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Hi, I need help with an idea for an argument. In my philosophy class I'm forced to write a paper arguing a point that a philosopher made. I'm wondering if I am understanding correctly that Nietzsche is saying warrior morality is what leads to a greater will to power. The book we are reading is beyond good and evil if that helps. Is Nietzsche saying that the warrior morality is better in a beneficial sense than the slave morality (the herd). If I'm correct then Nietzsche says people possess one of two DIFFERENT kinds of morality. One is the herd priest morality, and the other is the warrior morality. I think if Nietzsche doesn't understand why warrior morality is no more evil than a hawks killing nature and the morality associated with it then he should take into consideration that all hawks cannot differentiate between, much less get beyond, good and evil.
Hi, I need help with an idea for an argument. In my philosophy class I'm forced to write a paper arguing a point that a philosopher made. I'm wondering if I am understanding correctly that Nietzsche is saying warrior morality is what leads to a greater will to power. The book we are reading is beyond good and evil if that helps. Is Nietzsche saying that the warrior morality is better in a beneficial sense than the slave morality (the herd). If I'm correct then Nietzsche says people possess one of two DIFFERENT kinds of morality. One is the herd priest morality, and the other is the warrior morality. I think if Nietzsche doesn't understand why warrior morality is no more evil than a hawks killing nature and the morality associated with it then he should take into consideration that all hawks cannot differentiate between, much less get beyond, good and evil.
It is not that one morality leads to a greater WTP, which Nietzsche posits as the process underlying the universe, both the natural and the human world. Rather the WTP can manifest itself in many different ways, some of which are "healthier" than others, for example consider his accounts for the different origins of the moral pairs good/evil, good/base in the Genealogy of Morals.
"Healthier" is right, since it is a perversion of language to say that it is healthier.
What exactly makes it a perversion of language to say that it is healthier? I can understand the point that there is, for the individual, no specific 'health' which can be defined, but why would it be perverse to say that it is healthier, as I seem to have missed something.
It could be argued that if one rejects "good" and "evil" as useful categories, suggesting a different normative perspective that might supplant them is appropriate; jumping to a different horizon of meaning by using "healthy" or "diseased" allows this to happen.
One must, of course, understand his use of this new dichotomy is only meant to be suggestive of its medical overtones, and that Nietzsche intends the terms as spiritually, ethically, and psychologically descriptive of certain types and attitudes which promote ascending life or not.
Because Nietzsche's morality is sick, and calling what is sick, "healthy", is a perversion of language. I would have thought that did not need saying.
One of Nietzsche's central positions is that objective values do not exist [and often questions of the value of values, e.g., truth] and in investigating their historical origins, attempts to show how values are the result of various types of will to power.
Given this status of values, he offers a different perspective and a new way of looking at values that differs from the traditional nomenclature that has been ingrained in our thinking and developed over thousands of years by philosophy and by the society in which it operates. One such perspective, or interpretation, he suggests, can be created by tentatively thinking about values as healthy or unhealthy. As one reads Nietzsche, the way in which he uses these terms becomes clearer.
So it is not a matter of simply replacing one term with another, but more a matter of attempting to find a different way of thinking about morality altogether.
Truth as an army of metaphors. D*mn, that's a brilliant metaphor itself. The "truth" about "truth," which half-negates itself, or calls itself into question. Nietzsche was right about himself. He was indeed dynamite.
I would imagine that Nietzsche would say that asking such a question as " whether this way of thinking is a good or bad way of thinking" merely shows how ingrained over two millennia philosophical prejudices can become, or that he would reply, "No, but it is a healthier way of thinking."
And of course, suggesting a new way of interpretation is a value question, but one can talk of value without using "good" or "better" except by way of analogy or becoming hopeless lost in equivocations.