Bertrand Russell said that what drive him to philosophy are two reasons:
1. To find knowledge that are certain, and indubitable.
2. To satisfy his religious impulses.


In regard to 1, he wrote that he felt sad when his brother taught him geometry and found out that he had to accept the axioms of geometry as given. He wrote that he never felt comfortable with mathematics because of this reason. This might be the reason why he turned away from mathematics, and progressively channel his interests to the humanities like philosophy. He wrote that he try to find comfort in Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, but it did not help him. At the end of the article, he said that he never found the certainty he wanted in any of his philosophy, or mathematics. The article did not mention anything about 2. A suitable interpretation maybe given as follows. We can suppose Russell religious impulses is the motivation for his pursuit of knowledge that are certain, and indubitable. If this interpretation is true, then we can see that his religious impulses would necessary never be satisfied from our modern perspective.


sources: Last philosophical testament: 1943-68 - Google Books


My impression is that this is a sad article. Why is it the case? He spend countless hours and years in philosophy, and mathematics to arrive at knowledge that is certain, but only to find that nothing would satisfy his religious need.

I reckon he was looking for love (in all the wrong places...)

What makes that sad? And what has the one to do with the other, if that is what you are saying? Of course, not finding knowledge that is certain is not the same thing as just not finding knowledge. In fact, maybe one of the things Russell did find out was that he could find a great deal of knowledge which was not certain, and that knowledge did not have to be certain in order to be knowledge. And that's a good thing to discover.

actually he doesn't say it is to satisfy his religious impulses. He does not use the possessive pronoun.

I think it is sad because he did not get what he wanted.


Maybe he thinks knowledge that are not certain is not justified. If so, then how can there be knowledge if it is not justified?

Sometimes what we want is something impossible.

What I said is that there can be knowledge, but that does not mean that what we know must be certain. I know, for instance, that Quito is the capital of Ecuador, but I am not certain that it is, meaning that it is not impossible that I am mistaken. But it does not have to be impossible that I am mistaken just as long as I am not actually mistaken. And I am not mistaken about Quito being the capital of Ecuador. I believe that I am not mistaken (although I don't believe it is impossible that I am mistaken) because I have adequate justification for the proposition that Quito is the capital of Ecuador.

The "quest for certainty" (as it has been called) is a quest for the impossible. And this is something analytic philosophy has taught us. Now that is a good thing to know, since analytic philosophy as also taught us that certainty and knowledge are different, and that you can know without being certain. So, although we cannot have certainty, we can know a great many things, and, of course, we do.

He spend countless hours and years in philosophy, and mathematics to arrive at knowledge that is certain, but only to find that nothing would satisfy his religious need.

I still do not see what the one thing had to do with the other.

So, it seems to be that you are making a jump from knowledge to being satisfied.

How did you reach that conclusion? The point is that Russell thought that unless you are certain you cannot know. He was mistaken about that.

You are only seeing the most obvious, ken.

I am happy about that, since that is much more than I can say for many others. As Freud famously is reported to have said, "Sometimes a cigar is only a cigar" (But even if he did not say it, he certainly should have done so). The peculiar thing is that it is the obvious that most people fail to see since they are so often bewildered by looking for that is not right in front of their nose. For a fine account of that, read Edgar Allen Poe's, "The Purloined Letter".

The Purloined Letter by Edgar Allan Poe

Obviously you are not a retard for you can see beyond the obvious. You don ` t just see a person, but you see intentions. Someone can "act" retarded by "pretending" to be a child, but those are pretty pretentious people by trying to make us think they are wise, and knowledgeable. Don` t you agree?

The "quest for certainty" (as it has been called) is a quest for the impossible. And this is something analytic philosophy has taught us. Now that is a good thing to know, since analytic philosophy as also taught us that certainty and knowledge are different, and that you can know without being certain. So, although we cannot have certainty, we can know a great many things, and, of course, we do.

I guess I'm going to sidetrack this thread and ask you to expand on this comment. Specifically, what resources address the difference between knowledge and certainty?

I've often thought as much, but in this forum it seems to be a position that is often challenged. If someone disagrees with you, they harp on the impossibility of knowledge being certain rather than addressing the knowledge one presents ... a diversionary tactic IMO. So, what is your experience? Do people accept your position that knowledge and certainty are different?

In the philosophy of science, I can point to Polanyi as someone who claimed that language does not convey all knowledge (another tac I have tried to explain), but that is a different topic.

Thank you. I thought it was obvious that I was a retard. I am happy to know I have concealed it, at least from you.

I would agree even more if I knew what you meant.

The only bone I have to pick with that is that the word certainty describes a mental state where we are sure that what we know is true, not an actual impossibility of error. At least that is how I have always heard it used. I guess there is a philosophical use of the term that is different, but it doesn't seem like a good idea to have a philosophical term that means something different from how the word is normally used.

Perhaps using "absolute certainty" for the impossibility of error would be better.

If you don` t know what i mean, then why do you reply as if you do? Did i say you are retarded? I hope not, and i hope you can indicate where i actually say it. Some how, you do seem to be seeing beyond what i literally say, and come up with much more. How is that possible? It seems to be that you are not taking your our own advice, ken..

Well, I always like to suppose that the poster knows what he means, and so, using the principle of charity, I propose a plausible hypothesis, and suppose that is what he really does mean. I think that is the charitable thing to do, and it does allow the dialogue to go forth. Since if the poster really is confused, he will grasp at an intelligible interpretation of what he said as if it really is what he meant. Anyway, that is my general policy.

Well, if yours is the practical issue of whether we should use the term "certainty" both or the psychological state of great confidence, and for what Descartes and Russell called "certainty" namely, infallibility, I don't think there is much to quarrel about there. It is just a verbal issue about how it is best to use a term when the term is ambiguous. But, I think it is a good thing to point out the ambiguity of "certainty" because I think that the confusion between the two senses had been the source of confusion in epistemology. After all, however you want to correct the ambiguity, you have first to point it out. I have suggested, "Cartesian certainty" as an apt descriptive term for "absolute certainty" (in your lingo) since it would commemorate its leading proponent. But if that is your only objection, I am content that I am all right.