That a view of a landscape is a landscape is false on the face of it. There are (presumably) as many views of landscapes as there are people who are doing the viewing. But, (presumably) there is but a single landscape that each person is viewing. Therefore, it is impossible for a view of a landscape to be a landscape. Unless you think that there are as many landscapes as there are views of landscapes, and therefore, as many landscapes as there are people who are viewing. Is that what you believe? You seem to be having a problem with the verb, "to see". When I see X, I am seeing X. I am not seeing my seeing of X. The object of the term "see" is not my experience of seeing, it is what I am seeing. A dog, or a landscape, or whatever it is. It is the same problem Ortega seems to have with "view". Ortega seems to believe that when he views something, what he views is his view of that something, not that something. But that is false. Views are not what we see. Views are how we see what we see. For, as you, yourself, say, "the landscape is an expanse of scenery hat can be seen in a single view".

But a each perspective offers a different landscape. One person may see a hill in a landscape, but someone else does not see the hill in the same scenery because a tree blocks their view.

A landscape is not a concrete object like a dog. A landscape is formed from a perspective in which what can be seen from a certain perspective is the landscape. A landscape is also an abstraction based on the relationship of ideas from a perspective.

That a view of a landscape is a landscape is false on the face of it. There are (presumably) as many views of landscapes as there are people who are doing the viewing. But, (presumably) there is but a single landscape that each person is viewing. Therefore, it is impossible for a view of a landscape to be a landscape. Unless you think that there are as many landscapes as there are views of landscapes, and therefore, as many landscapes as there are people who are viewing. Is that what you believe? You seem to be having a problem with the verb, "to see". When I see X, I am seeing X. I am not seeing my seeing of X. The object of the term "see" is not my experience of seeing, it is what I am seeing. A dog, or a landscape, or whatever it is. It is the same problem Ortega seems to have with "view". Ortega seems to believe that when he views something, what he views is his view of that something, not that something. But that is false. Views are not what we see. Views are how we see what we see. For, as you, yourself, say, "the landscape is an expanse of scenery hat can be seen in a single view".

But that doesn't mean that the person who's view did not include the hill, saw a different landscape. It was the same landscape.

What you are referring to as 'the same landscape' is what Kant refers to as 'the thing in itself' independent of any viewpoint. Kant never said the thing in itself did not exist, but he said we never knew it. Everything we see and know is meditated through our sensory faculties and intuitions. The reason it is important to you that we all see the 'the same' landscape is because this is where you derive your sense of reality. The idea of perspectivism is threatening because it undermines your common-sense view of the basis of what is real. You are actually defending a belief.

But if a person self-consciously thinks "I am seeing X," he is in a metaphorical way seeing himself seeing. Just as a person can be self-consciously self-conscious. Also, if we view something visually and know conceptually that this is just one aspect of something with perhaps as many aspects as their are consciousnesses........ I think "view" can be used for what we see. For instance, "I understand your view on abortion." Language is organic and slippery. I say we have to bend toward the writer and give him the benefit of the doubt. But I do share with you a respect for clarity.

How does it follow from the fact that something looks different from different points of view, that the very same thing is not being seen?

thanks Ken but I am still having difficulty understanding your objection. Your initial response was



What is at issue is the identity of 'the very same thing'. Ortega's argument seems to establish, to my satisfaction anyway, that different perspectives are valid, and that there is no 'ultimate perspective' which comprises all of the invidual perspectives. So there are only perspectival views, and no 'thing' apart from those views against which they might be validated. So when you say 'they are all seeing the same thing', aren't you referring to the fictitious 'ideal viewpoint' which is what Ortega is showing, is groundless? Isn't this an assumption about the nature of 'the thing'? What is at issue is the what the predicate 'same' is referring to (I think...)

(I can't help but reflect, also, that this type of observation has also been validated by the 'copenhagen interpretation' of quantum physics, but this is more a footnote at this point.)

How does it establish that there is no landscape such that all the perspectives are different perspectives of the same landscape? What would the views be views of, if not the same landscape? Remember, I am not claiming that there is a landscape outside the different views. But you and Ortega are claiming that you have established that there is no landscape outside of the different views. But, how have you established that? What is your argument for that. The one Ortega gives is unsound.

Ortega has not shown anything so far as I can see. Since, as I think, his argument in the passage quoted is unsound, since it assumes that if there are different views of something, there cannot be something of which those are different views. And that assumption is false.

I see what you're saying, which is basically that the argument is self-contradictory, it it not?

But if you understand it as a statement about 'views', rather than a statement about 'objects', it is valid? Could it not be another way of saying that there is not 'one true view' of the landscape (or by implication any other thing), but only various perspectives? Or does that just re-state the original argument?


e But it might also be meant as a (what't that lovely word that philosophers use?) propaedeutic

...the premise is as follows: If there are different views of X, then there is no X. (If there are different views of a landscape, then there is no landscape)

Two men may look, from different view-points, at the same landscape. Yet they do not see the same thing.

The OP is in line with Heidegger's dasein. As much as we may "know" the thing we view is made of molecules and what we see is light bouncing, when we define the thing in this way, we're speaking in terms of cause.

What we actually experience is being in the world. This is the change from Descartes: he suggested that our conception of ourselves is formless... that "I" would be the same "I" even if the world wasn't there.

That's not what we experience, though. The experience of seeing the landscape is the experience of being in the world: it's one experience, not two: one of ourselves, and one of the causes of what we experience.

The word landscape is from the Dutch landschap, originally meaning a patch of cultivated ground, and then an image. The word entered the English language at the start of the 17th century, purely as a term for works of art; it was not used to describe real vistas before 1725.(1)

(1) OED [i.e., Oxford English Dictionary] - Its first use as a word for a painting is from 1598.

landscape, n.

1. a. A picture representing natural inland scenery, as distinguished from a sea picture, a portrait, etc. [1598]

spec. The background of scenery in a portrait or figure-painting. Obs. [1656]

2. a. A view or prospect of natural inland scenery, such as can be taken in at a glance from one point of view; a piece of country scenery. [1632]

b. A tract of land with its distinguishing characteristics and features, esp. considered as a product of modifying or shaping processes and agents (usually natural). [1886]

3. In generalized sense (from 1 and 2): Inland natural scenery, or its representation in painting. [1602]

4. In various transf. and fig. uses.

a. A view, prospect of something. [1612]

b. A distant prospect: a vista. (Cf. 2b.) [1599]

c. The object of one's gaze. [1659]

d. A sketch, adumbration, outline; occas. a faint or shadowy representation. [1649]

e. A compendium, epitome. [1656]

f. A bird's-eye view; a plan, sketch, map. [1642]

g. The depiction or description of something in words. [1681]

Two men may look, from different view-points, at the same landscape. Yet they do not see the same thing. Their different situations make the [view of the] landscape assume two distinct types of organic structure in their eyes. The part [of their view of the landscape] which, in the one case, occupies the foreground, and is thrown into high relief in all its details, is, in the other case, the background, and remains obscure and vague in its appearance. Further, inasmuch as things which are put one behind the other are either wholly or partially concealed, each of the two spectators will perceive portions of the landscape which elude the attention of the other. Would there be any sense in either declaring the other's view of the landscape false? Evidently not; the one is as real as the other. But it would be just as senseless if, when our spectators found that their views of the landscape did not agree, they concluded that both views [of the landscape] were illusory. Such a conclusion would involve belief in the existence of a third [view of the] landscape, an authentic one, not subject to the same conditions as the other two. Well, an archetypal [view of the] landscape of this kind does not and cannot exist. Cosmic reality is such that it can only be seen in a single definite perspective [at a time]. Perspective is one of the component parts of reality. Far from being a disturbance of its fabric, it is its organising element. A reality which remained the same from whatever point of view it was observed would be a ridiculous conception.

Hold on, guys. Let's try to clear up the confusion by looking at some definitions:

I did some research on the origin of the word "landscape" and I discovered the following in Wikipedia:

My question on this would be: If (my) reality is defined by only what I can see and not what I cannot (e.g. what you can see), what happens to elements of my reality when I cease to look at them? (e.g. Close my eyes, turn my head, etc.)

That is, of course, a good question. But it is not germane to Ortega's argument. It shows only that there is a problem with his conclusion.

Again, you've lost me as to the point of your post. If it questions the conclusion, it is appropriate to the topic of this thread, no? I would have thought this the right place to ask that question rather than starting a new thread (were I so inclined) in response to a post on this one.