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Since Descartes, skeptics don't dare express anything definite with regards to knowledge. Yet they dare to act, and in this respect are satisfied with probability. What an enormous contradiction! As if it were not far more dreadful to do something about which one is doubtful (thereby incurring responsibility) than to assert an idea. Or is it because the ethical is in itself certain? But then there is something that doubt cannot reach!
The method of beginning with doubt in order to philosophize seems as appropriate as having a soldier slouch in order to get him to stand erect.
If you suffer because you do good, because you are in the right, because your are loving; if it is because you are for a good cause that you live despised, persecuted, ridiculed, in poverty, then you will find that you do not doubt Christ's resurrection. Why? Because you need it.
A conviction is called a conviction because it is over and above proof. Proof is given for a mathematical proposition in such a way that no disproof is conceivable. For that reason there can be no conviction with respect to mathematics. But as far as every existential proposition is concerned, for every proof there is some disproof, there is a pro and a contra. The person of conviction is not ignorant of this; he knows full well what doubt is able to assert: a contra. For that very reason he is a person of conviction, because he has made a resolution and voluntarily raises himself higher than the logical manoeuvres of proofs and is convinced.
Thanks for the quotes. My comments are as follows:
Quote 1 - Circumstances often force us to act, so we then have to be satisfied with probability and hope for the best. But we can philosophise at our leisure, so we then have an intellectual responsibility to be thorough and acknowledge any doubts. And no, the ethical is not certain; we sometimes change our ethical intuitions.
Quote 2 - I would prefer the analogy of a soldier emptying his kit-bag and then re-packing it to make sure everything is present and stowed correctly.
Quote 3 - A nice piece of rhetoric, but manifestly untrue in many cases, especially when applied to non-Christians.
Quote 4 - This does not explain why conviction is a good thing, or why it is 'above' logic.
Decisiveness is good in practical life, but bad in philosophy.
Actually, I agree with the OP, and so did C.S. Peirce (the American philosopher who founded pragmatism). He wrote that, "You should not doubt in philosophy what you do not doubt in your heart". He also called Cartesian doubt, "sham doubt", and, "paper doubt". Peirce also argued that no one can begin with complete doubt, since in order to doubt anything, you have to believe something else. For example that you might be dreaming, or that there might be an Evil Genius, or that your eyes might be deceiving you.
Where is the boundary between Cartesian doubt and real doubt? Can I rule out the possibility that I will today be struck by a meteorite, or by lightning? Can the limit of real doubt be quantified in terms of probability?
When I wave my hand in front of my face, I know 'here is a hand'. The sceptic's suggestion that I might be dreaming is, I suppose, a logically consistent possibility, but I still do not doubt 'here is a hand'.
The best argument against scepticism, I think, is that proof, in the mathematical sense, is not a necessary condition for knowledge. When I wave my hand in front of my face, I know 'here is a hand'. The sceptic's suggestion that I might be dreaming is, I suppose, a logically consistent possibility, but I still do not doubt 'here is a hand'.
you do not know only if you are not mistaken.
Yes you do. You cannot know a thing that you are mistaken about. I think you meant "you do not know only if you are certain you are not mistaken".
No. I did not mean that. I meant that I cannot know p, unless p is true. I don't have to be certain I am not mistaken in order not to be mistaken. Just as I don't have to be certain that I have been checkmated in order to be checkmated. If I satisfy the conditions of being checkmated, then, I am checkmated. And if I satisfy the conditions of knowing, then, I know. I no more have to be certain I satisfy the condition of knowing in order to know, than I need to be certain I satisfy the conditions of being checkmated in order to be checkmated.
I think we discussed this before, and that you had agreed with me then.
Decisiveness is good in practical life, but bad in philosophy.
Thanks for the quotes. My comments are as follows:
Quote 1 - Circumstances often force us to act, so we then have to be satisfied with probability and hope for the best. But we can philosophise at our leisure, so we then have an intellectual responsibility to be thorough and acknowledge any doubts. And no, the ethical is not certain; we sometimes change our ethical intuitions.
Quote 2 - I would prefer the analogy of a soldier emptying his kit-bag and then re-packing it to make sure everything is present and stowed correctly.
Quote 3 - A nice piece of rhetoric, but manifestly untrue in many cases, especially when applied to non-Christians.
Quote 4 - This does not explain why conviction is a good thing, or why it is 'above' logic.
Yes you do. You cannot know a thing that you are mistaken about. I think you meant "you do not know only if you are certain you are not mistaken".
Yes, that is exactly what I thought you meant to say, and I agree. (But the last 10 words of your post #9 appear to say otherwise.)
The first quote is classic Kierkegaard. The skeptics introduce the conundrum about how can we ever know anything for sure, and then calls home to tell the wife to order a deluxe pizza for dinner. For Kierkegaard, there must be eventually be a time for human beings to just stop doubting and go for it. Life's too short to doubt.