A discussion of vegetarianism proper

  1. Philosophy Forum
  2. » General Discussion
  3. » A discussion of vegetarianism proper

Get Email Updates Email this Topic Print this Page

Reply Sun 22 Mar, 2009 01:00 pm
Let the last thread "on" the topic be consigned to history.

Here is the proposition:

(1) We, as human animals, should kill non-human animals for our purposes, whatever they may be.

You can affirm it or deny it. Syllogize, philosophize, justify, provide evidence. Poetry may help you, but poetry is usually suspect for analogical reasoning that can be questioned and equivocation. But it may give a useful model. Metaphor can sometimes move the greatest of minds where argument falls flat.

Obviously vegetarianism consists in the denial of (1). Most who affirm (1) do so on basis of some Cartesian or quasi-Cartesian thesis:

(2) Non-human animals (like dogs) are this, but humans are that.

It follows, under the Cartesian assumptions/axioms, that (1) be justified by (2). "This" and "that" sometimes stand for "automata" and "rational agents," respectively. But the form of the argument is what is Cartesian. Its content is too. But what's important for our purposes is that for the "Cartesian Argument," one assumes a dichotomy and certain consequences follow. You can replace "this" and "that" with whatever you wish, so long as the two hold some kind of dichotomous relation.

1. Humans are rational.
2. Dogs are not.
3. Therefore, humans can torture, eat, etc dogs.

Cartesian dualism seems to impose or presuppose some methodology or logic, aside from being a substantive metaphysical thesis. But moving on...

Some preliminaries

A proper discussion of the topic should, at least, have a clear beginning so that we might be able to reasonably judge when we've gone off the main road. I cite this not invoke negative feelings, but vegetarianism is a rather broad topic. It's difficult to know where to begin, and it seems almost pointless to imagine a conclusive end condition to any argument involving it.

What I will do is start us off from what is simple, then we may venture, should we have the right impetus, to what is complex. By "simple" I merely mean that I shall wish to give you basic arguments or questions. By "simple" I do not mean that this OP will be brief. I simply wish to give us an appetizer to snack on, then we move on to the full course in due time. You might wish to pick at this OP here or there, and we can coherently and accurately entertain your question or counter through the quote system, like a breadcrumb trail.

To round us up: we'll be centering on whether we ought to kill animals for consumption. We will not be entertaining the question of the "most ethical way to round up animals and consume them." This is by its very nature a political question, which presupposes a choice about the former. Ethically killing animals is still killing animals; and we're out to determine whether it is ethical to kill animals. Presumably, the pro-vegetarian would like to see that animals are killed with as much regularity as humans on, on roughly the same conditions (alike in kind of committing grave moral sins against other humans, acting on (immoral) maxims, murdering, committing adultery, etc). Yes, it sounds very odd to think of a non-human animal committing adultery. Just how far are we willing to grant animals "equality"? What exactly does equality mean? If you shudder at the thought of non-human animal marriage, then perhaps you would like to guide me to exactly those contours of the concept of "human as equal to non-human animal." I do not joke; I take your claim, should you hold it, to its (valid) logical extreme.

Back to the point: We're concerned with whether it is or is not moral to kill animals as animals. We might ask: "Might it be immoral to kill an non-human animal because it would be like killing a human?" What about all living things?

The Original Poster

My own position will be in favor of dogmatic skepticism about vegetarianism. Thus, I hold that you cannot (in the sense that it is not possible) be justified in your vegetarian, and thus moral, belief that animals should not or should be killed for consumption.

Essences and the Is-Ought dichotomy

The first and possibly only determining factor is whether animals have the same moral status as humans. The question then becomes What constitutes the moral status of humans?

We cannot look to physiological differences. Whether or not we wish to accept the consequence of ruling out infants, the senile and mentally challenged as having the same moral status as "normal" humans is irrelevant. We'd still have the is-ought gap which would not allow us to derive that, say, "We ought not kill animals" from "Animals are just like infants." We'd just be left with the question of why we ought not kill infants.

The interesting question is whether we could take all those justifications for why we ought not kill infants and displace those justifications onto animals.

So, for instance, we ought not kill infants because that would bring about the demise of humanity. But surely this ought claim is nothing more than a slippery slope. What is it, intrinsically, if there be anything intrinsic, about infants that makes it immoral to kill them? Or must we always appeal to an external justification? Does it make sense to talk about the essences of things?

Further, would the determined "essence" of a thing fit squarely into the "is" of the is-ought dichotomy? Is a metaphysical-is any different from a natural/physical-is? I answer in the affirmative. Whether we deduce affirmatively the "rationality" and "consciousness" of non-human animals to be of the same kind as humans, this would not thereby validate our ought-claim. It would only show that we have consequences to bear if we accept that ought claim. But our claim was never justified. It was merely a decision or a whim or a preference (though perhaps a preference that involved in-depth argument; e.g., picture how you might argue that one film is "objectively" better than other, or that the film adaption is "objectively always" worse than the original novel; does the mere conclusion of the argument make your preference any less of a preference? Is an "objective preference" somehow no longer a preference?)

Preference Vegetarianism

This last question is very much related to my own personal view that I held for a time. I was a Pyrrhonian skeptic about justified moral belief, which withholds assent from skepticism and its denial. My affirmative thesis was that all views on vegetarianism were justified only as preferences (which do not count as a kind of justification at all). But if there was any justification to speak of, preference would be it. I held that no person was justified in holding another to be immoral or moral in his or her views about the ought-claim in question (Where it is or is not moral to kill (and eat) animals.). My negative thesis just was my positive one.

Of course, this is different from merely killing and eating animals. It makes no sense to speak of "justifiedly killing an animal." We might say of a person who does kill an animal that he or she is acting immorally or morally and that his or her act follows from a maxim which is not justified. This was my view. Your maxim, should you act upon one, is not justified. Your maxim, as argued, could not be justified. If justified as a preference, then as a preference there is little to say.

The Social, The Economic

But in a strange sense, you can speak of having a subjective, preferential view that is justified in some sense. Perhaps an appeal to majority. Simply imagine a possible world where "the rule of the majority" is a valid justificatory move. Honestly, the majority "validates" many of our actions in this actual world. Think of tenure, presidential races, whether or not it is a "good idea" to go to a party as you wonder amongst your friends, etc. And if it doesn't validate it in some sense, it certainly is at least a determining factor.

Picture how much of vegetarianism is largely justified in terms of social consequences or "politics." For a while, I was sold on the argument that was somewhat of a slippery slope. "If you treat animals in such a way for so long, under such harsh conditions, you'll eventually ruin your resource. Thus, we'll have no non-human animals to nourish and supply us." This is a terrible formulation of it, but you get the idea. Is this a plausible justification? Of course, we can ask: Should we accept it? It's social-normative, but not moral, it seems.

One major determining factor in my no longer being vegetarian is my economic demographic and my location. Some city locales simply don't make vegetarianism a viable economic alternative. How might this fact be related to the proposition? You could see as asserting: Morality must be grounded in the world. Can we entertain moral justifications as if these social, economic, political factors are just hypotheses? Can we postulate a "possible world" in which the political and economic spectrum therein contorts and bends to our moral bias? How convincing is argument of this nature?

But one might say "that's no basis for a moral decision!" And I might even be condemned more for having such an egoistic outlook nevertheless. But we might respond: What else am I to do? Thus, it becomes a question of knowledge. What if I don't have the pragmatic-epistemic, the know-how, capacity to arrange and adjust my life in such a way to follow such a guiding principle as the denial of (1). We could do a very interesting dance with this topic.

Categories and Regress

To outline categorical maneuvers:

Again: (1) We, as human animals, should kill non-human animals for our purposes, whatever they may be.

You can either argue:

(i) From normative premises but no moral premises.

[INDENT](The moral is a kind of the normative; e.g., a whale is a kind of mammal. If something is moral, it follows that it is normative. If something is normative, it does not follow that it is moral. So, politico-normative, scientific normative, social norms, etc)
[/INDENT]

(ii) From no normative premises.

[INDENT](So perhaps factual premises, but beware the naturalistic fallacy and the is-ought gap. Any argument that (flagrantly) employs this category, on most accounts, will be viewed as suspect of fallacy. This is a fact.)[/INDENT]

(iii) From moral premises.

[INDENT](Of course, this move is subject to the skeptical regress argument. Any moral premise, if the conclusion is denied, which is (1), will be equally or subject to similar denial; and so on. Basically, we can always question a vegetarian moral premise. It may take some work, which is likely the point of this thread.)[/INDENT]
 
nerdfiles
 
Reply Sun 22 Mar, 2009 01:25 pm
@nerdfiles,
All right. I won't touch it anymore. My apologies.
 
Zetherin
 
Reply Sun 22 Mar, 2009 01:34 pm
@nerdfiles,
First, thank you very much for creating this thread. Admittedly I'm not that versed in formal logic, so if you could just bear with me clarifying a few points, I'd be much appreciated.

Upon reading your thread, the first line that jumped out at me was:

Quote:
Thus, I hold that you cannot (in the sense that it is not possible) be justified in your vegetarian, and thus moral, belief that animals should not or should be killed for consumption.
I remember speaking with you earlier concerning: What constitutes as "justification" in regards to moral proposition? I read your response, but frankly, I'm still at a loss. If you don't believe any moral/ethical premise can have justification, how is one to construct a solid argument?

You later state, however :
Quote:

But in a strange sense, you can speak of having a subjective, preferential view that is justified in some sense. Perhaps an appeal to majority.
Seemingly contradictory, you do note "strange sense", and "that is justified in some sense". I'm unclear as to what "strange sense" means, besides referring to the example you gave: Appeal to Majority. Perhaps there are other examples, in addition to Appeal to Majority, which would be considered justified allowing potential for a solid argument to form. Can you give me an example of a justified moral premise?

Next, you give us three options to argue, but within the parenthesis used to describe each option (which I imagined would just be a description), you outwardly apply your dogmatic skepticism, basically illustrating just how easily you could denounce any one of these arguments (this is the impression I got, at least).

I haven't a clue how to discuss vegetarianism proper, as every argument I've considered falters, no questions asked, to the guidelines you've provided. It doesn't appear anything I note could be justified, and thus I don't understand what is to be expected within 'vegetarianism proper'.
 
nerdfiles
 
Reply Sun 22 Mar, 2009 02:13 pm
@Zetherin,
Good!

Zetherin;54680 wrote:
I remember speaking with you earlier concerning: What constitutes as "justification" in regards to moral proposition? I read your response, but frankly, I'm still at a loss. If you don't believe any moral/ethical premise can have justification, how is one to construct a solid argument?


Well, if I may, I'd like to introduce a distinction between being justified and having available justification. Each seems to be valid interpreted senses of the proposition "X was justified." To give what one takes to be a justification is not at the same time to give a valid justification. On my view, a justification would be a logical one where acceptance of the argument does no damage to my other beliefs. Thus, one might give me a justification, but that argument will be justified, on my consideration, if the argument and its justification(s) sit will with my other beliefs. To confirm whether the argument has done this, you might simply ask me. I might say, "I've got nothing more to counter with. You've put me at wit's end."

The outline is provided as a helpful tool more so to display how I personally will categorize argument. I will look for arguments with normative premises, normative premises with no moral premises, and (well, basically) the naturalistic fallacy. Cartesian Dualism commits the naturalistic fallacy; so I do not view it as justified. So "Animals are this, humans that" is a kind of justification that might be given.

A moral premise can have justification, but nothing requires that I accept it as justified. Very much so, what is viewed as justified by one may not be viewed as justified by all. But all involved can very much see whether or not a justification has at least been given at all. We can all clearly say "Yes, Cartesian assumptions are a kind of justification, though they are rubbish."

A large part of this issue is determining the set of those justifications given. Once we clearly point them out, we can say whether or not they are justified to us.

The outline, further, species something like this: Only a moral premise can justify a moral premise. In principle, the Skeptical Regress wins in a philosophical, logical extreme sense. As said in the OP, or at least I hope I said this, the fun part is putting in the leg work, venturing along the grueling path the skeptical hypothesis forces one down. But it's always important to ask your skeptical interlocutor: Though your skeptical question is valid, are you even minding my premises anymore? Are you really that blindly skeptical? How you judge this is that at each stage where you entertain a moral premise, you gauge how near or far you both stand with respect to that premise. Have you convinced yourself that this moral premise is your moral premise? Or is it just some old moral premise you wish to "accept"--in an ironic way--so to get your argument off.

True debate is difficult and rare.

Quote:
Seemingly contradictory, you do note "strange sense", and "that is justified in some sense". I'm unclear as to what "strange sense" means, besides referring to the example you gave: Appeal to Majority. Perhaps there are other examples, in addition to Appeal to Majority, which would be considered justified allowing potential for a solid argument to form. Can you give me an example of a justified moral premise?


The way I see it "justification in the strange sense" would not be "logical justification." In first year logic (and it is sprinkled about much through the upper logics) we make a dogmatic and clear distinction between two senses of "validity." The person on the street may say "Your opinion is valid" while the logician may say "Your argument is valid." The two senses within these propositions cannot be harmonized.

I wish to get at the same idea with "justification in a strange sense." To say "You are justified (in a strange sense) to hold (1)" is not to say "Your argument is invalid in the proper sense" or that "I give up on this argument." What it means is that the justification comes from perhaps components (i) or (ii) in my outline. Look at it this way. In terms of politics or law, to justify a law or political reform on sole basis of its morality or logical cogency would be to justify it in "a strange sense" with respect to politics or law. In a way, to justify any proposition on basis of axioms, postulates or even theorems of a disparate "system" is to justify it in "a strange sense." By strange I mean "alien, remote, outside," etc.

So, a moral premise, give as a justification might be "Animals are moral arbiters" or "Non-human animals have moral rights".

You might wish to define morality in terms of rationality, or at least pay much of the justification of morality to the existence of rationality and the a priori. This would be through normative but non-moral premises. An example might be "Animals have a priori powers" or "Animals have free will."

But "Animals have free will" might be a moral premise if "free will" is defined in purely moral terms or under a purely moral conception.

Quote:
I haven't a clue how to discuss vegetarianism proper, as every argument I've considered falters, no questions asked, to the guidelines you've provided. It doesn't appear anything I note could be justified, and thus I don't understand what is to be expected within 'vegetarianism proper'.


I suppose it is important to point out that dogmatic skepticism, to me, is more like a principle for argument. I'm largely on the look out for (iii) moral arguments predicated on moral premises. But you may be able to convince based on (i) of the outline. The skeptic may have the argument, in principle, but then it becomes a question of whether or not that skeptical hypothesis has reached a level of absurdity or extremity that it must be rejected outright. For instance, we almost all of us reject Descartes' Evil Demon Skeptical Hypothesis even though it is valid. Many of the students in my philosophy classes reject it intuitively in that they reject it with cries, accusations and quasi-arguments that more or less intuit the more explicit arguments which have been used to attack and reject it. Perhaps we outgrow, as a culture, some formulations of skeptical hypotheses.

So, you may be able to catch the skeptic in two ways.

By component (i) of the outline you might say, "Look, skeptic, your argument is valid, but you've become way too horizontally or globally skeptical. Here is my non-moral normative premise. If you don't think it convincing, you must have some qualm with normativity all together. That's a bit too Cartesian for me, and thus your argument flouts common sense or natural good reason."

In a way, you're looking for our morality "fits in" with other aspects of normativity. You're looking for useful kin to morality; e.g., the political, the social, the legal, etc.

By component (iii) of the outline you might say, "Look, skeptic, your argument is valid, but you've become way too vertically or internally skeptical. If you accept the moral premise for yourself then the denial of (1) must follow. If the moral premise is consistent with your other views, then you must accept it. Therefore, you must accept the denial of (1)."
 
MJA
 
Reply Thu 9 Apr, 2009 09:42 am
@nerdfiles,
Vegetarianisn is a Higher Level View.

Me:

See first that the design is wise and just: that ascertained, pursue it resolutely; do not for one repulse forego the purpose that you resolved to effect. William Shakespeare


With resolve,

All tremble at punishment. Life is dear to all. Put yourself in the place of others; kill none nor have another killed. Buddha

=
MJA
 
Mr Fight the Power
 
Reply Thu 9 Apr, 2009 02:54 pm
@Zetherin,
Moral discourse can be productive and justification of moral statements can be achieved when valid argumentation is applied to one or more shared moral axioms.

I don't believe this topic can be resolved in such a manner, however.
 
nerdfiles
 
Reply Thu 9 Apr, 2009 03:08 pm
@MJA,
MJA wrote:
Vegetarianisn is a Higher Level View.

Me:

See first that the design is wise and just: that ascertained, pursue it resolutely; do not for one repulse forego the purpose that you resolved to effect. William Shakespeare



What design?

[quote]With resolve,

All tremble at punishment. Life is dear to all. Put yourself in the place of others; kill none nor have another killed. Buddha

=
MJA[/quote]

I cannot put myself in the place of my dog. Why would I? Why should I strip the dog of its dignity as a dog by treating it like a human?
 
Theaetetus
 
Reply Thu 9 Apr, 2009 03:28 pm
@MJA,
MJA wrote:

See first that the design is wise and just: that ascertained, pursue it resolutely; do not for one repulse forego the purpose that you resolved to effect. William Shakespeare



If design is wise and just, then you would be wise to study a little biological anthropology. From the Australopithecus afarensis and its evolutionary cousins; to Homo habilis to Homo erectus; and onto Homo heidelbergenis and archaic Homo sapiens; and then onto modern Homo sapiens, there has been a shift in the "design" of the teeth of these organisms from more robust forms especially suited for grinding, to smaller teeth, more pronounced canine teeth, and inscisors better suited to cut. The reason for this is obvious: the shift from a predominately vegetable diet consisting of fruit, vegetables, roots, and seeds, to a diet that contains far more calories from meat. Thus, the "design" and wisdom of human evolution suggests that it is natuarally just that humans eat meat.


MJA wrote:

All tremble at punishment. Life is dear to all. Put yourself in the place of others; kill none nor have another killed. Buddha
MJA


I highly doubt that Buddha was talking about animals as others, but instead was specifically talking about humans. Considering that Buddha led a religious revolution due to the caste system of Hinduism, his others were probably the less fortunate groups of people and foreigners. Punishment is a human concept that animals do not have a grasp of unless they are under the rule of a human (i.e. pet). There is no punishment in the natural environment outside of societies. The lion is not punishing its prey, nor did nature punish the diseased organisms.
 
MJA
 
Reply Mon 13 Apr, 2009 12:27 am
@Theaetetus,
Theaetetus wrote:
If design is wise and just, then you would be wise to study a little biological anthropology. From the Australopithecus afarensis and its evolutionary cousins; to Homo habilis to Homo erectus; and onto Homo heidelbergenis and archaic Homo sapiens; and then onto modern Homo sapiens, there has been a shift in the "design" of the teeth of these organisms from more robust forms especially suited for grinding, to smaller teeth, more pronounced canine teeth, and inscisors better suited to cut. The reason for this is obvious: the shift from a predominately vegetable diet consisting of fruit, vegetables, roots, and seeds, to a diet that contains far more calories from meat. Thus, the "design" and wisdom of human evolution suggests that it is natuarally just that humans eat meat.


I highly doubt that Buddha was talking about animals as others, but instead was specifically talking about humans. Considering that Buddha led a religious revolution due to the caste system of Hinduism, his others were probably the less fortunate groups of people and foreigners. Punishment is a human concept that animals do not have a grasp of unless they are under the rule of a human (i.e. pet). There is no punishment in the natural environment outside of societies. The lion is not punishing its prey, nor did nature punish the diseased organisms..



Whoa! I'm not impressed with your usage of big words nor your inequitable ignorance of all things. Maybe someday you'll simplify:"Australopithecus afarensisHomohabilisHomoerectusHomoheidelbergenisarchaicHomo sapiens" and find nature's equitable truth is simply the Oneness of All.
That's what Buddha was teaching, the same truth as me.

And,

Your blindness to truth takes away much of my optimism,
And your words like many others on this forum shows me how terribly far mankind has yet to go.
Here's a simple word of truth that you should study: ONE


=
MJA

---------- Post added at 12:25 AM ---------- Previous post was Yesterday at 11:27 PM ----------

nerdfiles wrote:
What design?



I cannot put myself in the place of my dog. Why would I? Why should I strip the dog of its dignity as a dog by treating it like a human?


I don't think you'd like being chained by your neck to a tree either.
A lot of dogs live that way.
Whoa is me.

=
MJA

Oh, and = is nature as well as my own design. Knowing and practicing that design is living the wisdom of truth.
 
Mr Fight the Power
 
Reply Mon 13 Apr, 2009 05:38 am
@MJA,
MJA wrote:
And,

Your blindness to truth takes away much of my optimism,
And your words like many others on this forum shows me how terribly far mankind has yet to go.
Here's a simple word of truth that you should study: ONE


=
MJA


Please leave this forum. We threaten your optimism and you threaten my sanity.
 
Justin
 
Reply Mon 13 Apr, 2009 06:27 am
@nerdfiles,
MJA, while I can appreciate your views you're expression of them in some of these discussions is trolling. Aside from that, his blindness is your blindness and I don't believe Buddha went around telling people how they should live or how blind they are.

Quote:
Vegetarianisn is a Higher Level View


For the record, it was requested that the above was not dragged into another thread on this forum. This thread is closed and there will be no more warnings. I don't believe for a moment that Buddha or Christ for that matter went around telling others how to live, they simply showed them with their actions and actions speak much louder words and lend much more credibility to the philosophy.

This thread is CLOSED!
 
 

 
  1. Philosophy Forum
  2. » General Discussion
  3. » A discussion of vegetarianism proper
Copyright © 2024 MadLab, LLC :: Terms of Service :: Privacy Policy :: Page generated in 0.08 seconds on 12/11/2024 at 04:05:13