Good question for me, as I have a particular moral standpoint contrary to Kant's and just about everyone on this philosophy forum.

I don't reject the moral quality of someone's intent. If someone intends cruelty irrespective of whether they achieve it, I see no use in defining the language such that we have no means of describing the character of such a person. I find the best language of judgements of a person as per their volition to be the language of good and evil. This is not the language Kant uses and not the subject he addresses, so there's no problem with terminology, but I disagree that this moral judgement is a non-issue, perhaps just a separate issue. People are capable of good and bad intent and are capable of judging and speaking of the good and bad intent and character of others. It seems as ripe an arena for moral philosophy as anything else.

I'm not sure to what extent Kant is championing utilitarian moral philosophy. He speaks of both actions and consequences, but rejects the possibility of any moral quality of actions that have no consequences for others. I agree fully with this - statements of the moral character of actions are abstractions, generalisations and absolute statements. A moral Christian need necessarily espouse such absolutes, but I see no use for it elsewhere. An abstract thing is not a real thing, so the moral judgement of an abstract thing is of little direct use. Further, if one generalises on the moral quality of an action, then by definition that action always has that moral character: it is always immoral because it is always immoral - the moral says so.

However... we have ethical codes that are different to moral absolutes. We agree that in situation X we will do Y rather than Z. Having agreed, to do Z is unethical - it is wrong with respect to the agreed to system of ethics, for instance codes of practise and ethics of medicine. Whether the actor doing Z did so out of goodness or evil, or whether or not there were any negative or positive consequences, seems by the by.

Finally (yes, finally) determining a moral judgement (whatever the language) based on consequences seems overly harsh to me, and I've had this debate here before. If I try to do right and in doing so accidentally do wrong, while I admit it was the wrong action, wherein lies the moral culpability? There seems none. This is why I think it is as useful to have a morality of consequences as it is to have a morality of chairs. I can say "this chair is morally wrong" but what exactly does this tell us? Likewise I can say "it was wrong to reflexively grab that woman's dress, pulling it off in the process, after slipping on an icecube because it caused her shame". That's not a useful moral statement. No-one would care about it... it's just a sentence.

Perhaps Kant excludes such accidents from his moral philosophy, but if the consequences weren't accidental then they were intended, and so, again, intention would become key.

I totally disagree with Kant, I side with Nietzsche here, the action should not be judged by its consequences "premorality" or by the intention behind it "morality" but perhaps by what the intention hides itself, that is, the instinct behind it. A thought can be of a great quality and would make it's thinker great, or it can be cowardly and thus would refer to the weakness of the thinker. It is the root of the action that matters not the consequences.

I think you may be confusing the idea of intention with that of motive. Kant leaves intent to the utilitarians. Intent has to do with the intended consequences of an action. Kant does not morally judge actions in terms of it consequences, actual, probable, or even intended. Rather, Kant judges actions in terms of the motive of the agent performing the action. My motive for keeping my promise (for instance) is to do my duty. My intentions may be to be helpful to the person to whom I made the promise. And that is fine. There is nothing wrong with that. But it does not confer what Kant called, "moral worth" on my action. Whatever my intentions (whatever the consequences), my action of keeping my promise is morally judged by whether I did that action for the sake of keeping my promise, and not because of good intentions "The path to hell is paved with good intentions".

Thanks Ken. I'm rather confused though. The boldened statement above apparently contradicts Kant's statement below. I'm just basing this on Khethil's extract and nothing more.




But your point makes much sense to me. We have in all:

• the motive (why I aim to achieve this);
  
• the intended consequences (what I meant to achieve);
  
• the intended means (the desired action);
  
• the actual means (what I did);
  
• the actual consequences (what I achieved).
  

I'd say all of these have probably been considered as per their morality be it by philosophers or every person on a day-to-day basis. For me, only the first three make sense as moral subjects.