Don't you think some labels are justified, like person, philosopher, artist, man, woman, child, etc. etc. I also don't like racial or ethnic labels very much. I only like to refer to ethnic labels when I'm talking about my ancestry, but it doesn't define me. I consider myself a human being first and foremost.

I guess I could fax you my lecture notes, or something, Zetherin.

Don't you think some labels are justified, like person, philosopher, artist, man, woman, child, etc. etc. I also don't like racial or ethnic labels very much. I only like to refer to ethnic labels when I'm talking about my ancestry, but it doesn't define me. I consider myself a human being first and foremost.

but still no two people have the same idea of what it means to be a human being. maybe i am thinking of the experience of being something rather than the correct definition. what would be the correct definition of anything that we could all agree on? sort of got off topic here.

labels can be useful because language itself is only a tool. how hard we try to use it to communicate and how almost impossible it is except in simple basic things like 'fire! fire!' too many people feel uncomfortable without some label on themselves and everybody else. these are also divisions. 'human being' isnt as harmful, but there are some people who would argue whether or not certain people are actually human beings by their definition, and where does that leave us?

i am a firm believer that language is one of the most inadequate ways anyone can ever understand another-but if we didnt use it, the forum would be pretty quiet.

As promised, two forms of moral relativism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Descriptive and Metaethical.


"Descriptive moral relativism (DMR): As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more signficant than whatever agreements there may be.

Metethical moral relativism (MMR): The truth or falsity of moral judgements, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions or practises of a group of persons."


MMR is close to DT's view, but it's important to note that "X is wrong", for instance, is the moral judgement that may be true or false, not "that X is wrong is absolutely true". By definition of MMR, this latter is always false.

Hope that helps some.

And there lies my disagreement with meta-ethical relativism. I would never say that a moral prescription is true or false, because the only sentences that can be verified as being true or false are those that are objective. Morality is subjective because it is a mind-dependent phenomenon, and therefore, it can never be verified as actually being true or false. I am an opponent of moral realism or moral naturalism.

I would instead say that a moral prescription can be justified as being right or wrong based on the universality of such a prescription.

can you expand on that? if i understand you right, you are saying that it is up to the individual's concept of morality, that is where it would be created as such, but is held up to society as far as the effect this individual has?

i mean i as an individual create my own moral system, but i cannot judge it-i am aware that i chose it so i would obviously think it is the best, but that it is best for me alone even as it regards the level of good i wish to distribute among others. so the true measure of my morality is society itself. but they too are not fit to judge my morals or their own-it needs an independent observer or impartial thinker who can analyze what effects my actions, driven by my morality, have on society...?

this is what i think i think...but i dont know yet if i have said it right.

Sentence 1: I will treat you with kindness if you treat me with kindness.

Sentence 2: I will treat you with malice, but you must treat me with kindness.

Sentence one can be justified due to its universality, but sentence two cannot be justified because of its relativity and its egoism. Sentence two, the relative sentence, is an example of the negation of morality.

I would instead say that a moral prescription can be justified as being right or wrong based on the universality of such a prescription.

Sentence 1: I will treat you with kindness if you treat me with kindness.

Sentence 2: I will treat you with malice, but you must treat me with kindness.

Sentence one can be justified due to its universality, but sentence two cannot be justified because of its relativity and its egoism. Sentence two, the relative sentence, is an example of the negation of morality.

Well, I think relativism has its roots in empirical observation that what moral statements people make differs from culture to culture. So really it is no more stating objective truths other than recognising that different people have different subjective truths.

But, yes, there's something in here reminiscent of the roots of relativism: the realisation that we (the West) could not assume in our dealings with other cultures that we were right and they were wrong, which has a hint of your second sentence about it.

It is not only a matter of what you do, but why you think you do it and why you actually do it (perhaps unconsciously)...and although it might seem obvious for most people that you shouldn't be hostile with no reason, it is not obvious why you shouldn't.

So as the purpose from morality in the first place differ, morality differs with it, and that is why morality can't be absolute, some want power, some want peace. In short, one of the reasons relativism is right is the "is-ought problem"

That's called descriptive ethics; we're talking about meta-ethical relativism and prescriptive ethics. There is no such thing as a subjective truth. Moral prescriptions are neither true nor false because morality is subjective (mind-dependent). Moral prescriptions can only be deemed as universally right or wrong based on the terms of the prescription.

Oh sure, I was talking about DMR and its relation to the origins of moral relativism, but MMR follows. Once we've established that moral propositions are culture-dependent, the question is then how to assign truth values to them. This is what MMR supplies.

We conclude that moral sentences do not state propositions at all.

Moral sentences are underpinned by mind dependent emotions and appetites. Moral prescriptions are an expression of the will of a conscious, personal being.

Because moral sentences are not mind-independent, there can be no truth value to them.

Morals must first be valued (though I would argue that everyone values moral prescriptions if it benefits them), and then they must be justified by the principle of universality, which entails treating others with equal moral consideration.

Well, a moral sentence may be true for a particular person. There is no apparent conflict here between truth value and mind-dependence, even if morality was entirely mind-dependent.

Why? This seems more to be putting forward a contrary view rather than showing whether MR is coherent or not. For instance, stating that a moral truth value must be justified by the principle of universality seems no more than saying a moral sentence with any truth value must be universal. Secondly, the MMR is itself a universal principle: it does justify the truth value of a moral sentence -the moral sentence is not universally true, but the method of ascertaining the truth value is universally applicable.

Moral sentences can only be subjectively right or wrong, not objectively true or false. A proposition's truth value depends on its ability to be verified by empirical observation or logical decidability. It cannot be verified that anything in the universe is instrinsically right or wrong or good or bad. Moral notions are dependent on the mind's perception. Subjective truth isn't truth at all.

MMR is not a universal principle

the terms of relativism and universalism are in direct conflict; they contradict each other.

MMR is negation masquerading as theory; it can easily be reduced to egoism, error theory, and nihilism.

Once again, moral sentences have no truth value, only subjective (mind-dependent) value. I don't want to get stuck on semantics, but proper language is very important to me when speaking of morality.

hue-man,

So you're using the logical positivist approach here, huh?

You believe all ethical, metaphysical, religious and aesthetic language is meaningless, and therefore the propositions which contain expressions of these types of language are also meaningless. You also believe in the verificationist principle which states a proposition is meaningful only insofar as it can be empirically verified, correct? And you also have joined Popper's falsifiability criterion which states a proposition is only meaningful if it can "logically be proven false".

First, what has made you join the verificationist principle and the falsifiability criterion? Clearly, this is how you've come to the conclusion moral propositions have no truth value.

I don't know if I agree with the logical positivist approach (and the later revisions of such), but I do understand where you're coming from - I understand the distinction you choose to make. I think, however, I disagree with it. I don't know why "subjective" truth should be deemed inferior to "objective" truth. My feelings, matured through empirical observation, are really all I have. These moral, aesthetic, spiritual propositions logical positivism deems meaningless, I deem some of the most meaningful. I make these propositions and I mean a lot. To say these propositions have no truth value because of some logical criterion just seems silly to me. They most definitely have truth value to me. Whether something can be logically deduced or empirically observed are not necessary conditions for those things I consider "truth"; I need these emotional underpinning to consider value, actually.