Existential Questions Discussed Analytically

@Victor Eremita,

Let me step back a little bit. Kierkegaard's question is

"Can we prove Napoleon's existence from his attributes?"

And Kierkegaard says no. Because his attributes demonstrate his existence if the "his" (second to last word in this question) is already identified with Napoleon in the first place. So this identification of his attributes must presuppose Napoleon's existence if the attributes are to be associated with him.

Now because Napoleon is only an individual, there is "no absolute relation" between Napoleon and his attributes, for any individual could possess these same attributes. So if you identify these attributes as Napoleon's attributes, you are presupposing Napoleon's existence. If you DO NOT identify these attributes as Napoleon's then you cannot prove logically that these attributes are Napoleon's.

@Victor Eremita,

Victor Eremita wrote:

If you DO NOT identify these attributes as Napoleon's then you cannot prove logically that these attributes are Napoleon's.

Agreed. But who would ever suppose that you can?

We start with a definition of Napoleon (who may or may not exist), then we look to see if the required set of attributes actually exists, and if we find it does, we conclude that Napoleon exists. But we can never be absolutely certain of this. If, for example, we found the remains of a city that had many of the attributes contained in the definition of Atlantis, it could be either that (i) it really is/was Atlantis, and that Atlantis therefore exists/existed, or (ii) it is/was a different city (having nothing to do with the ancient accounts of Atlantis), and that Atlantis may therefore be entirely mythical. This corresponds to (b1) in my previous post. Only if there were an exact one-to-one correspondence between the discovered set of attributes and the definition (which in practice we could never know for sure), could we say that the defined thing definitely exists. This would correspond to my (b2).

My basic question is this: Is Kierkegaard doing any more than stating the obvious?

One further point occurs to me. You say that there is no absolute relation between Napoleon and his attributes, for any individual could possess these same attributes. But his complete set of attributes includes his spatial position at any given time, and, since no two things can be in the same place at the same time, this position would be an attribute that only he could have. (Perhaps my earlier comments need to be revised in the light of this!)

@Victor Eremita,

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Agreed. But who would ever suppose that you can?

Rene Descartes and his Cogito.

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We start with a definition of Napoleon (who may or may not exist), then we look to see if the required set of attributes actually exists, and if we find it does, we conclude that Napoleon exists.

We ask if some existing thing is Napoleon. It is NOT the case we prove Napoleon exists, we show how this thing WHICH ALREADY EXISTS has the attributes associated with our definiton of Napoleon. As SK says, "We do not prove that a stone exists, but whether some existing thing is a stone"

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But we can never be absolutely certain of this. If, for example, we found the remains of a city that had many of the attributes contained in the definition of Atlantis, it could be either that (i) it really is/was Atlantis, and that Atlantis therefore exists/existed, or (ii) it is/was a different city (having nothing to do with the ancient accounts of Atlantis), and that Atlantis may therefore be entirely mythical. This corresponds to (b1) in my previous post. Only if there were an exact one-to-one correspondence between the discovered set of attributes and the definition (which in practice we could never know for sure), could we say that the defined thing definitely exists. This would correspond to my (b2).

We would want to prove NOT that the remains of Atlantis exists, but that some existing thing is the remains of Atlantis. Existence is already there, you don't need prove it; what you need to prove is the essence of this existence.

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My basic question is this: Is Kierkegaard doing any more than stating the obvious?

Kierkegaard is merely trying to show how one cannot proceed towards existence; but only from existence, unlike what Descartes was asking. Attempts to prove existence is futile, because you are pre-supposing it already. "I think" already presupposes the existence of an "I" which thinks. It's logically trivial to conclude "I exist"

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You say that there is no absolute relation between Napoleon and his attributes, for any individual could possess these same attributes. But his complete set of attributes includes his spatial position at any given time, and, since no two things can be in the same place at the same time, this position would be an attribute that only he could have.

At a specific place and time, an existing thing was asking for Francis II's abdication. It's our job to prove this existing thing is Napoleon.

@Victor Eremita,

Camus (a paraphrase): why do we even bother to live, or to do anything at all?

@Victor Eremita,

What I am struggling to understand is how SK deals with things that either may not exist (e.g. the yeti) or definitely do not exist (e.g. dragons). On the face of it, these 'things' seem to have an essence (i.e. a set of attributes) but (possibly or definitely) no existence.

Victor Eremita wrote:

Rene Descartes and his Cogito.

Ah! I think that is quite a different matter. See below.

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We ask if some existing thing is Napoleon.

Yes, we look to see if some existing thing matches the definition or concept of Napoleon.

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It is NOT the case we prove Napoleon exists, we show how this thing WHICH ALREADY EXISTS has the attributes associated with our definiton of Napoleon.

Yes, but suppose it does not. Then we check other things until we find one that matches the definition; or we fail to find one, and give up. In the former case, we conclude: "Some existing thing is Napoleon". In the latter case, we say: "Possibly no existing thing is Napoleon."

When we say "Some existing thing is Napoleon", we mean "The definition or concept of Napoleon is instantiated; it might not have been, but it so happens that it is". To my mind this is tantamount to saying "Napoleon might not have existed, but it so happens that he does/did". I would call this 'proving the (contingent) existence of Napoleon'. Why does SK deny this? Remember, it's not just about existence; it's also about the possibility of non-existence.

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As SK says, "We do not prove that a stone exists, but whether some existing thing is a stone"

We need to be careful of a linguistic oddity here (which I presume occurs in Danish as well as English). Normally, when we have a subject followed by a verb, the verb implies the existence of the subject (e.g. 'birds fly' implies 'birds exist'). But the verb 'exist' is peculiar in that (by linguistic convention) it does not presuppose the existence of its grammatical subject. In established usage, "x exists" denotes not the trivial proposition "the existing thing x exists" but the substantial one "there is an existing thing x", which is equivalent to "some existing thing is x". So I think SK is making a false distinction between the two underlined phrases.

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Attempts to prove existence is futile, because you are pre-supposing it already.

To 'prove the existence' of something is to prove that the universe contains that thing. In some cases, it turns out that it does not. I can't see any presupposition there.

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"I think" already presupposes the existence of an "I" which thinks. It's logically trivial to conclude "I exist"

True, but I believe Descartes was merely trying to demonstrate the incoherence of such assertions as "Maybe I only think I exist". He was saying "If you think you exist, you must exist in order to think it". Logically trivial, yes, but it needs saying, because many people think illogically!

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At a specific place and time, an existing thing was asking for Francis II's abdication. It's our job to prove this existing thing is Napoleon.

Or: Napoleon, by definition, was asking for Francis II's abdication at a specific place and time. It's our job to prove that this is true of some real historical figure.

@Victor Eremita,

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Camus (a paraphrase): why do we even bother to live, or to do anything at all?

Absurdists: Because we can. (and because we're too proud to die).

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What I am struggling to understand is how SK deals with things that either may not exist (e.g. the yeti) or definitely do not exist (e.g. dragons). On the face of it, these 'things' seem to have an essence (i.e. a set of attributes) but (possibly or definitely) no existence.
When we say "Some existing thing is Napoleon", we mean "The definition or concept of Napoleon is instantiated; it might not have been, but it so happens that it is". To my mind this is tantamount to saying "Napoleon might not have existed, but it so happens that he does/did". I would call this 'proving the (contingent) existence of Napoleon'. Why does SK deny this? Remember, it's not just about existence; it's also about the possibility of non-existence.
To 'prove the existence' of something is to prove that the universe contains that thing. In some cases, it turns out that it does not. I can't see any presupposition there.

Kierkegaard argues for something called concrete existence and conceptual existence. The attributes of Sherlock Holmes (wears a cap, smokes a pipe, a detective, etc.) exist conceptually ("purely ideally" as he wrote) just as a dragon's attributes (spits fire, flies) exist conceptually. But does Sherlock Holmes exist concretely? Here, we are determining the essence of things that DO concretely exist in the universe. Things that do NOT concretely exist in the universe cannot be proven that they exist. Some things for example, that can be demonstrated are: an existing object that is proven to be a book entitled "Sherlock Holmes and the Case of the Rabid Dog" and an existing object that is proven to be a man dressed up in Sherlock Holmes attire. We're not proving whether or not Sherlock Holmes exists, but we're trying to prove that some existing object already existing in the universe is Sherlock Holmes! (Unfortunately a book and an imposter don't cut it as old man Holmes!)

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We need to be careful of a linguistic oddity here (which I presume occurs in Danish as well as English). Normally, when we have a subject followed by a verb, the verb implies the existence of the subject (e.g. 'birds fly' implies 'birds exist'). But the verb 'exist' is peculiar in that (by linguistic convention) it does not presuppose the existence of its grammatical subject. In established usage, "x exists" denotes not the trivial proposition "the existing thing x exists" but the substantial one "there is an existing thing x", which is equivalent to "some existing thing is x". So I think SK is making a false distinction between the two underlined phrases.

There is a difference the meaning of the two phrases that is utilized here: "A Stone Exists" is toward existence, while "some existing thing is a stone" is from existence. What matters is whether these phrases are a premise or conclusion. Think of it this way: Kierkegaard is acting like a scientist. Scientists observe phenomena such that the planets move in an irregular orbit. What can explain it is an existing celestial object, like a comet, is adjusting the planets' orbits. Now, the scientists are not proving that "a comet exists"... they are trying to prove that some already existing thing that has the attribute of altering planets' orbits is a comet. Now existence does not need to be proven, because whatever is causing the planets orbits is already there, but what needs to be proven is what its essence is (a comet or an asteroid or an UFO or what have you)! Once it has been proven that what exists has the attribute of adjusting planets' orbits is a UFO, then a UFO exists.... but we have already proven the essence of this UFO from existence, not towards it.

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True, but I believe Descartes was merely trying to demonstrate the incoherence of such assertions as "Maybe I only think I exist". He was saying "If you think you exist, you must exist in order to think it". Logically trivial, yes, but it needs saying, because many people think illogically!

Right, thus it's significance as a psychological import which Kierkegaard does NOT deny. But it's still a logical triviality!

@Victor Eremita,

OK, I can follow Kierkegaard's reasoning more clearly now. But I still maintain that the grammatical form of the sentence "A stone exists" is deceptive; it is actually equivalent to "There is (contingently) a stone" or "The universe happens to contain a stone" or "Some existing thing is a stone". In other words, it does not presuppose existence, but reports it. Or, to put it another way, it says that this particular thing with conceptual existence also has concrete existence.

Let us return to my assertion:

"To 'prove the existence' of something is to prove that the universe contains that thing."

Clearly, seeking to prove that the universe really contains a particular theoretical entity (e.g. top quarks) is a useful scientific enterprise. Is this 'reasoning from existence'? Surely not. How can it be, when we do not yet know whether there is (concretely) such an entity?

How does SK's 'reasoning from existence' apply to the process of counting? When we count the objects in a box, or in the universe, we are not primarily interested in their qualities; we want to know their quantity. True, if we find there are five balls in a box, then they already exist, but that is trivially true. We want to demonstrate (prove) that there are five, and not three, or none.

To sum up - I agree that we often reason from existence to essence ('this real object "x" is such-and-such'), but I do not understand how it can be claimed that we always do so. It seems to me that some reasoning goes the other way ('this theoretical object "x", which is such-and-such, is present in the real world').

@Victor Eremita,

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I still maintain that the grammatical form of the sentence "A stone exists" is deceptive; it is actually equivalent to "There is (contingently) a stone" or "The universe happens to contain a stone" or "Some existing thing is a stone". In other words, it does not presuppose existence, but reports it. Or, to put it another way, it says that this particular thing with conceptual existence also has concrete existence.

Assume you're right. Then it's

X exists
X is proven to be R
----
R exists. (or some existing thing is R)

Some existing thing is x
x is proven to be R
------
R exists. (or some existing thing is R)

It's still a logically trivial argument as one has already assumed existence to prove existence. You've identified what X is; it's "R", but you still ain't proving existence.

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Let us return to my assertion:
"To 'prove the existence' of something is to prove that the universe contains that thing."
Clearly, seeking to prove that the universe really contains a particular theoretical entity (e.g. top quarks) is a useful scientific enterprise. Is this 'reasoning from existence'? Surely not. How can it be, when we do not yet know whether there is (concretely) such an entity?

What scientists do is create a concept and see if the universe has things that correspond to this concept. Top quarks or Haley's Comet exist already, they don't need to be proven... they need to be DISCOVERED (in other words, to show how an existing thing is a top quark; to show how an existing thing is a comet!).
In other words, the assertion should be:
"To prove the concrete existence of "R" is to assume the universe contains an concretely existing object and that we can prove that this object is "R". If the universe does not contain this concretely existing object, we cannot prove the concrete existence of "R"."

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How does SK's 'reasoning from existence' apply to the process of counting? When we count the objects in a box, or in the universe, we are not primarily interested in their qualities; we want to know their quantity. True, if we find there are five balls in a box, then they already exist, but that is trivially true. We want to demonstrate (prove) that there are five, and not three, or none.

If you can prove there are SIX OR SEVEN OR MORE balls in the box when in reality there are only five in the box, SK will concede that you have reasoned towards existence. There already exists five balls, we "prove" it by counting it, but we've already taken those balls' existence as granted in order to even count it!

@Victor Eremita,

Victor Eremita wrote:

"To prove the concrete existence of "R" is to assume the universe contains an concretely existing object and that we can prove that this object is "R". If the universe does not contain this concretely existing object, we cannot prove the concrete existence of "R"."

I want to change the first sentence to:

"To prove the concrete existence of "R" is to assume the universe contains a concretely existing object "R" and prove that fact."

I am unhappy with your phrase "we can prove that this object is "R"." Prove that what object is R? If there turns out to be no concrete "R", what does "this object" refer to? It seems to refer to a specific object that is not necessarily "R". Is that what you mean?

Again, take your earlier paragraph:

X exists
X is proven to be R

Now, what if X is not proven to be R? X still exists, yes, but this is now irrelevant, because it may not be the thing we are looking for. What we want to know is whether R exists; and it may not. So we cannot assume the existence of R; we need to prove it. It may be that no existing thing is R; but this is logically equivalent to there is no (concrete) R.

I am sorry if I am being obtuse, but this is really a sticking point for me. Thank you for your patience!

@Victor Eremita,

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I want to change the first sentence to:
"To prove the concrete existence of "R" is to assume the universe contains a concretely existing object "R" and prove that fact."
I am unhappy with your phrase "we can prove that this object is "R"." Prove that what object is R? If there turns out to be no concrete "R", what does "this object" refer to? It seems to refer to a specific object that is not necessarily "R". Is that what you mean?
If we can prove this concretely existing object is "R".

Let's say the universe consists of only 4 objects (Of course our universe has much more than that LOL). I have a conception of "R" in mind. Now, those 4 objects already exist. Let's try to prove if any of those 4 objects is "R". 1st object...nope corresponds to conception "A". 2nd object... nope corresponds to conception "B" 3rd object...nope corresponds to conception "C". and finally, 4th object... nope corresponds to conception "D".

That's all the objects in the universe. I have now shown that "R" does not concretely exist in the universe. (*Final Fantasy Failure Music plays*)

X exists
X is proven to be R <----- Disproven (Argument collapses).
--------
R exists

--------------

Let's say the universe consists of only 4 objects (Of course our universe has much more than that LOL). I have a conception of "R" in mind. Now, those 4 objects already exist. Let's try to prove if any of those 4 objects is "R". 1st object...nope corresponds to conception "A". 2nd object... nope corresponds to conception "B" 3rd object...nope corresponds to conception "C". and finally, 4th object... hey... I can prove that this object is "R"!

That's all the objects in the universe. I have shown that "R" does concretely exist in the universe! (*Final Fantasy Victory Music plays*)

But remember, the fourth object as with all the other objects in the universe ALREADY CONCRETELY EXISTED! We didn't prove that, all we did prove is that the fourth object is R.

X exists
X is proven to be R
--------
R exists

can be done like this

4th object exists
4th object is proven to be R
--------
R exists

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Again, take your earlier paragraph:
X exists
X is proven to be R
Now, what if X is not proven to be R? X still exists, yes, but this is now irrelevant, because it may not be the thing we are looking for. What we want to know is whether R exists; and it may not. So we cannot assume the existence of R; we need to prove it. It may be that no existing thing is R; but this is logically equivalent to there is no (concrete) R.

If "R" does not exist, according to SK, "it is, of course, impossible to prove [that it exists]". If "R" does exist, it is so that it already exists and that it's our job to discover it.
As I wrote in the revised assertion: "If the universe does not contain this concretely existing object, we cannot prove the concrete existence of "R"." If for all X, x cannot be proven to be R, then R does not exist, if x is the objects in the universe.
Here Kierkegaard says we're not proving existence of R, we're proving the NONEXISTENCE of R, which is different from proving existence. If R does exist, it already exists independently of our proof, and it's our job to discover it.

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I am sorry if I am being obtuse, but this is really a sticking point for me. Thank you for your patience!

Don't worry about it, Kierkegaard made the same arguments and fielded the same objections in his day. In his Journals about this issue he writes, "Fixed ideas are like a cramp in the foot - the best remedy is to stomp on it". What I hope to at least be doing is that you understand SK's argument much better now then when we started the discussion.

@Victor Eremita,

Kierkegaard just wants to disambiguate what can be proven in the strict philosophical sense. Existence just can't be proven. Either it doesn't exist or we assume its existence. So once Kierkegaard gets this argument through, the next implication for him is this:

"God's Existence Cannot Be Proven."

So Kierkegaard disposes of the Ontological Argument, Cosmological Argument, Intelligent Design Argument, and other so-called proofs of God's Existence with one fell swoop.

@Victor Eremita,

Victor Eremita wrote:

Kierkegaard just wants to disambiguate what can be proven in the strict philosophical sense. Existence just can't be proven.

One final question:

By 'prove', does SK mean "establish (or demonstrate) beyond reasonable doubt"? Or does he mean something different?

@Victor Eremita,

Proven as in reasoned.

@Victor Eremita,

Victor Eremita wrote:

Proven as in reasoned.

Well, in that case I will simply have to conclude by disagreeing. I can only go back to what I said in my post #31. Kierkegaard sees a contradiction where I don't.

Thank you very much for the interesting discussion.

@Victor Eremita,

You're welcome! Cheers!

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