In these he points out, I think, the absurdity of dismissing common sense. If you reason that the external world is not mind independent, by the time you have finished reasoning you will have used memory in some way, and surely you have no reason to think that your memories are real if what you see is not. And so he suggests this as the way to do philosophy:

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there
is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this
is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language
which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.


5.621 The world and life are one.


5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)


5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains
ideas. If I wrote a book called The World as l found it, I should have
to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were
subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of
isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense
there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.--


5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of
the world.


5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will
say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field.
But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field
allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.


5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this


5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is
at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a
priori order of things.


5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are
followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of
solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the
reality co-ordinated with it.


5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk
about the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into
philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical
self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with
which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit
of the world--not a part of it.

Sure; you can talk about the self, but if some one charges you with proving the existence of this moral form you are out of business or long on meaningless words... What is the self??? The self is a collection of meanings... What are all moral form??? All moral forms are a collection of meanings without being... Is this common sense??? If So; why have so few considered it so, and why have so many tried to apply the logic of the physical world to the world of infinite moral forms???

Can you say my world is your world... We can be fairly certain of it, but we cannot know it... If we stand upon a mountain top together looking upon a beautiful valley, a river, and a range of mountains opposite; can we know we are looking each of us upon the same scene since what we see we not only see with different eyes perceived with different "minds", but through a lense of different life experiences condition by society and education to denature nature... I don't want to get all phenomenalogical on anyone... The great challenge in life is to prove our own existence which we cannot do objectively, but only by testimony tomorrow that we were here today... We each lend support for the existence of others in our lives, and that is the purpose of our relationships; and we might say it is only common sense that we are all living on the same earth, in the same world; but it is after all, an act of faith... Why do we accept so much we cannot prove... We live as if the thing proves itself, and call it common sense... In fact, we can prove very little and accept very much without proof, and again, call it common sense.. It is common non-sense... And we live with it, and it adds as much as destracts from our existence...

On the other hand the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated
seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to
have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.
And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which
the of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when
these problems are solved.

6.52 We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been
answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course
there are then no questions left, and this itself is the answer.


6.521 The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of
the problem. (Is not this the reason why those who have found after a
long period of doubt that the sense of life became clear to them have
then been unable to say what constituted that sense?)

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there
is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it
cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this
is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language
which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.


5.621 The world and life are one.


5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)


5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains
ideas. If I wrote a book called The World as l found it, I should have
to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were
subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of
isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense
there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.--


5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of
the world.


5.633 Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? You will
say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field.
But really you do not see the eye. And nothing in the visual field
allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye.


5.6331 For the form of the visual field is surely not like this


5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is
at the same time a priori. Whatever we see could be other than it is.
Whatever we can describe at all could be other than it is. There is no a
priori order of things.


5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are
followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of
solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the
reality co-ordinated with it.


5.641 Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk
about the self in a non-psychological way. What brings the self into
philosophy is the fact that 'the world is my world'. The philosophical
self is not the human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with
which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit
of the world--not a part of it.

Thomas Paine wrote "In Defense of Common Sense"; If I were to write a philosophical treatise, it might be titled "In Defense of Nonsense".



As for the similarities between Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein... Wittgenstein was no Kantian (what else need be said?). Descartes was a solipsist, but Wittgenstein is not. Etc.

It is not very good philosophy if 'Common sense' is used as criterion to end discussion. I see plenty of stupid people that don` t even entertain a more abstract answer because they think it is impractical, or don` t fit with their 'common sense'.

His essential demand, therefore, on the philosopher, is not primarily that he should make his beliefs consistent with those of the vulgar, but that he should make them consistent with his own;

Accordingly, in Reid's view it is the duty of a philosopher-his duty as a philosopher-to aim steadily and persistently at bringing the common human element of his intellectual life into clear consistency with the special philosophic element.

Oh but he was influenced by that "crude man" Schopenhauer. I never said he Witty was a Kantian. Tell you what: read the TLP and then read The World as Will and Representation. You will notice some very similar things between the two. Trust me. :cool:

Descartes was a solipsist, but Wittgenstein is not. Etc.

As I have explained under I., I am not at all sceptical as to the truth of such propositions as "The earth has existed for many years past." "Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it," i.e. propositions which assert the existence of material things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions is. And this is a matter as to which I think I differ from many philosophers. Many seem to hold that there is no doubt at all as to their analysis, nor, therefore, as to the analysis of the proposition "Material things have existed," in certain respects in which I hold that the analysis of the propositions in question is extremely doubtful; and some of them, as we have seen, while holding that there is no doubt as to their analysis, seem to have doubted whether any such propositions are true. I, on the other hand, while holding that there is no doubt whatever that many such propositions are wholly true, hold also that no philosopher, hitherto, has succeeded in suggesting an analysis of them, as regards certain important points, which comes anywhere near to being certainly true.

Oh but he was influenced by that "crude man" Schopenhauer. I never said he Witty was a Kantian. Tell you what: read the TLP and then read The World as Will and Representation. You will notice some very similar things between the two. Trust me. :cool:

In this essay Moore talks about Common Sense as well, and brings up this point:

Quote:

As I have explained under I., I am not at all sceptical as to the truth of such propositions as "The earth has existed for many years past." "Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it," i.e. propositions which assert the existence of material things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions is. And this is a matter as to which I think I differ from many philosophers. Many seem to hold that there is no doubt at all as to their analysis, nor, therefore, as to the analysis of the proposition "Material things have existed," in certain respects in which I hold that the analysis of the propositions in question is extremely doubtful; and some of them, as we have seen, while holding that there is no doubt as to their analysis, seem to have doubted whether any such propositions are true. I, on the other hand, while holding that there is no doubt whatever that many such propositions are wholly true, hold also that no philosopher, hitherto, has succeeded in suggesting an analysis of them, as regards certain important points, which comes anywhere near to being certainly true.

Being skeptical of your own common sense, and un-skeptical of your own philosophical analysis seems to me to be a completely backwards way of doing philosophy.

Jebediah wrote:

In this essay Moore talks about Common Sense as well, and brings up this point:

Quote:

As I have explained under I., I am not at all sceptical as to the truth of such propositions as "The earth has existed for many years past." "Many human bodies have each lived for many years upon it," i.e. propositions which assert the existence of material things: on the contrary, I hold that we all know, with certainty, many such propositions to be true. But I am very sceptical as to what, in certain respects, the correct analysis of such propositions is. And this is a matter as to which I think I differ from many philosophers. Many seem to hold that there is no doubt at all as to their analysis, nor, therefore, as to the analysis of the proposition "Material things have existed," in certain respects in which I hold that the analysis of the propositions in question is extremely doubtful; and some of them, as we have seen, while holding that there is no doubt as to their analysis, seem to have doubted whether any such propositions are true. I, on the other hand, while holding that there is no doubt whatever that many such propositions are wholly true, hold also that no philosopher, hitherto, has succeeded in suggesting an analysis of them, as regards certain important points, which comes anywhere near to being certainly true.

Being skeptical of your own common sense, and un-skeptical of your own philosophical analysis seems to me to be a completely backwards way of doing philosophy.

I agree, but how is this relevant to the passage by Moore? He explicitly writes that he knows these commonsense propositions for certain. So he is not skeptical of his own commonsense. And where does he give any philosophical analysis (in this passage) at all?

I will largely agree with you.

Imo "common sense" is common stupidity, common sense will change over time, and be very individualistic.