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(i) Transcendental realism: Space and things in it are entirely independent of us. (A370) Empirical knowledge aims to be knowledge of these 'things outside us': things in space, things in themselves, existing independently of us. Empirical idealism: Perception does not establish the existence of things so understood, we have no knowledge of them, and since that is what knowledge aims at we have no knowledge. So transcendental realism leads to empirical idealism (A369).
(ii) Transcendental idealism: Space and things in it are mere appearance. (A369) We can have no knowledge of things in themselves, that is, things existing independently of us; rather we have knowledge only of appearances. Empirical realism: we do have knowledge of things outside us, though, that is things in space. Since space is ideal, things in space are not to be inferred on the basis of perception, but are rather immediately perceived. Transcendental idealism leads to empirical realism (A370).
2. Kant draws a distinction between empirical idealism and transcendental idealism, A369. According to Kant, the traditional philosophical way of thinking, which he calls transcendental realism, ends up with empirical idealism: so Locke and Descartes, starting out with the common sense assumption that material objects are independent of us, end up (according to Kant) skeptical about them. By contrast, Kant's own transcendental idealism, which denies that material objects are independent of us, ends up with empirical realism.
4. Notice how empirical realism is construed as dualism: mind and matter both exist (A367, A 371). But matter is not independent of mind (A385). How does this work?
Kant assumes here that that immediacy of perception is the key to knowledge. This seems quite unlike the sophisticated talk of the Analytic, according to which objects are representations brought under rules. His idealism is expressed most extremely here, e.g. at A383: If I remove the thinking subject, the whole corporeal world must at once vanish. He even suggests there is something 'deceptive' about the way matter appears in space, hovering outside us (A385-6).
5. Does empirical dualism solve the problems of transcendental dualism (A391)? How can mind and matter interact? Kant here seems to suggest that matter is not an external cause, but a mere representation. What then is the cause of our representations? Kant's answer: things in themselves, which we don't know. So how do we know they are causes? Notice the hands off move: Kant's opponent must prove that things in themselves cannot be the cause of our representations, which they can't do of course. But is this the right way to think about the burden of proof?