universe is different/perceived differently...
Understanding the trans-superficial understanding of a car, for instance, we are better able to keep it fit and functioning, thus, explanding the 'possibilities' of our world, such as going for a longer trip sans stress.
"Knowledge' is power. 'Power' makes for a different world than a powerless one. Etc.. Thats why many 'need' to know, to understand. Thats what philosophers and scientists and mystics do.
 
vectorcube
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 11:04 pm
@Zetetic11235,
Zetetic11235;73790 wrote:


However, I reject this:



What does it mean when we say that there is an object behind our experience of it? What we can say is this: We gain the sum total of our knowledge from experience and tautologies. Of course, this does not imply idealism, but rather ignores it along with realism and neutralism (which are virtually indistinguishable ideas), since these ideas are not verifiable, that is, they are neither empirically testable nor tautological. It is a big dance around what is really there that gives a conclusion that cannot be shown to be either true or false, and really gives us nothing but a new way to state what we already knew.

We cannot verify that there is an object beyond our experience of it, for any verification would simply be the verification of our experience of the object. The very idea precludes the possibility of its verification.

I would say of Roberson that his ultimate assertion just as wrong as what he is attacking. 'objects behind experience' certainly aren't something verifiable. Really, he should be saying that 'objects behind experience' are not verifiable, they are not deducible, and therefore they are ontologically undecidable.


It is true that objects behind sense experience is ontologically undecidable. I agree with you here.

Quote:



That view assumes this:

We have patterns of experience.


Here, i think you are just stating a obvious fact, namely, there are pattern of experiences.


Quote:

Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

I also say that an object is simply a bundle of occurrences



I am not sure what this means. The ontological issue is "is there anything behind the sense experience?". The answer is either yes, or no. This is an ontological thesis. You can voice epistemic concerns, and doubt that we could ever answer such a question, but that is not related to ontology.

---------- Post added at 12:09 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:04 AM ----------

Holiday20310401;73793 wrote:
And therefore they are not objects. Actuality transcends understanding.

Can there be such a thing as categorical particles?



I think that if we can imagine an empty universe with only one electron, and we can identify it as an electron in such and such possible world, then the answer is yes.

---------- Post added at 12:14 AM ---------- Previous post was at 12:04 AM ----------

nameless;73838 wrote:
A) Many are intterested in the 'reality' beyond the superficial.
B) When we understand a 'reality' beyond yesterday's reality, the world-view becomes/is different also. With understanding, the Universe changes.
Understanding the trans-superficial understanding of a car, for instance, we are better able to keep it fit and functioning, thus, explanding the 'possibilities' of our world, such as going for a longer trip sans stress.
"Knowledge' is power. 'Power' makes for a different world than a powerless one. Etc.. Thats why many 'need' to know, to understand. Thats what philosophers and scientists and mystics do.



To say that "you want to understand the reality behind everyday experiences" presuppose there is a really behind everyday experiences. It is a completely cogent position to maintain that all there is are patterns of daily experiences. That the feeling of uncovering the reality behind the sense is really just uncovering different patterns of sense experience.
 
nameless
 
Reply Tue 30 Jun, 2009 11:51 pm
@vectorcube,
vectorcube;73878 wrote:

To say that "you want to understand the reality behind everyday experiences" presuppose there is a really behind everyday experiences.

Science and philosophy have shown us the truth that there is a reality 'beyond' that which our naive sensory data indicates.

Quote:
It is a completely cogent position to maintain that all there is are patterns of daily experiences.

Cogent, but limited.
Science, for example, has discovered that the earth is an oblate spheroid, and not flat; orbits the sun rather than vice versa. 'Reality', for all, has become different along with that advance in understanding of our perceptions of our worlds.

Quote:
That the feeling of uncovering the reality behind the sense is really just uncovering different patterns of sense experience.

Perhaps, but not necessarily so.
I guess that you haven't seen too deeply yet, so that statement of your's is 'true', for you in your perceived world. Your 'truth' ain't necessarily everyone's 'truth'. And the 'obvious truth' of the moment is the falsehood of another moment.
Your sense data, like everything, is perceived.
Our understanding of our worlds do not come from the fingers and the eyes, they come from mind/perception of, within which are fingers and eyes and 'blue' and 'rough'.
So called 'sense experience' is no more than another perception. The blue is not in the sky or in your eye, it is in mind/perception.
There is no difference between what you might call 'sensory experience' and perception. We perceive the sky, we perceive thoughts about the sky, we perceive existence which is exactly as we perceive it, and so much more (the sum total of all perceptions).
The reality is that there is no 'out there' for our senses to discern.
It is all Consciousness/Mind.
 
vectorcube
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 12:28 am
@nameless,
Quote:
Science and philosophy have shown us the truth that there is a reality 'beyond' that which our naive sensory data indicates.


What authority?


Quote:

Cogent, but limited.
Science, for example, has discovered that the earth is an oblate spheroid, and not flat; orbits the sun rather than vice versa. 'Reality', for all, has become different along with that advance in understanding of our perceptions of our worlds.


It is perfactly cogent to maintain that such discoveries are really uncovering different pattern of sense experience. DIfferent in the sense that we need more work to find out. Imagine the movie matrix. In the movie, people think they are really planets orbiting around the sun etc. Matter of fact is that everything is a giant computer. What they thought as the movement of planets are just the movements of certain pattern of experience ( like color) in their mind.
 
nameless
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 12:55 am
@vectorcube,
vectorcube;73903 wrote:
nameless wrote:
Science and philosophy have shown us the truth that there is a reality 'beyond' that which our naive sensory data indicates.

What authority?

I hope that you aren't asking me to commit the fallacy of argument from authority?
Study some of the refutations of the philosophy of 'naive realism' to learn why it is, and has been, a refuted and obsolete philosophy for centuries.
Perhaps you might learn some of what quantum physics has discovered (Consciousness).
There is plenty of data for your reading pleasure.
Rather than 'physical reality' containing us, as has been naively assumed, it indicates that we (and it) are features within "Consciousness, the Ground of All Being" - Copenhagen interpretation

Quote:
Quote:
Cogent, but limited.
Science, for example, has discovered that the earth is an oblate spheroid, and not flat; orbits the sun rather than vice versa. 'Reality', for all, has become different along with that advance in understanding of our perceptions of our worlds.

It is perfactly cogent to maintain that such discoveries are really uncovering different pattern of sense experience. DIfferent in the sense that we need more work to find out. Imagine the movie matrix. In the movie, people think they are really planets orbiting around the sun etc. Matter of fact is that everything is a giant computer. What they thought as the movement of planets are just the movements of certain pattern of experience ( like color) in their mind.

Yes, it is all cogent until one finds that one's toys are all in the mind.
What they thought was real in the movie, like the people on the streets in your town, think that this is real also. For you both, it is real, a feature of the complete reality.
Everything exists, everything is real, all perceptions are limited as all Conscious Perspectivs are limited.
Wether you 'touch' something with your finger or imagine a unicorn, they are both 'real' within their context. Touching something (we really cannot touch anything) doesn't make it 'realer' then imagining something.
Is the 'imagination' a 'sense'? Are the 'thoughts' sensory?
No, Reality transcends the 'senses'. You cannot sense 'this' reality! Yet it is a true feature of the Universe, 'real'.

"To know 'Reality' you must see it, physically or mentally; with 'Truth', you must know it before you can see it." - Lloyd Graham
 
vectorcube
 
Reply Wed 1 Jul, 2009 01:12 am
@nameless,
Quote:

Study some of the refutations of the philosophy of 'naive realism' to learn why it is, and has been, a refuted and obsolete philosophy for centuries.


Be specific. Give me an author, or a book.

Quote:

Rather than 'physical reality' containing us, as has been naively assumed, it indicates that we (and it) are features within "Consciousness, the Ground of All Being" - Copenhagen interpretation



There are other interpretations. I know the interpretation of how consciousness collapse the time evolution of the wave equation. It is the cause for a alot of talk about realism in science, but this is not exactly what i am talking about. There is a probability value associated to each eigenvalues observables of a corresponding hermitian operator. The observables are still there in the world exist as potentiality, but collapse to some value by an observation. Idealism is a whole different concept.
 
 

 
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