I suppose you could imagine that when I said "there is no truth", I actaully meant, "there is no truth, pending evidence to the contrary."

Perhaps the problem lies in that you are not catching the ironic twist in your own statement. I'll leave it at that. Good stuff though.

Let's not leave it there. I forgot all about this thread and now found it again. I don't want to debate what is or is not, per formal philosophy dictionairies e.g., an axiomatic statement. Let's just return to the original post that opened the thread.

I basically asserted that no philosophy could be whole: complete, not in need of external validation. Moreover, I asserted that no such external validation could be proven to be true without, in turn, some other external justification and so on ad infinitum. This holds for all statements, whether or not they are a supposed to be complete philosophy. The fact that any statement can always be made insufficient by asking why or what or how demonstrates this.

For Example:
1. God exists
Why?
2. Because x
Why is x the case?
3. Because y
Why is y the case?

etc.

I basically asserted that no philosophy could be whole: complete, not in need of external validation. Moreover, I asserted that no such external validation could be proven to be true without, in turn, some other external justification and so on ad infinitum. This holds for all statements, whether or not they are a supposed to be complete philosophy. The fact that any statement can always be made insufficient by asking why or what or how demonstrates this.

Gotta love Kurt Godel! Can philosophy be both complete and consistent? We all know neither arithmetic nor Euclidean geometry are: there are axiomatic statements in both disciplines that they cannot prove within said discipline.

Or: is it warranted searching for unity?

I think the unity comes in the understanding of the aforementioned fact - There is no objective philosophy. If we become humble, remove our elitist grounding, unity could come.

If we constructed a philosophy completely placed on logical tautologies I believe we could call it objectively true.

I agree with the notion that we can not objectively draw general conclusions from empirical observations, I just think some common errors in reasoning follow by branding everything subjective. Mathematics is not subjective, nor are the consistent methods reasoning. Indeed, lack of objective models driven from empiricism does not necessitate the lack of universal truth. In fact, saying that "there is no universal truth" implies that that statement is ironically a universal truth, therefore there must logically be at least one universal truth.

You're right. We have to differentiate methods such as Mathematics, Logic, and Reasoning, from philosophies with no objective frameworks. There is a difference, otherwise we could say anything is just nonsensical rhetoric, implying there is no better or worse argument ever; it would be chaos. Obviously, this wouldn't be to our benefit. Moreover, you're absolutely right also when you state that lack of objective models derived from empiricism does not necessitate the lack of universal truth.

However, in my eyes, though Mathematics, Logic, and Reasoning have an objective grounding, and are clearly different, often times more respected methods for understanding the world around us, I still think they may suffer from human foibles. These methods are a means to an end; "3x3" only equals "9" because they are both the same value expressed differently. I suppose you would say "9" in this context is an objective truth, but I would say that we've constructed the very framework that the notion "9" was even bred from. There is no universal counting - we are the ones counting! We create the very models of objectivity to then assert objective claims.

Let me clarify, I believe in the possibility of an universal truth. I don't believe in our ability to reason with an objective truth; to reason with an objective truth renders it a subjective truth. In other words, any means of evaluation, at all, whether it has emotional or objective grounding, renders whatever the notion is, our personal notion. Which is why I say we only can experience subjective truth. We would have to transcend this consciousness, as I mentioned in my previous post, to know. Ultimately, if we did know, it wouldn't even be a truth at all, as we wouldn't be evaluating in "true", "false" terms. There would be no evaluation. We would just be. However, as I said in my initial paragraph, I understand there is a differentiation between objective models consistent in Mathematics, etc. and philosophies with no objective grounding whatsoever.

Yes, sorta like "The Castle" by Kafka. Universal truth might exist but we either have no right to it or we can't access it.

If we constructed a philosophy completely placed on logical tautologies I believe we could call it objectively true.

I agree with the notion that we can not objectively draw general conclusions from empirical observations, I just think some common errors in reasoning follow by branding everything subjective. Mathematics is not subjective, nor are the consistent methods reasoning. Indeed, lack of objective models driven from empiricism does not necessitate the lack of universal truth. In fact, saying that "there is no universal truth" implies that that statement is ironically a universal truth, therefore there must logically be at least one universal truth.

I won't even comment on tautologies for now; best to take on one almost intractable problem at a time. Mathematics is no objective. Why would we think it is? Because its rules are applied without passion, because in fact they cannot be applied with or altered by passion? Well that is true, but who invented the rules? One might say correctly that mathematics is objective 'within itself,' in that there is no possibility of perspectivity, but that is because is has been designed that way. The fact that mathematical 'truths' are certain does not demonstrate the lack of subjectivity, but rather the skill of the systems inventors, who made it internally coherent. Mathematics does not objectively represent reality, because it is founded on anthropocentric concepts: esp. 'the thing.'

I just wanted to post this thread, titled as it is, to demonstrate the essential problem with all philosophy, logic, etc. Any 'solution' ultimately depends on someone making unfounded assumptions. This is obvious no doubt, but I just couldn't resist the joke, though now its beginning to seem less funny...:perplexed:

...and we proceed.

That's a strong proposition to make since Bertrand Russell grounded arithmetic (I believe only with the operation of addition, nevertheless) in logical tautologies which must be true no matter what perspective, universe, or mind. Tautologies are truly objective since they are applicable to anything in existence no matter what their physical construction or perspective. Therefore, if I understand Russell's Principia Mathematica correctly, there is no one that can deem Russell's arithmetic as a clever invention that only apparently corresponds to empirical data, but rather one would be forced to acknowledge it as an unquestionable truth pertaining to the consistency of anything or anyone in existence.

I'm just going to go with "No" for now, will be in touch...

ground arithmetic in logical tautologies which must be true no matter what perspective, universe, or mind.

As I said before, mathematics is true or correct only insofar as it is internally coherent, and it is internally coherent because it has been designed as such. Consider an equation. Nothing is demonstrated, rather something is defined in new terms: i.e. according to invented definitions. Saying that 2+2 is 'true' is like saying the statement 'that wall is black' is true, when its only true because we have just named that thing black. In other words, imagine some thing in the distance, which I see and name 'boobleplex.' I then say 'that is booblepex;' is that a true statement; does that prove anything meaningful? It seems to me that it only proves what we have already assumed to be true, namely the definition, which asserts that the thing is 'boobleplex.' It's all a matter of language. Mathematics does not represent realities of nature, but rather our own thoughts, our own particular manner of dividing the world into conceptual objects.

Ergo, I find it impossible in principle for anyone, even a gentleman as distinguished as Bertrand Russel, to...



I'm not familiar with the details of this argument of his. If you like, present it and we'll see what happens.

As I said before, mathematics is true or correct only insofar as it is internally coherent, and it is internally coherent because it has been designed as such. Consider an equation. Nothing is demonstrated, rather something is defined in new terms: i.e. according to invented definitions. Saying that 2+2 is 'true' is like saying the statement 'that wall is black' is true, when its only true because we have just named that thing black. In other words, imagine some thing in the distance, which I see and name 'boobleplex.' I then say 'that is booblepex;' is that a true statement; does that prove anything meaningful? It seems to me that it only proves what we have already assumed to be true, namely the definition, which asserts that the thing is 'boobleplex.' It's all a matter of language. Mathematics does not represent realities of nature, but rather our own thoughts, our own particular manner of dividing the world into conceptual objects.

Ergo, I find it impossible in principle for anyone, even a gentleman as distinguished as Bertrand Russel, to...



I'm not familiar with the details of this argument of his. If you like, present it and we'll see what happens.