Christianity is not based on a historical truth; rather, it offers us a (historical) narrative and says: now believe! But not, believe this narrative with the belief appropriate to a historical narrative, rather: believe through thick and thin, which you can only do as a result of a life. Here you have a narrative, don't take the same attitude to it as you take to other historical narratives. Make a quite different place in your life for it.-There is nothing paradoxical about that! (32E)
I believe that one of the things Christianity says is that sound doctrines are all useless. That you have to change your life. (Or the direction of your life.) ... The point is that a sound doctrine need not take hold of you; you can follow it as you would a doctor's prescription.-But here you need something to move you and turn you in a new direction . . . Once you have been turned round, you must stay turned round. Wisdom is passionless. But faith by contrast is what Kierkegaard calls a passion. (53E)
In the 30s and 40s, Wittgenstein came to see that Kierkegaard's conception of philosophy was the right one, and that pondering "The Big Questions" was the right thing to do.
Russell's quote seems to be a rather unfair appraisal of Wittgenstein and his views, with Russell quite unfairly misrepresenting them. Russell complained that Wittgenstein concerned himself, not with the world, but only with words--as if these concerns were exclusive of one another. Wittgenstein, however, did not share that view. He held, rather, that the way to arrive at a correct philosophical view of the world is by means of an investigation of words that will remove our misconceptions and leave us with an unspoiled view of reality.
I don ` t know what this means. As i know, the latter Wittgenstein say we ought to look at words, and how it is used in different language games. These languages are sort of like conventions of a particular linquistic community. This is a very liberating idea, but if one push it to it`s logical conclusion, the notion of reference to reality is replaced by how certain words are used by some community of people. One can already see the seed of relativism. Relativism is not such a bad idea, but very few people publically endose it.
Russell felt that genuine Philosophical questions existed and felt that Wittgenstein's logical clarification of language and it's uses with the aim to solve Philosophical problems 'seems to me to have abandoned, without necessity, that grave and important task which philosophy throughout the ages has hitherto pursued. Philosophers from Thales onward have tried to understand the world. . . . I cannot feel that the new philosophy is carrying on in this tradition. It seems to concern itself, not with the world and our relation to it, but only with the different ways in which silly people can say silly things. If this is all that philosophy has to offer, I cannot think that it is a worthy subject of study.' Some have felt that a lot of Russell's hostility towards Wittgenstein's later Philosophy was due to it detracting attention from Russell's work at the time, which he felt of great importance to Philosophy.