If a certain maleable set of morals are hardwired into a species, or even if the simple need for morals is hard wired into the species, how does this not refute nihlism? <-- not a rhetorical question BTW.

Moral nihilism seems more like moral self-centeredness to me.
I have a hard time believing that anyone would think that it is just fine and dandy for someone to rape and pillage them anytime they like.
Having a moral society does not mean that you don't need laws and enforcement. Most people who act immorally have a different idea when it's done to them.
Sociopathic personalities may be an exception but I doubt that's really true.
Mentally hiding pain and outrage from yourself is not the same as not feeling any.

I agree with everything you say. However, you have not provided any argument against moral nihilism. If you can provide any argument for the existence of objective moral truth, I would be all ears.

The choice is not between nihilism and "objective moral truth" or moral realism. There are other possibilities like Hume's quasi-realism, for example. To think that the choice is only between moral nihilism, and moral realism, is to commit the black or white fallacy.

Isn't a genetic mandate the ultimate in objective?

As phrased, which sounds like a catch, I wouldn't try to refute it. There is no absolute moral truth that I'm aware of. But let's back up: In saying so, you might want to first define what you consider an absolute moral truth to be, lest we be chasing our tails on a term designed to have no substance.

But as I understand it, whether or not there is any objective morality isn't a pertinent question. We have morals (or not) based on a myriad of factors; our interaction with others, innate or ingrained need for cooperation (to some lesser or greater extent), what we've been taught (both explicitly and implicitly through example) and much more. These are the types of sources of each individual's morality and each person's vary according to their disposition; cultures vary, as do nations. This all in spite of any absolute anything.

Besides, "absolute moral"-anything is a paper tiger. Can you show an absolute.. anything? Nothing within the conceptional realm is absolute... and all this before we toss in the word "truth"; which this forum alone has no doubt dedicated terabytes discussion to no avail.

So no, I wouldn't refute it; but so what.

... hoping this adds.

Thank you for your response. However, I'm not convinced that I am committing such a fallacy. I think that it is fair to say that either objective moral truth exists, or it doesn't. If there is truly a middle ground between existence and non-existence, I would greatly appreciate it if you could elaborate on what such a middle ground would consist.

Regarding quasi-realism, the following is a quote from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

"Quasi-realism is best thought of not as a philosophical position but as a philosophical program. The quasi-realist is someone who endorses an anti-realist metaphysical stance...but who seeks, through philosophical maneuvering, to earn the right for moral discourse to enjoy all the trappings of realist talk."

If quasi-realism is an anti-realist metaphysical stance, then it denies the existence of objective moral truth, and is therefore consistent with moral nihilism (the way I have defined it).

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It depends on from where the "mandate" comes. I have argued that such a "mandate" may simply be the result of natural selection--and therefore there is no reason to posit the existence of objective moral truth. Also, natural selection (a process that includes randomness) would better account for the wide range of moral disagreement in the world. If the "mandate" came from the actual existence of objective moral truth, one would expect that moral disagreement between individuals would be much less severe and widespread.

For something to be objective it just has to be. It is objectifyable. This would effectively remove the subject/agent as anything but the practical observer. If morals or rather the need for morals are genetic, the route they came to be is irrelivent, the fact that they are is what matters. The randomness of the evolutionary system is not as random as one would think, especially since it is an objective system itself. Its randomness follows a set of rules within the system. For it to be subjective, the genes themselves would have to be endowed with agentive properties not reactionary properties.

Isn't a genetic mandate the ultimate in objective?

Well yes, either there is objective moral truth or there isn't. But, then of course, that does not mean that either there is objective moral truth, or there is nihilism. No more than because it is true that either horses are mammals or they are not mammals, that the only choice is between horses and reptiles. There are other kinds of animals besides horses or reptiles. And there are other kinds of positions besides objectivism and nihilism. Although objectivism and non-objectivism are exclusive alternatives, and there is no middle ground between them, objectivism and nihilism are not exclusive alternatives, since nihilism is not the only kind of non-objectivism. Now, as between objectivism and nihilism, those are not exclusive either, since although objectivism says all values are objective, and nihilism say that there is no value, it might very well be that there are values, but they are not objective values. That position would be a middle ground. For example, there might be a very modified objectivism like Hume's view of value as a kind of interaction between the world and people. And quasi-realism might deny the existence of moral facts, but that does not mean it is nihilistic, since it does make room for value judgments, and so it is not consistent with nihilism. For example, an Aristotelian might say that when we say that a watch is a good watch, we are making a value judgment about that watch. And there are criteria for whether a watch is a good watch. For example, that it keeps time accurately, or that it is comfortable to wear, and that it looks good.

Everyone's genetic code is different. Perhaps it's the ultimate in subjective?

Ken:
An aboslute of human behavior for it to be absolute must have the agentive removed completely or else it is subjective. Whatever it is must be an object like a chair or a process, a system, or method that can be somehow rheified, measured, and standardized. So if the need for morals is genetic, it has had its agency removed. Now a specific moral code the actual behavior or a specific moral, that I doubt could ever be objective.

---------- Post added 04-20-2010 at 05:22 PM ----------

For something to be objective it just has to be. It is objectifyable. This would effectively remove the subject/agent as anything but the practical observer. If morals or rather the need for morals are genetic, the route they came to be is irrelivent, the fact that they are is what matters. The randomness of the evolutionary system is not as random as one would think, especially since it is an objective system itself. Its randomness follows a set of rules within the system. For it to be subjective, the genes themselves would have to be endowed with agentive properties not reactionary properties.

I think you're saying that moral judgments and moral codes are "objective" in the sense that they do, in fact, exist. I agree. However, the existence of moral judgments and moral codes (or "morals") does not show that objective moral truth exists. And all I claim is that objective moral truth does not exist.

Of course moral codes and judgments exist. But that is not the issue. The issue is whether moral judgments are true or false, and if they are, what that means. The view that moral judgments are true or false is called, "moral cognitivism". It is a different question whether moral cognitivism implies moral objectivism.