[INDENT]So subjectivism, even with its unsettling contrast between morality and science, is still not logically committed to producing practical consequences. It cannot even yield the conclusion that we are more solidly justified in having factual beliefs than moral ones; or on more objective ground in pursuing a factual question than pursuing a moral one; or objectively justified in seeking the truth about anything; or in trying to find scientific explanations of phenomena rather than resting content with superstition. For all it gave us was that factual and scientific beliefs were objective; that we should seek factual or scientific beliefs is not itself a factual or scientific belief.
--Bernard Williams; Morality: An Introduction to Ethics


[/INDENT]Thoughts?

Am I the only one that is growing tired of isms in general? They make nice categories for the different understandings of the world, but I worry about the herd mentality, and following hierarchies of ideas too literally. While I do think science tends to hold authority, upon closer examination it is good science that holds authority, as well as good morality, etc. So anything that puts science on a pedestal without questioning its empirical worth is a highly questionable basis of ethical authority.

In other words, you can seek science and be inconsistent, or you can stick with irrationalism and be a hypocrite.

Reminds me of the subjectivist argument against rationalism: That there is no rational reason to only accept rationalism. Funny thing about both of these arguments, however, is that if you reject rationalism, then you are embracing irrationalism. But if that were the case, the irrational thing to do in that scenario would be to embrace rationalism. So it is the same with the scientific theory, and your back where you started.

In other words, you can seek science and be inconsistent, or you can stick with irrationalism and be a hypocrite.

I don't know enough about the arguments of each group to really comment on that.

I will say that even if science is not mind-independent, it can be said that scientific truth is not subject (or at least less and less subject) to mind variation, in that the scientific method is intersubjective.

With that said, I don't see how subjective valuations of morality cannot be extended to meet the same intersubjective requirements, some would meet them.

Neither science nor moral belief ever meets a final arbiter and the only difference between them is the degree of variation in the functions that lead to them amongst people. The processing of external sensation is simply more uniform than the processing of moral decision making.

Surely I can get to an objective truth by subjective means. "The cat is on the mat at time t" can be a true proposition which, in some cases, someone can arrive at by subjective means (perhaps a priori).

You need to explain why science's procedure is objective and why moral discourse cannot have that. You cannot say "well, science's truth are objective.

The whole point is that subjectivists use the nature of "scientific truth" to imply a nature of scientific methodology.

Your means is not objectively justified simply because the truth you happened to obtain is objective.

This is the point. And further, you cannot say discourse on morality cannot be an objective procedure simply because you've shown that science obtains "scientific truths." You need to explain why science's procedure is objective and why moral discourse cannot have that. You cannot say "well, science's truth are objective." That doesn't say anything about science's procedure or morality's procedure; really, it's a red herring.

I'm very interested in hearing how moral procedures can hold the objective weight scientific procedures can. Let me clarify I completely understand we cannot make the objective error: thinking our procedure is objective simply because we reach an objective truth. But what I'm saying is I don't see any truth at all spawning from a moral procedure.

I'm more concerned with how we make the jump from subjective procedure to objective results.

You seem willing to admit to objective truth in science (countering it with the absence thereof within morality), and that we do not have an objective procedure. How is that leap made?

You shouldn't assume that your scientific truth is objective just because it seems to deal with external phenomenon. It is just as subject to the perception, interpretation, and consensus you submit moral judgment to.

nerdfiles' example, the one I just quoted, suffices for this.

What I posted here for was to realize how moral procedure is similar to scientific procedure. All moral procedure is subjective procedure, but not all subjective procedure is moral procedure. Since I do not take a moral objectivist stance, I do not believe moral propositions (and the moral procedures that derive) hold any truth.

I'm trying to be proven wrong.

How?

Take the two propositions I suggest: "I think Rob is a good guy" and "I think there are two hydrogen atoms in a molecule of water". What other interpretation do we have for the latter? One seems preferential, a moral proposition, the other seems to be truth-inclined. My perception of the latter is not based on judgment, but objective analysis. Is it not? Are you to say scientific truths and moral discourse do not have distinctions?

Please detail how moral procedures derive truth.

At what point does my perception of the cat being on the mat and your perception of the cat being on the mat become the objective truth of the cat being on the mat?

And alternatively, when does my perception of George Bush being a morally reprehensible figure and your perception of George Bush being a morally reprehensible figure hit a wall that stops it from being objective truth?

And I'm trying to show that moral and scientific truth and study is a difference of degrees, not kinds.

What "objective analysis"? How is such a thing possible? Isn't the point of this thread to stop people from assuming that, since the truth is objective, the procedure is objective?

Reread my post and you will see that I never said they did.

Yes, but this is not moral discourse, is it?

I cannot think of any way moral discourse can have that. Moral propositions seem to be completely open to interpretation, perception-based; it's not the fact they are subjective that is key. The procedure to come upon, "I think he's a good guy", doesn't seem to follow any objective grounds, or even a template with which we can measure off of - it's an opinion, based on "feeling", is it not? What kind of truth can we obtain from a moral proposition such as this? Whereas the procedure to come upon, "One molecule of water has two hydrogen atoms" seems to allow us to obtain truth, perception and interpretation aside, this coincides with reality. Moral procedures and propositions that follow seem to be outside the realm of "true" or "false".

I'm very interested in hearing how moral procedures can hold the objective weight scientific procedures can. Let me clarify I completely understand we cannot make the objective error: thinking our procedure is objective simply because we reach an objective truth. But what I'm saying is I don't see any truth at all spawning from a moral procedure.

Can you provide any examples where we do?

Now, no matter what truth you seek, we must accept that it is ultimately anchored within the human mind, and at some point, to avoid circularity, certain assumptions are contained within the mind that are simply inviolable. It stands to reason that, with the environment imposing far greater variation on social and moral norms than perception and interpretation, that the biological framework of the mind would cause a much greater variation in those inviolable moral values and assumptions.

Said acknowledgment of variation could easily cause scientific, empirically-based knowledge to appear more objectively founded.

As someone who is far more interested in simply thinking than actual philosophizing, I would like to thank nerdfiles for the term "philosophical grab-assing". I use it not as a barb, but as a term which I lovingly apply to my brand of philosophizing: undisciplined and unfocused, but still impassioned.