In response to your post, does this example relate?:

Socrates is mortal
Socrates is Plato's teacher (or maybe Socrates is Socrates would less questionable)

Socrates is mortal as in it is a characteristic of Socrates that he is mortal but that doesn't mean that Mortal = Socrates by any means. On the other hand, Socrates is Plato's teacher refers to the identity of Socrates. So Plato's teacher = Socrates is true. Then, one is a characteristic of the thing and one is the thing itself maybe?

So the first is an example of predicate and the second identity?

I always laugh at this part of Aristotles "meta" physics. He is contradicting himself even in one page. He is pointing to something and then he boldly states that he isn't. In combination with VideCorSpoon's quote, ook at this one:



So, what happened to the "quality" of things? WHat happened to psyche? What happened to the primary mover? Aristotle says different things on this subject here and there. I guess in this case (as in most others) it boils down to the question: "What do you see in his words?"

I, personally see in his work a sort of covering up of many triths. I, personally see in his work many things that the church has been saying for centuries and which has caused much suffering. In his works Aristotle names certain difficulties and then explains them in a way that nothing is explained, but that one would be inclined to look in a different direction. Sand has been trown in the readers eyes. However it is easier to see the sand when reading Aristotle then when merely confronted with the sand. That explains to me why Aristotle was made illegal by the church.

So; is it true that the "quality" which is called transcendental (or a priori) does not exist, apart from in the first mover?

Aristotle was made illegal by the church? I did not know this. When did this happen? I'm not well versed in church history but as far as I know one of the important tasks for Aquinas was reconciling christian theology with aristotelian philosophy. Are you referring to a time after Aquinas then? I'm sure that the church didn't like some of the stuff he had to say but I was also under the impression that what Descartes meditations were against was the rampant appeal to authority (If Aristotle said it then it is true) that was so prevalent during that time.

Regardless, I think it would be best to give him the benefit of the doubt. As the saying goes, We stand on the shoulders of giants. Sure he didn't get everything right and at times he was seemingly blatantly wrong or contradicted himself, but...where would be without him? It's hard to say I suppose but I have to assume he had good intentions.

I have heard the same thing of Aquinas. I think, however, that it was not offcial work; meaning that it was not officially the church paying him for the work. The works of Aristotle were outlawed from the moment the works were "rediscovered" untill the enlightenment. That is why "secret circles" in universities discussed Aristotle instead of openly in classrooms. Spinoza for instance was damned after his death for pointing to nature as "God" and "reason" (which is in any man) as the way to learn how to act like "God" (in self preservation; for that which is perfect preserves itself indefinately). Well, I could name a whole list of people being intimidated or killed by the inquisition but I will not. I just hope this has added something for you.

haha yeah I'm definitely not saying that the church wasn't crazy. I just assumed that Aristotle was something of a big deal for the church.

Now that I think about it, I seem to remember that what the church did have it had used for its theology and then, when the writings that the Muslim world had kept intact surfaced, they had Aquinas attempt to reconcile those newly discovered writings with church theology. But again, maybe I'm wrong. I agree that the church was keen on damning anyone that disagreed but I thought they were pretty fond of Aristotle.

They are; but it was not voiced then. Itwas made illegal.l

Chandler,


I agree with the ultimate grasp of your method and I think it is well founded. You move ahead, reasonably, to 1028a20. Also, Socrates is Socrates is definitely less questionable.


Putting your example up to Aristotle's framework, it makes sense to me (with the Socrates is Socrates substitution)

Socrates is Socrates
Socrates is mortal

That Socrates is Socrates in himself (Socrates qua Socrates) is right on. But I believe that to introduce "Socrates is mortal" is problematic because of the ontological nature of Zeta. We are looking for primary substance, and we both have the same idea, that there is something that is itself by itself. So when we see Socrates, we see Socrates as a whole, like we see apple, tree, or car. We know that car, tree, and Socrates have attributes (such as legs, arms, torso, head, blood, flesh, sinew, etc.) but we refer to Socrates as Socrates in himself (Socrates qua Socrates). So I agree with you totally on you interpretation this far.


That Socrates is mortal may be problematic, but definitely not wrong. That Socrates is mortal as an attribute of Socrates but not Socrates himself seems rational. Any attribute Socrates has, as we know it, has mortality? and will decay and die. But mortality is not a tangible attribute we can see on Socrates, it's an abstract concept that affects the attributes.

The first example is an example of a predicate and thing predicated of (substance). It's basically saying that we can perceive "a thing" and the "attributes" of that thing, and somehow, the two are separable. This is the first step Aristotle takes in revealing to us the nature of primary substance.

I was just under the impression that Aristotle was bringing up the distinction to move on to talk of substance (the thing in itself?). So he begins by making the distinction:

the substance - socrates is socrates
the predication - socrates is a man, mortal, lover of wine, etc.

so those qualities of socrates not tied to his substance depend on his substance, but his substance does not depend on them (could he still be socrates without loving wine?)

is that not what he's doing?

Chandler,

I agree with you in that Aristotle is discerning between two different accounts of substance.

Aristotle does this throughout the entire text which is really confusing, which may tie into what Arjen thinks about Aristotle, in that he is always contradicting himself. As soon as you read into chapter 2, Aristotle posits even more accounts of substance (i.e. that it seems to belong to bodies, geometric shapes, etc.), and really doesn't arrive at any really solid conclusions until zeta 10!!! This is basically a transcript of Aristotle troubleshooting the issue and writing down his misconceptions as he goes along.

But anyway, your impression is right, and I agree with you. But I think the issue is in your conception of the thing itself and its predicates with the Socrates example.

For substance at this point, Socrates is Socrates is fine. A rock is a rock, a tree is a tree, an apple is an apple.

That Socrates is a man, mortal, lover of wine is problematic. These seem to be incidental properties of a substance (at this point), that is, they are not primary attributes. Aristotle is seeking primary substance in a primary sense, like the physical attributes of Socrates that are immediately apparent.

That attributes depend on substance, but substance not depend on attributes? You are exactly right on in your deduction and I completely agree with you. That ties in with the second paragraph where Aristotle stabs at the heart of the matter, the underling substance.

I think you are both a bit off in this case. I think Aristotle's opinion in this matter sets matter apart from a thing-in-itself which has the shape and form of the object (extension), but is not the object we percieve. He then adds to this thing-in-itself a "metaphysical" something which is part thought. That leaves us with a physical thing and a metaphysical thing. The physical thing has extensions but is not the essence of what is percieved. In reality this "thing-in-itself" has extension (but other than we percieve) and is also not really solid (metaphysical). It is a really strange thing; this thing-in-itself of Aristotle..