Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

There may be certain subjective qualities that are not subject to being accurately communicated, such as the context in which you perceive an object or the qualitative aspects such as color or smell, which are only communicated in a relational context with no way to verify if the correct sense object has been communicated or not.

Think about this, I see red like you see blue. I see blue like you see red. When they mix the still make the same purple for both of us, but I see orange as green ect. We can still communicate in respect to color, and when you say 'look at that orange cat!' and point at a tabby, I will know what you are talking about, but the qualitative aspects remain untouched. You can't verify how I experience a color, only that the relational framework between my colors is consistent with yours. If it is inconsistent, I am either color blind or I have some odd condition where I might look at a green stool one minuet and then I see it as purple, but this shift is entirely internal, so that it happens only for me(no clue why this would be).

So the distinction is primarily linguistic, the object you experience is different that the aspects of the object that can be accurately communicated in a verifiable way. The size of the object can be communicated, the relational aspect of its color can be communicated, it can be compared to other objects that you and another person have a shared experience of. Every aspect of the object is still relational, however, but aspects such as the qualitative aspect of color are totally internalized and totally inconsequential.

According to kant, there are what things appear to us, and there are what things are in-them-self

The latter is unknownable.

"The complete Universe (or any feature ('thing') of it) can be defined/described as the sum-total of all Conscious Perspectives!" - Book of Fudd (4:20)

The complete Universe (or any feature (thing) thereof) is unknowable (un-perceivable) to any single (inherently limited to one extent or another) Perspective.

I wonder how, then, when we identify something as red, and then, a little later, we identify another object as red, we know that we mean the same thing by "red" the second time, as we did the first time. For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.

For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.

I don't think there is anything in-themselves. How can categorical properties exist within an object if the object itself is a dispositional quality. So what exactly is it that is dispositional.

Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

There may be certain subjective qualities that are not subject to being accurately communicated, such as the context in which you perceive an object or the qualitative aspects such as color or smell, which are only communicated in a relational context with no way to verify if the correct sense object has been communicated or not.

Think about this, I see red like you see blue. I see blue like you see red. When they mix the still make the same purple for both of us, but I see orange as green ect. We can still communicate in respect to color, and when you say 'look at that orange cat!' and point at a tabby, I will know what you are talking about, but the qualitative aspects remain untouched. You can't verify how I experience a color, only that the relational framework between my colors is consistent with yours. If it is inconsistent, I am either color blind or I have some odd condition where I might look at a green stool one minuet and then I see it as purple, but this shift is entirely internal, so that it happens only for me(no clue why this would be).

I wonder how, then, when we identify something as red, and then, a little later, we identify another object as red, we know that we mean the same thing by "red" the second time, as we did the first time. For all we know, according to you, we may be calling very different colors "red". In fact, we are in the same position as regards our earlier or later selves, as we are in regard to someone else.

What 'appears to us' is a feature of the complete 'thing', one Perspective.
The only way that a 'thing-in-itself' can be delivered from the 'fantasy zone', is if 'translated' in the context of the complete 'thing';

"The complete Universe (or any feature ('thing') of it) can be defined/described as the sum-total of all Conscious Perspectives!" - Book of Fudd (4:20)

The complete Universe (or any feature (thing) thereof) is unknowable (un-perceivable) to any single (inherently limited to one extent or another) Perspective.

There is no object behind the experience, just the experience of daily life.

Since all we know are dispositions of things, and never the thing itself. One can ask why we need "something" behind the world of sense experience.

However, I reject this:



What does it mean when we say that there is an object behind our experience of it? What we can say is this: We gain the sum total of our knowledge from experience and tautologies. Of course, this does not imply idealism, but rather ignores it along with realism and neutralism (which are virtually indistinguishable ideas), since these ideas are not verifiable, that is, they are neither empirically testable nor tautological. It is a big dance around what is really there that gives a conclusion that cannot be shown to be either true or false, and really gives us nothing but a new way to state what we already knew.

We cannot verify that there is an object beyond our experience of it, for any verification would simply be the verification of our experience of the object. The very idea precludes the possibility of its verification.

I would say of Roberson that his ultimate assertion just as wrong as what he is attacking. 'objects behind experience' certainly aren't something verifiable. Really, he should be saying that 'objects behind experience' are not verifiable, they are not deducible, and therefore they are ontologically undecidable.

That view assumes this:

We have patterns of experience.

Every aspect of an object makes itself manifest in the object's interactions, whether the object is interacting with our senses or with another object/set of objects or both.

I also say that an object is simply a bundle of occurrences

And therefore they are not objects. Actuality transcends understanding.

Can there be such a thing as categorical particles?

A) Many are intterested in the 'reality' beyond the superficial.
B) When we understand a 'reality' beyond yesterday's reality, the world-view becomes/is different also. With understanding, the Universe changes.
Understanding the trans-superficial understanding of a car, for instance, we are better able to keep it fit and functioning, thus, explanding the 'possibilities' of our world, such as going for a longer trip sans stress.
"Knowledge' is power. 'Power' makes for a different world than a powerless one. Etc.. Thats why many 'need' to know, to understand. Thats what philosophers and scientists and mystics do.

To say that "you want to understand the reality behind everyday experiences" presuppose there is a really behind everyday experiences.

It is a completely cogent position to maintain that all there is are patterns of daily experiences.

That the feeling of uncovering the reality behind the sense is really just uncovering different patterns of sense experience.

Science and philosophy have shown us the truth that there is a reality 'beyond' that which our naive sensory data indicates.

Cogent, but limited.
Science, for example, has discovered that the earth is an oblate spheroid, and not flat; orbits the sun rather than vice versa. 'Reality', for all, has become different along with that advance in understanding of our perceptions of our worlds.

nameless wrote:

Science and philosophy have shown us the truth that there is a reality 'beyond' that which our naive sensory data indicates.

What authority?

Quote:

Cogent, but limited.
Science, for example, has discovered that the earth is an oblate spheroid, and not flat; orbits the sun rather than vice versa. 'Reality', for all, has become different along with that advance in understanding of our perceptions of our worlds.

It is perfactly cogent to maintain that such discoveries are really uncovering different pattern of sense experience. DIfferent in the sense that we need more work to find out. Imagine the movie matrix. In the movie, people think they are really planets orbiting around the sun etc. Matter of fact is that everything is a giant computer. What they thought as the movement of planets are just the movements of certain pattern of experience ( like color) in their mind.

Study some of the refutations of the philosophy of 'naive realism' to learn why it is, and has been, a refuted and obsolete philosophy for centuries.

Rather than 'physical reality' containing us, as has been naively assumed, it indicates that we (and it) are features within "Consciousness, the Ground of All Being" - Copenhagen interpretation