I believe in moral universalism, or that morality is a universal, or relatively impartial concept that can be applied to all relevantly similar things.

No, I disagree. I believe in moral universalism, or that morality is a universal, or relatively impartial concept that can be applied to all relevantly similar things, but I don't believe that morality is objective or mind-independent. The first problem with moral objectivism is that you're assuming that because X causes harm, X is therefore wrong, in spite of what a mind thinks about X. The problem with that is that notions of goodness and badness are strictly a result of subjective, mind-independent perspectives. Saying that moral sentences represent facts about the natural world is like saying that aesthetic sentences represent facts about the natural world. These notions of right or wrong, and good or bad, are dependent on the minds that infer them. They are abstract concepts that don't actually represent reality.

This in no way diminishes morality in my eyes. Morality is a human value, and from the staindpoint of evolutionary psychology, morality evolved for the survival of a highly social species. I value morality because regardless of moral realism, I have perspectives of goodness and badness. I value morality for its utility and practicality, not because it represents a fact about the natural world. Nature is not an agent, and nature is most certainly not moral. There are many animal behaviors that would be considered natural but many of us would consider them immoral. In some ways, morality is a rebellion against the dog eat dog (egoistic) 'laws' of nature. We don't need an ontological justification for morality, and there is no ontological justification for it.

God is an objective reality.

If that is true, then he can be corroborated by objective measures. For those who lack your confidence in this, which objective measure would you suggest to prove this quoted statement?

Have you ever considered that you might be wrong about God?

If each human is a separate, independent moral judge (insofar as they make judgements), and each human has their internal inconsistencies, then how can we ascertain any universalism?

I've been quite influenced by people who have suggest that our moral makeup is partly innate to us. It is to some degree demonstrably biological, and this phenomenon is cross-cultural. The "oughts" that we come up with are often rationalizations of things we already feel or know viscerally. This is what makes them universal -- that they're part of our human makeup.

If ethical facts were like matters of fact such as the location of Paris or the serial number on my computer, which allow objective status, then one could have ethical objectivity.
But it seems fairly clear that ethical "facts" do not have that kind of epistemological status (e.g. of verifiability, for example), and that while one can determine whether Paris is the capital of France (because we understand and agree to certain rules and procedures), one cannot determine, for example, if hurting animals is a right action.

From another point of view, even if people learn about "good, sound, ethical theory" what they are either learning is actually various theories with differing ethical injunctions, or are indoctrinated into only ONE "good, sound" set of norms. If they are learning various perspectives, then it seems they will not arrive at an objective ethical system; if they are learning only ONE, then they preclude the possibility that another theory is either more objective than theirs or closer to the "truth."

I believe ...that morality is a universal, or relatively impartial concept that can be applied to all relevantly similar things, but I don't believe that morality is ... mind-independent.

The first problem with moral objectivism is that you're assuming that because X causes harm, X is therefore wrong, in spite of what a mind thinks about X.

Who ever said that is was? I know you can read ! Tell me exactly just what is "mind-independent" -- and how you know this.

Didn't several minds have to get together and agree on the distance from the Earch to the moon, and on the rules and procedures to determine it?

I assume no such thing. It would follow as a deduction from my definition - in my system - of "wrong" and of "harm." Then, when the system finds application by some creative ethical "engineers" (viz., artists at application), as it likely one day will, a public consensus will agree that the theoretical model made sense. Hopefully, "good sense."

You write: "The ... notions of goodness and badness are strictly a result of subjective, mind-independent perspectives."

Of course they are. So what? You could say the same for the notion of "acceleration" or "valence" or "charmed quark." Or "hyperspace", "complex number, "vector," "radian." Does that mean they are not useful to us? Good Heavens! I don't see this as the problem that you do. I use the word "good" in common speech every day, and manage to communicate - with no problem.
You say much the same thing when you write: "I value morality because ... I have perspectives of goodness and badness. I value morality for its utility and practicality..."

These constructs are not facts of the 'Natural sciences,' but are facts of nature to the extent that human Earthlings are a part of nature.

You write: "...notions of right or wrong, and good or bad... don't actually represent reality."

They represent my reality. ...My wife's too. But then maybe we are eccentric.

We - the human family - have human natures. And while my model is a Non-naturalist one, in G. E. Moore's sense, the data of ethics are facts of human nature - which the discipline studies and seeks to explain and thus to understand.

The facts may be gathered by cleverly well-designed technologies, such as projective/objective value surveys to learn what human groups (and individuals) value. Psychologists and psychotherapists avail themselves of such tools every day. They consult manuals, such as Buros, to find out the best ones to use. But these are serious scientists going about their business. If you would claim they are not real scientists they would give you a good argument.

p.s. How did you do on those exams you wanted to pass?

... The fact of the Earth's distance from the moon does not depend on our perspectives or perceptions. ...

...What is you're reality? Reality is not subjective (mind-dependent)........

This is just plain false. Sorry to disillusion you, Hue-man.


I agree that morality is dependent on the mind, but then so are Natural Science facts. I don't care what fancy label you want to put on it. As I said in the earlier posts: Everything human beings do (such as to make measurements) is subjective and mind-dependent. We have no argument there.

You write: " This does not, however, mean that it's wrong when we kill cows."
It won't be a publicly-agreed consensus (objective) that killing cosw is "wrong" until the human race reaches a point of sensitivity wherein they are able to identify with mammalia as their relatives and are able to intrinsically-value them. That day may yet come.

My system of Ethics leaves that open but does not call for it. Peter Singer is teaching us to avoid 'specie-ism.' His is a more advanced system than mine in that regard.




Did you see what I proposed in the thread Existence and Reality in the Metaphysics Forum? I guess not. Also see and What is Truth and What Does it Mean to Exist? in the Epistemology Forum.

God is an objective reality

If people care about being a good, moral human being

You said that morality is objective, which means that it's mind independent, and that's where we disagree.

"For the normative self-understanding of modernity, Christianity has functioned as more than just a precursor or catalyst. Universalistic egalitarianism, from which sprang the ideals of freedom and a collective life in solidarity, the autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, the individual morality of conscience, human rights and democracy, is the direct legacy of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love. This legacy, substantially unchanged, has been the object of a continual critical reappropriation and reinterpretation. Up to this very day there is no alternative to it. And in light of the current challenges of a post-national constellation, we must draw sustenance now, as in the past, from this substance. Everything else is idle postmodern talk."

Everything human beings do (such as to make measurements) is subjective and mind-dependent

Jurgen Habermas has surprised many observers with his call for "the secular society to acquire a new understanding of religious convictions", as Florian Schuller, director of the Catholic Academy of Bavaria, describes it his foreword. Habermas discusses whether secular reason provides sufficient grounds for a democratic constitutional state. Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI argues for the necessity of certain moral principles for maintaining a free state, and for the importance of genuine reason and authentic religion, rather than what he calls "pathologies of reason and religion", in order to uphold the states moral foundations. Both men insist that proponents of secular reason and religious conviction should learn from each other, even as they differ over the particular ways that mutual learning should occur.

[Hue-man] The fact of the Earth's distance from the moon does not depend on our perspectives or perceptions. ...

[Deepthot]This is just plain false. Sorry to disillusion you, Hue-man.