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If I have understood it correctly Wittgenstein argues that if we all have different sense impressions for the same word we cannot communicate meaningfully - this is because we must mean different things even when we say the same word, i.e. there is no non-linguistic similarity between my sense impressions and yours
However, could it not be argued that we can still communicate practically through categorisation? so long as I call what I perceive to be white objects white and you call what you perceive to be white objects white, we can communicate practically by describing objects that have this 'white-ness' in common, as white. It's not a logical impossibility, just perhaps an undesirable consequence of Hume's 'object-->sense impression -->concept' chain of how we gain our concepts (I'm not saying Hume's argument is right, just questioning whether Wittgenstein's criticism severely undermines it).
sorry I think I'm still missing the point - my private sense impression of a computer may be different to your private sense impression of a computer, so long as we both agree to call this thing we experience a computer, surely we can communicate practically? how can this refute representative realism?
I always thought he was, with the beetle in a box, showing how talk of a soul or God can not be objective...
. And that is why when he speaks of beetles and red and language games, I hear God and Salvation and Church.
And Jesus was really speaking about farming, everyone just misunderstood him.
The point can be summed up in a joke: Two men walk into a bar, the third one ducks.
What does representational realism have to say about the 'bar' in this sentence?
What is a 'bar' in my sentence?
Is it a place where men drink even though they are not thirsty? Or is it a metal pole?
As for what the gentiles think of Wittgenstein I have no patience. He has been historically called a positivist, which is roughly the opposite of that which is expressed in the TLP. So, no, screw Google. It is wrong.
The point is, he is using metaphors. Don't tell me what a metaphor can refer to and what it cannot. I was only sharing what I found in it, afterall.
How can the TLP be about Ethics when Ethics is not its context?
What the hell has the private language argument to to with TLP?
The private language argument is in the Philosophical Investigations. What are you talking about? Have you even read his private language argument? Have you any idea what it is all about? It has nothing to do with ethics. It has to do with linguistic meaning.
It was produced 30 years after the TLP, and after the TLP had been repudiated by Wittgenstein himself.
Aren't you the least embarrassed to be caught blatantly talking out of your hat (and I am putting that politely)? And shouldn't those who thank you for talking out of your hat (again a euphemism) also be embarrassed?
I always thought he was, with the beetle in a box, showing how talk of a soul or God can not be objective..
Whether or not your monotheistic religion really worships the same God as my monotheistic religion or whatever. It's ridiculous talk. And the philosophers of old and the scientific philosophers of new don't really escape this criticism.
metaphysical statements, tautologies and contradictions, cannot be (to quote Deckard, iirc) 'empirically verifiable or logically differentiable'.
Treasureisland asks whether or not we can use categories, then; which seems intuitive, no doubt. Wittgenstein says no, though. Basically, that assumes that variables can be defined-- that is, definite variables. A contradiction, if you will. Again, not solid ground.
I think this is an important point. Thanks.
---------- Post added 05-20-2010 at 06:05 PM ----------
Maybe it is an important point, I would not know. But I do know that there is no evidence whatever that Wittgenstein was talking about God and the soul in the beetle in the box example. If you think he was, then you simply made it up that he did.
Well, let's say I did. Or let's say I'm taking Wittgenstein for what he's worth to me.
Apparently you do adhere to the Italian, se non vero, ben trovato. (Even if it is not true it should be). Not my cup of tea. We already know where that sort of view leads people.