New Mysterianism;81266 wrote:
Oh, okay. Well let's see. I'm a moral objectivist and believe that the following moral standard is objectively true: "deliberately causing unnecessary harm to innocent, unconsenting, and uninformed people, regardless of their race or rank, is morally wrong." But understand that we don't need a fixed example of a particular moral standard in order to discuss the ontology of morality.
Taking into account that this may have been (and probably was) an offhanded example, it provides for me an interesting jumping off point; wouldn't this simply fall under acting efficiently? If it is unnecessary then it can be broken down to simply being a matter of priority.
If an action is unnecessary, then there is no rational reason to commit it. The impetus would be directly and entirely compulsive. Would you draw a distinction between a priority of action and a moral standard, or would you not?
From a different perspective: How would you approach the position that morality is totally derived from human neurological structure? That is, the basis for human social interaction is entirely based in the physical, and thus so are morals ( a subset of the tendencies of human interactions) a fortiori
. Would you simply attempt to show that perspective to be isomorphic to your own or might you try to entirely uproot it I wonder?
My perspective, laid bare, is this: Moral standards are indeed based in the structure of the human brain, and arise naturally from patterns in human social behavior. So then morality cannot be called objectively true nor objectively false, it is entirely emotive and psychological. I would in fact claim that morality has as its primary function the guidance of human action in the most efficient way. It seems to me that deep analysis of a situation can lead one to make the most efficient decision in view of human social propriety and that emotive morality as a psychological function allows one to make a decision that can be generally accepted, so as to facilitate efficient human social interaction. In short, morality is entirely neurological; its primary purpose of morality is efficiency, and the secondary is social (which in turn serves the primary purpose).
Given your more lax definition of moral objectivity, I am sure that my view can be segued into appearing to be (and it may be so) totally isomorphic to yours.