Well, is it that you cannot follow us? I think we're doing some serious philosophizing here. We're disagreeing on definitions, giving examples, counterexamples, analysis, etc.

"Human right" is simply that kind of right which applies to human beings that is expressed within some legal system. The legal system need not be "on paper," as it were, but the right itself must be determined and known by some legal body within its system. Thus, a right is conferred or produced by law.

A "natural right" or an "innate right" is nothing more than a metaphor or a turn-of-phrase. It doesn't literally mean that we have rights outside of legal systems. Talk of these kinds of rights is an attempt to appeal to cultural or social conventions. It is not necessary that they be justified on moral grounds, but they can be. "Natural rights" are not necessarily "moral rights." They are simply conventional, social understandings between persons.

I'm not sure I follow you...

Definition of Compel:
1. to force or drive, esp. to a course of action: His disregard of the rules compels us to dismiss him.
2. to secure or bring about by force.
3. to force to submit; subdue.
4. to overpower

So again, NO you would not be obliged to jump off a bridge if someone points a gun to your head as you are not being forced or overpowered to do so. You can still choose not to do so.

No because if moral absolutism is true then it is no longer an interpretation is is a fact.
So if universal human rights are true then it is also not an interpretation of the world it is a fact.
So in our debate if we assume that is is true then we are viewing it no longer as an interpretation but as a fact.

Yes of course we could defy it but that is not the point. It is different then a construct of man because it then should be followed.

My point is that there are people that say that humans have rights that 'should be absolutely followed'. I say that they are wrong.

It is not my definition and any particular definition of "rights." Rights are conferred by laws. It's not that rights are "legal" or "moral" or "innate." It's that rights are general; and when we speak of generality, we speak of law. Thus, law confers rights.

Telling me that they are "transcendental" and "absolute" does not make your particular case any more coherent. I am telling you that obligation has two senses, if not more. One is of the particular (your example), and the other is of the general (rights). The general case cannot be analogous to the particular because it depends on a different sense of obligation: general obligation.

If I say, "I am obliged to law to do X" this means something general because the law speaks to a set of conditions, antecedents, precedent, etc.

If I say, "I am obliged to Bob, my neighbor, to do X" this means something radically different. It means that either Bob is compelling me, asking me as a friend, demanding, hold me for ransom, etc.

Rights are about law. Obligation to jump of a bridge is about something very different. It makes no sense to say that I had the right to no jump off the bridge. But you can appeal to rights to not jump of the bridge, just in case the demand that you do so is against the law. But if not against the law, it makes no sense to speak of rights. It's not that you do or do not have the right. A particular desire does not, on its own, instantiate law; thus, no right is present.

If you say "it is my right as a human bring to not be treated this way," all you mean is "please, treat me with some dignity" or "hey, the rules of social decorum suggest that what you ask is taboo." You don't literally mean rights.

Which leads me to my further point, which I think is central to this issue. "Innate rights" or "natural rights" presuppose natural law theory. If you accept natural law theory, then the questions you ask are meaningful. But if you are a legal positivist, your question makes no sense. "Innate absolute transcendental forever binding rights" are simply nonsense to the legal positivist.

To the legal positivist, rejecting to jump of the bridge cannot have anything to do with rights. And this is a disagreement about definition. The point is: I understand what you definition you employ (it's a tenet of natural law theory), but I am telling you that it is false. Your question presupposes that definition, and thus a particular sense to "rights." I do not misunderstand you. I understand you and fully disagree. I think that your question, and your counterexample, are senseless (because I accept legal positivism, which holds a particular definition of "rights").

I should have been more explicit about my definition. Instead, I have been attempting to show you what your definition is (it's natural law theory), and why it is wrong. I think, in a thread about rights, we should not be talking about morality at all unless we have satisfactorily shown that natural law theory is true. (Your question, however, presupposes its truth. I am here to tell you that I think it is false, and this is why it is frustrating, I am sure, that I seem to be dodging your question or misconstruing it.)

This is what you should have clarified beforehand; You're making the assumption that moral absolutism is true.

Who says we should do anything? One could say the same thing not even being a moral absolutist. They could say we should not kill simply because of laws, or because of their morality. It's entirely subjective. These people are not necessarily 'wrong' for having a different view of morality. They are just as much 'right' as you.

Thesis: One shouldn't feel they have to obey any man-made law, or abide by any conceptual notion of "rights", as there is no "absolute" or "natural law" predicating one's action.

Is this correct?

If so, what is the point you are trying to make by stating this?

Kinda. The idea of not having an absolute reason to abide by a man-made law I think is quite obvious. There are plenty of 'stupid' laws out there. You have not absolute obligation to follow them nor any other man made laws. As any law is subjective even if it is shared between many people it is still a subjective decision to conclude along the same lines.

My thesis simply is that there are no absolute human rights.

My point that I am trying to make is there are some who believe that their are absolute human rights. I ask for them to justify it. What really gets me is those whom do not believe in absolute right or wrong but still believe in absolute human rights...

I'd say that those that believe in "Absolute Human Rights" may be of the religious type? A confused, religious type, because, as many have noted (especially nerdfiles), "rights" is a legal term. A "right" doesn't even make sense outside of legal discourse. However, most religious folk I've come across also believe in a defined 'right' and 'wrong'. So, personally, I've never encountered someone like this.

Was this from another thread? Can you link it? If not, can you give us an example of when you heard/saw this? I'm kind of intrigued.

So you would say that the universal morals are whatever the large percentage of the population thinks is 'right' and 'wrong'?
So its basically a unity of people that all believe rape is wrong and they agree to force their opinions on others. I don't see much of a difference between universalism and relativism. Universalism seems to me to just be slightly more organized but yet still all completely opinion based.

You can't say we have a moral sensibility because our brains can sense morals. That is a tautology.

I've read the entire thread, and I believe the person clarified their response to the above "inherent" statement. I'm going to quote from where you left off in the thread in order to possibly enlighten:

I believe you oversimplify universal ethics here. You must remember that humans do, generally, have universally identical responses to certain situations. So, if one were raped, it generally makes one feel bad (I'm using "bad" as a placeholder for negative emotion; You can pick the adjective at will). Therefore, it's only natural that an understanding come where it's universally accepted as "wrong". It's not that people are trying to *force* their opinions on others, but rather it's aimed at the greater good (usually). You make it sound like it's just a group of old men gathered in a circle mumbling, "Hehe, what kind of new moral constructs can we make these mindless citizens obey next!"

Let me clarify, I completely understand where you're coming from, and you're even right - ALL of this is constructed by man; there is no innate "right", "wrong", and there surely isn't any absolute morality or inherent 'rights' of man. However, as hue-man suggested, I believe you must look at the human condition, the condition we all share. Though we can see that yes, everything is ultimately grey, is it not wise to come to some universal agreement? It's not *forcing* but rather in the benefit of everyone. Do you not believe raping should be considered "wrong"? Have you ever been raped or have known someone that has been raped? If so, I would think you would understand why it's been, for the most part, universally considered "wrong". This is what I feel hue-man meant.

Though what I said above does stand true (morality is subjective), there is sensibility among humans. When you think about murdering the old lady do you feel "bad" about the action simply because a group of people have agreed upon it, or because there are laws against it? I'd hope not. I'd hope that you would *feel* "bad" about murdering the woman -- transcending "morality", "laws" "convention", you would simply *feel*. This is the sensibility that is to be understood. It's not moral sensibility because morality is a construct of man, but it is an emotional sensibility that most of us can relate to.

Hope I've shed some light,

Zeth

Where does this 'moral duty' come from? Where does the right to demand this 'moral duty' come from?

Why should this 'moral duty' be followed? Why is it wrong if the 'moral duty' is not followed?

By attempting to justify one's action, one necessarily accepts that those affected can be convinced of the correctness of the action. This means that you assume both the necessity of free agency of all those affected, and preclude your ability to use coercion. Therefore, no justification can ever be offered for any action that violates the free agency of any other person.

And you simply MUST understand what rights are. Rights are not relationships between material things. They are conceptual relationships between people. When someone owns a house, it is not a link between the person and house, but between all people related to the house.

Saying that one has an absolute right to life does not mean that one has absolute protection of one's life. It simply means that there is a moral duty on all people to respect that person's life.

First, if something is a moral duty, then it should be followed and it is wrong if it is not followed simply because it is a moral duty. That's pretty much the definition of 'moral duty'.

I can run the same points about the term "acceptance." Nothing about "agreement" or "acceptance" necessarily implies "volition" and explicit thought, reflection, etc. So that definition simply does us no good.

Now we've got some legwork here. Good. So my question is: When you use "derived concept" do you mean "discovered" or do you mean "invented?" I think the original poster wants to say rights are "invented" or "expressed through," say, "a constitution or document."

Naturally, it would be silly to think we have "innate documents" or "innate letters." The concept of a "right" outside of a legal system has no meaning.

I'm not saying that at all. I was merely attacking the notion that the definition of "convention" implies reflection, deliberation, volition. To say "it is a convention" does not necessarily imply that it was a contrivance of human rationality. Essentially, what I'm getting at is that our poster must be careful when he says "convention." It's unsafe to use any term related to or similar to "man-made convention."

That's like employing "God," as if we can intelligibly talk about how God decided, one merry day, to write out the enumerable infinity of moral imperatives which are, ironically, etched onto our "hearts" rather than on something more...tangible.

Sure, "rights" are brought about through writing and expression, likely proposed at conventions and public meetings, but it's not at all the case that "man" decided to sit down an write out all the conventions of the social, the moral, the ethical, the scientific, the religious, the academic, etc etc etc.

A convention is a manifestation found within complex human interaction and discourse. The convention itself is not something that someone plans or decides upon. It's a matter-of-fact that some things are conventional while others are not (perhaps outmoded).

And to my point: This absurd notion of convention, I feel, is what is being combined with the "fallibility of man" premise. The point I am trying to make is that our conventions are not at all at fault here; they cannot possibly be. Our conventions are not fallible because we are. Conventions cannot be fallible or infallible; thus, they cannot be contrary or in agreement with the notion of "absolute rights." The notion of convention, basically, is irrelevant to this topic.

My apologies.

Yes, I also say there is no absolute reason to follow any 'human right'. Just as if someone tells you to jump off a cliff. You don't have an obligation to follow their whims. Neither do you have an obligation to follows any mans ideas on 'human rights'

An action can not be justified either good or bad. You can not convince someone that the action is 'correct'.

So yes you are correct in saying that "no justification can ever be offered for any action that violates the free agency of any other person." Yet it is pointless to say that because ALSO no justification can ever be offered against any action that someone directs at another person.

Sure only if you define a 'moral duty' as that which is expected to be followed as a creation of the goverment and applied to all individuals 'under' the law of the government.

But what you can't do is define 'moral duty' as something other then created by man.

So there are no absolute human rights asside from those created by man.