In Metaphysics Zeta, Aristotle examines the question "what is being." But as we will soon find out, the question of "what is being" will soon become "what is substance?" But this is a very difficult question. Aristotle will examine what substance is in a number of chapters, namely from chapter one to ten which is in fact the scope of this paper. Aristotle begins his examination into "what is being" by positing that, "We speak in many ways of what is, i.e. the ways we distinguished earlier in our work on the several ways in which things are spoken of." (1028a12) Aristotle is picking up where he last left off on his examination of being wherein he refers to his work in the Categories, where "what is" could be taken to be substance, quality, quantity, etc. But Aristotle seeks to refine his previous inquiry as he did in Categories by stating that "what is" is primarilysubstance, for he states that "?it is clear that the primary thing that-is is what a thing is, which signifies its substance."(1028a13) Aristotle gives us an important notion to latch onto which is that "what is" is now taken to be substance. Further, that substance is the primary "what is" compared to the previously listed candidates for "what is" in Categories such as quality, quantity, etc.

If Aristotle is to accept the answer to the question of "what is being" as primary substance, he must now examine the different ways in which substance may be viewed as being primary. Aristotle begins by stating that when we ask "what quality a thing is"(1028a15), our immediate response is to say that it "is good" or it "is bad." But when we ask "what it is"(1028a17), we reply with a statement that it is "a man" or "a god." That it is good or bad, or a man or a god is underlined by the fact that it is the "what," or "the substance" that is primary in "being" a god or "being" good. Other things, Aristotle continues, are also said "to be" by being predicates of substance, such as, "?qualities, or affections, or something else of this sort." (1028a17)

Now a thing may partake in some action, whether it is sitting or standing for example. This may at first be taken as being, but sitting or walking does not make it something in its own right because of the fact that predicates cannot exist without a substance to which they might adhere. "Walking" does not exist outright, but rather it is a thing that walks. Aristotle solidifies this point by immediately stating that, "If anything, it is the walking thing and the sitting thing and the healthy thing that is."(1028a24) Thus the predicate is not being, but it is rather the substance that is and further underlies the predicates which belong to the substance. Aristotle continues this assumption stating that, "?what primarily is -not is something but is without qualification- will be substance." (1028a19). Substance is then according to Aristotle in a way void of attributes, much like a blank substrate with predicates then attached to it.

Aristotle continues to further underline the primacy of substance by stating that, "Now we speak of what is primary in many ways, but substance is primary in every way - in definition, in knowledge, and in time." (1028a31) Substance for Aristotle is primary because the definition, for example, of all non-substantial attributes must include the definition of substance. Substance is also primary in knowledge because we know something most fully when we know what it is rather than the attributes which predicate themselves upon the substance.

"Indeed the question that was, is and always will be asked, and will always cause difficulty- that is, the question "what is being?" - is the question what is substance."(1028b2) Thus the examination of "what is being" is in fact "what is substance" because substance is primary to anything predicable of it. "This it is that some say that it is one, some more than one; that some say it is infinite in number, some finite." (1028b4) Here Aristotle points out that there are different conceptions of "what is substance." This may in fact be the link between the first and second chapters of Zeta. Chapter one's main question is indeed "what is substance?" In answering this question, Aristotle states that substance is spoken of in many ways, but one thing is certain, which is that substance is that primary thing that other things are predicated of. It is foremost in our inquiry because it is primary definition, knowledge, and time. But what kind of thing could this primary substance be? To answer this question, we must move now into chapter two where Aristotle examines what kind of things substance could be by examining other opinions on "what is substance" given by Aristotle's contemporaries. This link appears to be logical because Aristotle must formulate ideas on what primary substance is, and perhaps his contemporaries can shed light on the issue or cast doubt on others.

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