I don't agree that that is meaningless, even from a literal point of view. Entertain the possibility that we can scientifically demonstrate that "to love" or "to become angered" is a physiologic function of the brain. Thus, the statement "the brain is angered" is no less accurate than the statement "the hand grasps" or "the heart contracts".

Sure, all kinds of caveats can be interposed, like arguing that "to love" is a conscious experience, whereas what goes on in the brain is nothing more than a facilitative physiology. But the problem here is not the statement, but rather the rather generic subtexts of the concept "to love".

I don't think you followed my point. There may well be an exact neurophysiologic correlate of what we mean when we say "is angered". If so, then it would be accurate and meaningful to say that the brain is angered. Similarly, John can have a meningioma and John's brain can have a meningioma.


Edit -- I missed your addition. I think you see what I mean, and I am cognizant of some embedded vagaries in language that can have a large, unconscious influence on philosophical discourse. Indeed fruit for other threads.

I see. What I am arguing is that "fallibility" is not a proper predicate to apply to a convention.

Like if you say "That dog's bark was slippery." I cannot say this declaration is true or false, correct or incorrect, right or wrong, but only figurative, at best, or meaningless.

It's not that conventions are fallible or infallible. They're not the kind of thing that can be predicated as such. Any statement that fits the concept of "convention" with the concept of "fallibility" is misleading, at best, but is at its core conceptually confused. It might "make sense" intuitively, but on serious reflection, you'll see that you're only entertaining a pseudo-concept, and thus a pseudo-problem.

I'm not saying that man can create bad or good conventions I am only saying that he creates conventions.

My arument: t's not that conventions are fallible or infallible. They're not the kind of thing that can be predicated as such.

Is this not my argument?



No, I understand your post/argument entirely. I am telling you that as it stands now, I find it incoherent.

What sense is there to be had from the notion of man "creating a convention." My whole point is that a convention cannot be good or bad, fallible or infallible (we usually hold "fallibility" to be "bad" and "infallibility" to be pretty sweet ("good")), etc. Thus, attacking human conventions neither helps nor hurts your argument about rights being absolute or local.

By convention you may be "contrived," "fabricated," "invented," and so forth. So it would be best that you use that term because using "convention" only leads to confusion and is generally misleading. Only in a figurative, poetic sense can you mean "man creates conventions." A convention is not the kind of thing that is literally "created." Attacking conventions really just distracts us from your argument.

Suppose we take your argument. What is "following" a human right? Do you mean "obeying," "respecting," "accepting"? What about rights being a human convention makes them have no "absolute reason to be followed"? Naturally, some people can't "follow" right simply because they're not old enough to understand what rights are.

And how is not following an "absolute right" any different from not following a regular ol' normal right? What exactly are your agruing for, and why are you arguing for it?

Perhaps we can just leave "conventions" out of it anyway since your premise is "all human rights are created by man." But are you saying that "there is no absolute reason to follow any 'human right'" follows from your premise?

Just as if someone tells you to jump off a cliff. You don't have an obligation to follow their whims. Neither do you have an obligation to follows any mans ideas on 'human rights'

I see. What I am arguing is that "fallibility" is not a proper predicate to apply to a convention.

Like if you say "That dog's bark was slippery." I cannot say this declaration is true or false, correct or incorrect, right or wrong, but only figurative, at best, or meaningless.

It's not that conventions are fallible or infallible. They're not the kind of thing that can be predicated as such. Any statement that fits the concept of "convention" with the concept of "fallibility" is misleading, at best, but is at its core conceptually confused. It might "make sense" intuitively, but on serious reflection, you'll see that you're only entertaining a pseudo-concept, and thus a pseudo-problem.

Another example: "The brain believes, understands, interprets, is angered, loves, and sets goals." This is not correct or incorrect, right or wrong, accurate or inaccurate; it's simply meaningless.

Well, if it were just an particular order for me to jump off a bridge, then it makes no sense to even speak of obligation. It's not that I do or do not have the obligation to obey. This is simply not a case of "obligation"; the concept simply does not apply. Now I might be obliged to jump off the bridge, supposing that the person had a gun.

Your "jump off a cliff" example is categorically distinct from your "Neither do you have..." claim. So it does not help your argument, nor does it help me see why you are actually making it. Thus, I claim that your analogy is false.

Now the problem is that "right" is a legal concept. "Morals" are not necessarily legal concepts. A natural law theorist may have trouble with your arguments (though you have failed to give a plausible one). However, someone who is a legal positivist or a legal realist, who at the same time ascribes to moral absolutism, would have no problem with your argument because their position, initially, would be to make the distinction between legal concepts and moral concepts. For these positions, legal concepts do not depend on morality. On the other hand, if they argue against "absolute morals," whatever that is supposed to mean, they can argue for "absolute rights,"whatever that is supposed to mean, since they do not think that legal concepts depend on moral concepts for their justification.

Actually it still is a case of obligation. The fact that you don't have an absolute obligation to do so means the same way as if some one were to say to you "Don't kill me! I have a right to live!" There is no obligation that you should abide by what he says. A lack of obligation simply is a lack of requirement to do something. They ask you not to kill them though you do not have a requirement to do as they say.

It is the same case with the person who tells you to jump of a cliff/bridge. You have no requirement to follow their command.

Since all 'human rights' are simply commands from another human you have no obligation to follow them.

You are asking what moral absolutes are? "Moral absolutism is the belief that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged, and that certain actions are right..."

I don't see where you are getting at by calling 'rights' a legal concept. Whatever title you wish to put on 'rights' and 'morals' they are both man made.

To speak of obligation, as opposed to being obliged, is to speak of law. Particular commands and law-like commands distinguish two senses in which the term "obligation" can have. Being asked or commanded to jump off a bridge instantiates the sense of "being obliged." I would be obliged to jump off the bridge, in that particular instance, but it would be senseless to speak of it being my obligation to jump off the bridge. It is now a law that I jump off the bridge. When we speak of rights, we speak of legal concepts, which means we are discussing these matters within the context of law and legal systems.

Being asked to jump off a bridge, on some particular instance, has no possibility of becoming a law, for the purpose of the command itself is intrinsic to the immediate situation. I am being asked, or commanded, to jump off the bridge for some immediate reason, like to save my own life or being I've stolen from a mafia boss. This would be a particular situation. Law is not about particular situations, but ones that fit within generalizations and rules.

Would you say "It is a rule that you jump off the bridge"? What would be the reasons for such a rule? Is it a law? It is important to understand that "rights" are aspects, or products, of law. They are legal concepts. As such, it makes no sense to treat rights as if analogous to particular situations like being asked to jump off a bridge. They are categorically distinct objects of study.

It is still required of you, I think, to provide an argument or evidence for why being "man made" makes being absolutist about rights an unjustified position. My criticisms thus given of your analogy show that you have not given a sufficient argument.

I made those comments about morality because you claimed that rejecting moral absolutism implies that you must also, to remain consistent, reject absolutism about rights. But my point is that this just is not so. Since "rights" are a legal concept, the standard under which a right is judged would be an "absolute" one, but that standard would not be a moral standard, since for the legal positivist or legal realist, legal concepts properly understand have no basis in morality. Thus, one could be absolutist about rights while in rejection of moral absolutism, so long as one distinguishes the legal from the moral.

If the reason for your raising your argument in the first place is because you think one cannot be in rejection of moral absolutism while in support of absolutism about rights, I think I have satisfactorily shown that your initial qualms came about because of a simply confusion about the relevant concepts.

You must have a really odd definition of oblige... You say that you are obliged to jump of the bridge that is false. You can still choose not to jump of the bridge. You may get shot but the fact that you can choose otherwise means you are not obliged

I still think you are missing the definition of absolute universal human rights. You are only defining human rights under constructs of the law. That is not universal absolute human rights. Absolutes transcend human law.

They are only distinct in that one has been written down and agreed upon. That still doesn't mean that it has any more absolute authority then someones simple command to jump off a bridge. I have no absolute obligation in any situation whether that situation is a 'law' or something commanded directly from an individual. Neither has any more authority or 'right' then the other. So in both situations I am not obligated to listen to whom ever is giving the command.

Oblige: to compel someone by legal, moral, or physical means to do something

You can compel someone to jump off a bridge. The mere fact you can choose either way does not mean you aren't obliged if someone holds a gun to your head -- of course you would be!

I think this is the problem: You don't understand that moral absolutism is a mete-ethical view, not a fundamental objective notion of morality. It is simply an interpretation of morality.

You say:

Again, the mere fact that you have choice does not mean you cannot be obliged. To oblige does not mean to force but to compel.

Law, in addition to your own moral values, could be obligation enough to listen to another giving a command. What exactly is an "absolute" obligation? Even if the obligation was agreed upon universally, we would still run into the same problem, no? So, by "absolute", you are implying there is some higher force transcending all human thought -- an "ultimate reason" for doing something? To humor you, even if there was an "ultimate reason", we would still feel obligation, and could still choose to defy it, could we not? It would be no different than a construct of man in this respect. So, what's your point?

Let's try this.

If you say, "Jump of the bridge, now" to Smith, this would be a particular command. Smith would be obliged to follow your command, but it is still the case that "being obliged" does not entail that one do it. Being obliged still leaves open one's capacity to go against it.

All that I wish to point out is that "being obliged" and "having an obligation" highlight two different senses of "obligation" insofar as rights are concern.

Firstly, I am not choosing to talk of rights in a legal sense. "Right" is by definition a legal term. Rights are conferred by law. "Right" is a term of art, a piece of jargon, in legal discourse. When we talk of rights, it is by definition, that we are talking about legal systems. When we speak of legal systems, we speak of law. Laws make rights possible.

To be obliged or to have an obligation does not mean that one must obey it. It is simply to say that the party that requires the action expects it to come about. I am not at all saying that one must do this or that. I am arguing for a distinction between two senses of "obligation." What I am trying to show you is that the "particular case of obligation" is categorically different from the "general case of obligation."

The example you give, of issuing a command to jump off a bridge, is a particular case of obligation. The concept of "rights" is not to be understood, and cannot be supported or undermined, by analogy from the particular case of obligation because rights are by definition produced by law. It makes no sense to speak of rights outside of law because law create rights. Laws are by definition general. "Jump off the bridge" is particular; "respect the property of your fellow man" is general.

I am not at all saying that "so long as many assent to it, then you must do it." I am merely trying to tell you that your analogy is inappropriate. It presupposes a sense of obligation (applied to the particular) that is not presupposed when we speak of rights (which are applications of the general, because they by definition are created through law).

Talk of "how many people decide on it" is irrelevant. Talk of "a group of highly educated individuals" is irrelevant. Rights can be conferred by a monarch, an aristocracy, or a democracy. I am talking abou the definition of "right." A right is produced by a law. Anyone can produce a law, so long as it is intended to be a law (intended to be applied to the general case, not the particular case).

"Do not park you car in my drive-way" is not a law. It is a command. You are obliged to obey it, so far as I am concerned, but you need not obey it. That does not change the fact that I expect you to; as the speaker of that utterance, I take it that you are obligated to obey it. But I do not intend for you to understand me as "establishing a law" on my own accord. Thus, I am not establishing any right of my own by my command or wish. I might appeal to property law (which is a kind of right), but I am not at the same time making a law between us. I am telling you what not to do within a particular case. If I decide to take my particular case to my city council to have it applied to all citizens within my county, it would then become a law, if passed, applying to the general case. "No one should park their car in some others drive-way, etc". It would be an obligation in the general case because it is intended to apply to no particular person.

The point is: If you do not obey my particular command, this by no means affects the general command. Your disobeying my particular command has absolutely nothing to do with the general command because you are obligated to obey my particular command in a radically different sense from how you're obligated to obey the general command.

Rights are general, regardless of their being agreed upon, passed, rejected, inactive, active; regardless of the number who assent. The point is they presuppose a sense of obligation that is general.

Wishes, requests, commands presuppose a sense of obligation that is particular and not intended to be law. Thus, showing that I need not obey a particular command is to show something categorically different from why I should not obey a general command. If I express a particular desire that you do X, you are obligated to me in the particular case. It makes no sense to speak of your "right" to disobey. You don't have a right to disobey me in any sense other than you have the right to appeal to the law, which confer your rights, to undermine my desire. You might say, "Look, your desire goes against my conferred rights by law. Thus, I do not have to do it."

If my wish does not go against the law, and you still disobey, you have not exerted any right of yours. A child, when he tells his parent, "I will not clean my room right now, father!" has not expressed a right of his. He has simply disobeyed. The child does not have an obligation to some "law of the house"; he simply had an obligation to the wish of his parent. Since no law of the house exists, he exerted no "right" because there are no rights to speak of. Thus, his obligation was not to some law, but only to some particular wish.

When we talk of rights, it is by definition, that we are talking about legal systems.

No because if moral absolutism is true then it is no longer an interpretation is is a fact.

And there enlies the problem. You again are using the wrong definition. I am not speaking of just regular old rights. I am speaking of absolute universal transcendental rights.

My example is only wrong if we except your definition of rights.

There really is no point of me deconstructing your response as you have it all based on the wrong definition. We really need to straighten that out before we continue. So before you type your next long response lets come to an agreement on some definitions as this is becoming pointless.

I dont think changing the thread has produced the desired result..Im sorry but i cant get the point of this in the slightest... not one post has made the slightest inny twiinny bit of sense...am i alone ?am i the only one?...I asked twenty years ago what is or should be Human rights....define human.. define rights..Is it the right to impose.. expect... demand or is it some ethereal right floating in the ether..