Of course moral codes and judgments exist. But that is not the issue. The issue is whether moral judgments are true or false, and if they are, what that means. The view that moral judgments are true or false is called, "moral cognitivism". It is a different question whether moral cognitivism implies moral objectivism.

Thank you for the clarification. However, I as I am defining moral nihilism simply as the denial of the existence of objective moral truth, that means (I think) that I am defining moral nihilism as non-objectivism. Under my definition of nihilism, value judgments may be made, but such judgments do not correspond to any objective moral truth. I'll grant you, then, that my definition of moral nihilism may be more inclusive than is conventional.

I am looking for convincing arguments against moral nihilism.

Lately, I have found myself attracted to moral nihilism, as espoused by Mackie and Joyce. I define moral nihilism as the denial of the existence of objective moral truth. However, as moral nihilism is both counterintuitive and uncomfortable, I would like to ask whether any of you are aware of any convincing arguments that refute this position. As I am an atheist, please keep in mind that any arguments that invoke God would not be convincing. In the following, I will summarize the case for moral nihilism:

The only evidence for the existence of objective moral truth is our so-called moral intuition. However, this intuition is unreliable, and it may be alternatively explained by natural selection. It is unreliable because there is wide disagreement over the actual content of objective moral truth (Mackie's "argument from relativity"). It may be explained by natural selection by noting that empathy (the basis, in my view, of moral intuition) would likely promote group coherence and cooperation for mutual benefit, thereby enabling those with empathy to survive and reproduce more successfully than those who are non-empathetic. Furthermore, if objective moral truth existed, it would be a strange metaphysical entity indeed (Mackie's "argument from queerness"), as it would be intrinsically motivating, yet not confirmable by sense-data. Therefore, applying Occam's Razor, one should not posit such a strange entity if the only evidence for it (so-called moral intuition) is unreliable and may be explained instead by a scientific theory (natural selection) that is widely accepted.

For those who reject moral nihilism, I propose the following challenge: How would one motivate a non-empathetic atheist--who is convinced that he will not get caught--to refrain from a harmful action (such as torturing a child for fun)?

Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it all possible concessions, we must acknowledge that there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for giving it the preference above virtue, with a view of self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, where a man, taking things in a certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his integrity. And though it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think that an act of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach in the social union and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy, may be a good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions.

I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning much requires an answer, it would be a little difficult to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and convincing. If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue; and we may expect that this practice will be answerable to his speculation. But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them.

Such a one has, besides, the frequent satisfaction of seeing knaves, with all their pretended cunning and abilities, betrayed by their own maxims; and while they purpose to cheat with moderation and secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, and they give into the snare; whence they can never extricate themselves, without a total loss of reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and confidence with mankind.

But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest man, if he has any tincture of philosophy, or even common observation and reflection, will discover that they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, with themselves at least, for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws. How little is requisite to supply the necessities of nature? And in a view to pleasure, what comparison between the unbought satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even health and the common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection on one's own conduct; what comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty amusements of luxury and expense? These natural pleasures, indeed, are really without price; both because they are below all price in their attainment, and above it in their enjoyment.

And if one cannot do so, how can one posit the existence of objective moral truth (objective in the sense that it applies to everyone, and moral truth in the sense that it should provide at least some motivational force)?

Again, I am looking for convincing arguments against moral nihilism. Thank you for your time.

Lately, I have found myself attracted to moral nihilism, as espoused by Mackie and Joyce. I define moral nihilism as the denial of the existence of objective moral truth. However, as moral nihilism is both counterintuitive and uncomfortable, I would like to ask whether any of you are aware of any convincing arguments that refute this position. As I am an atheist, please keep in mind that any arguments that invoke God would not be convincing. In the following, I will summarize the case for moral nihilism:

The only evidence for the existence of objective moral truth is our so-called moral intuition. However, this intuition is unreliable, and it may be alternatively explained by natural selection. It is unreliable because there is wide disagreement over the actual content of objective moral truth (Mackie's "argument from relativity"). It may be explained by natural selection by noting that empathy (the basis, in my view, of moral intuition) would likely promote group coherence and cooperation for mutual benefit, thereby enabling those with empathy to survive and reproduce more successfully than those who are non-empathetic. Furthermore, if objective moral truth existed, it would be a strange metaphysical entity indeed (Mackie's "argument from queerness"), as it would be intrinsically motivating, yet not confirmable by sense-data. Therefore, applying Occam's Razor, one should not posit such a strange entity if the only evidence for it (so-called moral intuition) is unreliable and may be explained instead by a scientific theory (natural selection) that is widely accepted.

For those who reject moral nihilism, I propose the following challenge: How would one motivate a non-empathetic atheist--who is convinced that he will not get caught--to refrain from a harmful action (such as torturing a child for fun)? And if one cannot do so, how can one posit the existence of objective moral truth (objective in the sense that it applies to everyone, and moral truth in the sense that it should provide at least some motivational force)?

Again, I am looking for convincing arguments against moral nihilism. Thank you for your time.

objective in the sense that it applies to everyone, and moral truth in the sense that it should provide at least some motivational force

Something implicit in this discussion is that we are only talking about an objective morality as it applies to humans. I am sure that everyone reading this is aware of this.

There aren't any.

Saying "abortion is wrong" is like saying "the King of France is bald". There is no King of France and there is no wrongness. The only question left is whether sentences like "abortion is wrong" or "the King of France is bald" are false (error theory) or meaningless (non-cognitivism).

But to say that all moral judgments are false (or meaningless) is to do exactly that: conflate moral judgments with factual ones.

That's clearly false though because that's not what I'm doing.

moral judgments are a proper subclass of factual judgments

Conflation occurs when the identities of two or more individuals, concepts, or places, sharing some characteristics of one another, become confused until there seems to be only a single identity - the differences appear to become lost.

Saying that X is a subclass of Y is not the same as conflating X and Y. Do you even know what "conflating" means?



Saying that a F150 truck is a subclass of Ford vehicles is not conflating F150 trucks and Ford vehicles. I'm sure you would have realized that if you took the time to think about what you're typing.

If X is a proper subclass of Y, then all members of X are members of Y (although, of course, it is not true that all members of Y are members of X). So, to say that the class of moral judgments is a proper subclass of factual judgments, as you are when you say that all moral judgment are false, is to say that all moral judgments are factual judgment (although it is not to say the converse, of course). Is that what you are on about?

What I'm on about is that you are wrong. I'm not conflating anything. Once you can admit that you're wrong then we can proceed.

Wrong about what? To say that all moral judgments are factual judgments is to conflate the two even if the converse is not true.

That's false. That's not conflating the two. The fact that the converse is not true means that they are still separable ideas. By your reasoning, to say that all Ford trucks are Ford vehicles is to conflate trucks and vehicles. That's false. That's simply not what the word "conflate" means. If I was actually conflating something, that would be cause for concern. However, I'm not and you haven't provided evidence that I am.

But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to treachery and roguery is too strong to be counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest man, who feels the importance of them.