Heidegger

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Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 12:03 am
@MMP2506,
MMP2506;162725 wrote:

I agree with Heidegger here, as I see concepts such as God, the One, or Being as ways to describe what is independent from our realities, and therefore concealed from us. The only way to get to the One, is through the Word, aka. the Logos, Jesus Christ, Language.


You are touching upon one of my favorite themes, which is the Logos. I see "man" as self-conscious logos. Or perhaps we should say that the philosopher is self-consciousness logos. I put "man" is quotes because it seems to me that self-consciousness logos (us) realizes that distinctions are imposed by language, and therefore contingent. In my opinion, this is why "no finite thing has genuine being" according to Hegel. It seems to me that the One is negative, for the same reason that Being is written "under erasure." I suppose the paradox of negative theology or "nontology" (:sarcastic:) is that knowing there is something we don't know is tricky business. It amounts to a perception of our experience-so-far as contingent. It turns our spheres into toruses? Kant's noumena is a fascinating concept, and I can't help but relate it to what you said above.

I find it fascinating that we automatically think of the One, God, Being as singular. I think that "Being" deprived of particularity is something like the number one. For Being apart from beings seems only to keep its vague existence as something singular. Singularity and existence, nothing more. Rarefied unity.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 12:04 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;162713 wrote:
Also Heidegger had his fan club, whereas Nietzsche went it sickly and alone. And style matters, in my book. Nietzsche' style was not elitist. For all his ironic talk to the contrary, he was still after the Truth. But what philosopher isn't?

I don't find Heidegger elitist at least not yet. He's more understandable than Nietzsche, more understandable than Hegel or maybe I just get the Being thing. The profundity of the first few pages of Being and Time impressed me... However, I'm not sure if the several hundred pages that follow will move further away from that initial profundity or further away from it.

I don't know anything more elitist than the doctrine of the Obermensch (unless the whole thing was an ironic which is actually an idea I like quite a lot --- jokes on you would be supermen!). But this is not the thread to go on about Nietzsche so I will make that comment and ask you not to reply:sarcastic:. Nietzsche dismisses Truth in the same way that he dismisses Being. Of course Being and Truth are connected. Heidegger points out "The Greeks have the word aletheia for revealing. The Romans transalte this with veritas. We say "truth" and usually understand it as correctness of representation." And if Truth is a revealing (aletheia) what is revealed... why Being, or perhaps beings but since we are talking about capital T Truth we are really at the same time talking about capital B Being.
Reconstructo;162713 wrote:

I suppose from a physics viewpoint you are right. But what sort of being could we be talking about, if we take ourselves from the picture? Because it seems to me that Being as understood by humans is made of language organizing sensation. It's the old issue of using consciousness to imagine a universe without consciousness. I can't help but feel that it's like waking up dead.

'Waking up silent" is a be a better way to say it. Before he dives into the language of Being and the consciousness of Being Heidegger makes a few caveat's - something on the order of trees being in the forest still are even if there is no one around to hear them. But the thing is H. wants to talk about Being and he can't talk about the Being that he is not conscious of... there is still a "transcendental horizon"... a vast ocean perhaps an undiscovered noumenal country even ... but we can't be consciouse of that or talk about being conscious of that. We must pass over it in silence. But Heidegger believes the Great Greeks passed over less in silence or that their language revealed more of Being. Heidegger believes that the transcendental horizon of the Greeks was set further back.

We don't know how vast that land beyond the transcendental horizon is. Perhaps it is not as vast and mysterious as we think it is. We might even join Berkely and say that to be is to be perceived. For Berkely as for Nietzsche "being" is just a vapor. But we don't know.

Everything is bracketed off Husserl fashion but I do wonder to what extent Heidegger's revealing (aletheia) or for that matter Hegel's Becoming is really about what is happening at the bracket, at the horizon, at the dividing line, in the twilight. Ontologically things Become at the horizon. Epistemologically things are revealed at the horizon. The epistemology of ontology. Ontological epistemology? Epistemological ontology?

The "Question Concerning Technology" is very much a holographic text. The larger question of Being are contained and reflected in what appears to be a focus on technology.
Me wrote:

Heidegger gets from poiesis to alatheia by saying simply "Bringing-forth propriates only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment." To me this seems like the biggest jump.

Technology is not just about machines of course. Technology is also about methods and techniques. Techniques can be thought of a means to an end but that end is a revealing (aletheia) hence technology is a revealing. That is how we get from everyday understanding of technology as means to an end to the understanding of technology as a revealing (aletheia).

The everyday understanding of technology takes the revealing for granted and sees both the revealing and that which is revealed as a means to an end. But technology in truth, technology is essentially a revealing.

Technology is not just about machines of course. Technology is also about methods and techniques. Techniques can be thought of a means to an end but that end is a revealing (aletheia) hence technology is a revealing. That is how we get from everyday understanding of techonology to aletheia.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 12:34 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162740 wrote:
But this is not the thread to go on about Nietzsche so I will make that comment and ask you not to reply:sarcastic:. Nietzsche dismisses Truth in the same way that he dismisses Being.


I can't resist. For me, N's style is less "elitist." I think he modeled himself on French clarity. And N doesn't only dismiss truth. He also talks at times as if Truth is wench that only heroes can win. And this is elitist. I won't deny that. And even if he sometimes denies some underlying being, he also sometimes talks about a metaphysical will-to-power at the root of things, which is a metaphysic that Heidegger accused him of, if memory serves.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 01:36 AM ----------

Deckard;162740 wrote:
We say "truth" and usually understand it as correctness of representation." And if Truth is a revealing (aletheia) what is revealed... why Being, or perhaps beings but since we are talking about capital T Truth we are really at the same time talking about capital B Being.

I think that capitalization is a representation of value. Just as Christ is capitalized. Perhaps it goes back to Plato distinguishing his motives from those who are paid for their wisdom.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 01:40 AM ----------

Deckard;162740 wrote:

'Waking up silent" is a be a better way to say it. Before he dives into the language of Being and the consciousness of Being Heidegger makes a few caveat's - something on the order of trees being in the forest still are even if there is no one around to hear them. But the thing is H. wants to talk about Being and he can't talk about the Being that he is not conscious of... there is still a "transcendental horizon"... a vast ocean perhaps an undiscovered noumenal country even ... but we can't be consciouse of that or talk about being conscious of that. We must pass over it in silence. But Heidegger believes the Great Greeks passed over less in silence or that their language revealed more of Being. Heidegger believes that the transcendental horizon of the Greeks was set further back.

This is undeniably poetic. I like "transcendental horizon." Nice. Was Heidegger right? Did the Greeks see something we didn't ? Perceive more fully? Or are moderns the true ancients, as I think Bacon said. The Greeks were children, said the Egyptians, right? Or is this their virtue? Spengler thinks they lived in the present, the finite, and distrusted the far and the infinite. That might be a good counterpoint to Heidegger. One might think that the square root of 2 would emphasize this transcendental horizon. One could also compare cathedrals to columns.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 01:42 AM ----------

Deckard;162740 wrote:


Everything is bracketed off Husserl fashion but I do wonder to what extent Heidegger's revealing (aletheia) or for that matter Hegel's Becoming is really about what is happening at the bracket, at the horizon, at the dividing line, in the twilight. Ontologically things Become at the horizon. Epistemologically things are revealed at the horizon. The epistemology of ontology. Ontological epistemology? Epistemological ontology?

I think this is it. Also I think that epistemology and ontology are inseparable.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 01:48 AM ----------

Deckard;162740 wrote:

Technology is not just about machines of course. Technology is also about methods and techniques. Techniques can be thought of a means to an end but that end is a revealing (aletheia) hence technology is a revealing. That is how we get from everyday understanding of technology as means to an end to the understanding of technology as a revealing (aletheia).

The everyday understanding of technology takes the revealing for granted and sees both the revealing and that which is revealed as a means to an end. But technology in truth, technology is essentially a revealing.


THis is a good point, and I agree. I don't know if Kojeve is referencing H or H, but he presents the slave's attainment of self-consciousness as being caused by his working of material. We find ourselves in what we make. I also agree w/ McLuhan that tools are extensions of the human. A gun is a confession of intention/desire. So is an airplane.

I don't know if it's fair to say that technology is essentially a revealing, but I do like the sentiment. A personality less poetic or philosophical might see the revealing as secondary to the utility. It seems that even if technology is a sort of revealing or confession, that it must be interpreted or recognized by language-using humanity for this revelation to reveal.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 01:03 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162740 wrote:

Technology is not just about machines of course. Technology is also about methods and techniques. Techniques can be thought of a means to an end but that end is a revealing (aletheia) hence technology is a revealing. That is how we get from everyday understanding of techonology to aletheia.


Right, but I see the machines as the product of the methods and techniques. You can call them both technology if you'd like, but the reason that a lot of machines exist is because of inauthentic intentions which lead to faulty methods and techniques, and in the end dangerous and destructive machines.

As important as nuclear technology is, it has created an untold amount of death and destruction. The question is whether or not the benefits of nuclear technology is worth the risk involved. I think Heidegger may argue that it is not.

Much of our technology does not reveal what Heidegger was speaking of when he spoke of aletheia. He is speaking of revealing a much more primordial experience, and not just blind advancement of ontic knowledge.

But I agree, the authentic advancement of technology is necessary for aletheia, but as I mentioned earlier, much of our technology development has a very inauthentic focus.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 01:24 am
@Reconstructo,
Reconstructo;162762 wrote:

This is undeniably poetic. I like "transcendental horizon." Nice. Was Heidegger right? Did the Greeks see something we didn't ? Perceive more fully? Or are moderns the true ancients, as I think Bacon said. The Greeks were children, said the Egyptians, right? Or is this their virtue? Spengler thinks they lived in the present, the finite, and distrusted the far and the infinite. That might be a good counterpoint to Heidegger. One might think that the square root of 2 would emphasize this transcendental horizon. One could also compare cathedrals to columns.

I accidentally erased the post where I quoted this so I'll quote it again:

Quote:
"Thus the Greeks become essentially a higher type of Hottentot, whom modern science has left far behind. Disregarding the lesser absurdities involed in this view of the beginning of Western philosophy as something primitive, we need only say this: those who put forward such an interpretation forget that what is under discussion is philosophy, one of man's few great achievements. But what is great can only begin great. Its beginning is in fact the greatest thing of all. A small beginning belongs only to the small, whose dubious greatness it is to diminish all things; small are the beginnings of decay, though it may later become great in the sense of the enormity of total annihilation" - An Introduction to Metaphysics
I think a lot can be made out of this piece of text. In philologist mode he also makes a great deal of how the Latin translation corrupted the original Greek. The Greeks were gold, the Latins were Silver. The Greeks looked back to a golden age but Heidegger looks back and the Greeks themselves as a Golden age.

This quote brings to mind something else too. Heidegger's Nazism...

Wikipedia just told me that "An Introduction to Metaphysics" are a 1953 publication of lectures from 1935.

One might even read some veiled antisemitism in the quoted text. Was the reference to the small beginnings of decay a reference to the humble beginnings of the Jews? So far the Jews have not been mentioned in Intro so I cannot be sure though this is perhaps a conspicuous absence and quoted text seems like something the Nazis would just gobble up.
Of course to disregard all of Heidegger because of his Nazism would be to commit the genetic fallacy (thanks kennethamy) but an becoming aware of such biases is part of the critical reading of any text. For Heidegger our understanding of Being has been corrupted linguistically by corruption of Greek into the baser metal of Latin but Heidegger the Nazi likely believed in other corruptions of Greek philosophy... e.g. the Jews.

If it still seems feasible after I do some more reading I may want to start a thread comparing Spinoza's God to Heidegger's Being. Has anyone run across this comparison elsewhere? One interesting difference that almost immediately comes to mind is that Spinoza's God was One. While Heidegger's Being is ever coupled with Nothing.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 02:30 AM ----------

MMP2506;162776 wrote:
Right, but I see the machines as the product of the methods and techniques. You can call them both technology if you'd like, but the reason that a lot of machines exist is because of inauthentic intentions which lead to faulty methods and techniques, and in the end dangerous and destructive machines.

As important as nuclear technology is, it has created an untold amount of death and destruction. The question is whether or not the benefits of nuclear technology is worth the risk involved. I think Heidegger may argue that it is not.

Much of our technology does not reveal what Heidegger was speaking of when he spoke of aletheia. He is speaking of revealing a much more primordial experience, and not just blind advancement of ontic knowledge.

But I agree, the authentic advancement of technology is necessary for aletheia, but as I mentioned earlier, much of our technology development has a very inauthentic focus.

I think you are a few steps ahead of me. Authenticity is a concept that is often traced back to Heidegger. Thanks for the heads up. I see your footprints on the trail ahead of me.

I am unsure what you mean by "primordial experience" as compared with "ontic knowledge". Can you say a little more about this please?
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 01:36 am
@MMP2506,
MMP2506;162725 wrote:

In a philosophy that believes that objective truth can only be reached by trusting inter-subjective relationships, ethical activity becomes self-evident. In order to learn more about the world, we must do so through other people.



And it would be even better if the notion that objective truth can only be realized by trusting inter-subjective relationships made any sense. What does it mean? Could we get to "the rough ground" by your giving us an example of what that would be? What does it mean to "trust an inter-subjective relationship". Or is that kind of question out of bounds when discussing continental philosophy? I mean the kind of question that asks you to make sense of what you say.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 01:43 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162788 wrote:

If it still seems feasible after I do some more reading I may want to start a thread comparing Spinoza's God to Heidegger's Being. Has anyone run across this comparison elsewhere? One interesting difference that almost immediately comes to mind is that Spinoza's God was One. While Heidegger's Being is ever coupled with Nothing.

The Spinoze/Heidegger comparison sounds promising. And fresh. As to nothingness,

Here's the short version, followed by the long if it interests you, and a link.
Quote:

Being, the indeterminate immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.

Nothing is, therefore, the same determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the same as, pure being.

Guess who...

Book I of Hegel's Science of Logic - Being
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 01:50 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162788 wrote:
One interesting difference that almost immediately comes to mind is that Spinoza's God was One. While Heidegger's Being is ever coupled with Nothing.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 02:30 AM ----------




Now that does ring true. Especially the last sentence.
 
Reconstructo
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 01:53 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162788 wrote:
The Greeks were gold, the Latins were Silver. The Greeks looked back to a golden age but Heidegger looks back and the Greeks themselves as a Golden age.

Interesting that he sees a diminishing. And right where many others would expect progress, dialectical progress. Perhaps this connects to his theological background, original sin. Maybe Ur-philosophy was Eden. He also shares this w/ Nietzsche, somewhat, but not with Hegel. Of course Nietzsche also stressed that the higher evolves from the lower. Still, he obviously considered social decay more than possible.
Schopenhauer to some degree saw stasis, man's nature as if were as immutable as an eagle's or a worms. (I think Schope was wrong here.) Spengler saw decline but considered it natural, inescapable, and not tragic or blameworthy. What can I say, I like to compare Germans.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:02 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162788 wrote:

I think you are a few steps ahead of me. Authenticity is a concept that is often traced back to Heidegger. Thanks for the heads up. I see your footprints on the trail ahead of me.

I am unsure what you mean by "primordial experience" as compared with "ontic knowledge". Can you say a little more about this please?


Have you ever heard of Hubert Dreyfus? He considered one of the current pioneers of phenomenology, he currently teaches it at UC Berkeley, and many of his lectures are available at the university website. I would suggest listening to a few if you have the time as it was able clear up a few main points for me.

Prior to Descartes' idea of a closed Cogito separate from the exterior world, ideas of consciousness were described under the term soul, and the soul was always something that was developed within a community and never isolated from the exterior world. Descartes unsuccessfully left philosophers in either solipsism or naive materialism, and both had drastic effects on the attitude of the entire Western Culture.

As Reconstructo touched on earlier, I think Heidegger understood that the Greeks, and even some Medievals, spoke of a much richer reality simply because of this ability to understand the self as existing within a whole network of other souls. It is the pre-Cartesian, primordial experience that Heidegger was trying to reach, and this was what is revealed with aletheia. The interesting thing he found is that this primordial experience is still being expressed within our everyday language, or idle chatter as he calls it, but it takes a Dasein to become aware of it.

Understanding Dasein allows for the ability to abstract this concealed understanding or experience of reality, and overcome the ontic, inauthentic, existence that we have been left with since Descartes.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:02 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162793 wrote:
And it would be even better if the notion that objective truth can only be realized by trusting inter-subjective relationships made any sense. What does it mean? Could we get to "the rough ground" by your giving us an example of what that would be? What does it mean to "trust an inter-subjective relationship". Or is that kind of question out of bounds when discussing continental philosophy? I mean the kind of question that asks you to make sense of what you say.

Intersubjectivity by definition is something between the objective and the subjective.

Intersubjectivity - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Discussing solipsism seems to be a backwater in philosophy or something. I mention it only shyly. I don't know if this is because everyone else has already figured it out or if it is because it makes everyone else uncomfortable to think about it. Trust and perhaps even Faith are one way out of the radically skeptical subjective state of solipsism. Intersubjectivity is about shared meanings. It is about receiving confirmation from others. Wittgenstein's rejection of Private Language must be of some importance here. Trusting in Public Language is a form of trusting in intersubjective relationships. This may not constitute objective truth but it offers more possibly objective truths than does solipsism.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:07 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162793 wrote:
And it would be even better if the notion that objective truth can only be realized by trusting inter-subjective relationships made any sense. What does it mean? Could we get to "the rough ground" by your giving us an example of what that would be? What does it mean to "trust an inter-subjective relationship". Or is that kind of question out of bounds when discussing continental philosophy? I mean the kind of question that asks you to make sense of what you say.


Sure. I am able to get closer to an objective understanding of Heidegger by inter-subjectively discoursing with those who have studied him. Without discourse, I will never be able to reach any sort of objective understanding of Heidegger. Full objectivity can never be achieved, because the sum of all knowledge pertaining to Heidegger can never be exhausted. For this reason, I am only able to get closer to an objective understanding of Heidegger by reading his words, and discoursing about his words inter-subjectively with others.

If you are in a relationship with a person you do not trust, then you are severely restricted with what you will be able to learn from them. Without trust, you cannot learn. Without inter-subjectivity, you can't reach an objective truth.

Inter-subjectivity is essentially the spreading of language and reason within a community. It would be opposed to solipsism where only ones own mind exists. Inter-subjectivity allows for an escape from solipsism.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:12 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162811 wrote:
Intersubjectivity by definition is something between the objective and the subjective.

Intersubjectivity - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Discussing solipsism seems to be a backwater in philosophy or something. I mention it only shyly. I don't know if this is because everyone else has already figured it out or if it is because it makes everyone else uncomfortable to think about it. Trust and perhaps even Faith are one way out of the radically skeptical subjective state of solipsism. Intersubjectivity is about shared meanings. It is about receiving confirmation from others. Wittgenstein's rejection of Private Language must be of some importance here. Trusting in Public Language is a form of trusting in intersubjective relationships. This may not constitute objective truth but it offers more possibly objective truths than does solipsism.


I would thank you, but I don't quite see how what you write above answers my request to explain what it means to say that objective truth can only be realized by trusting inter-subjective relationships.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:19 am
@kennethamy,
MMP2506;162810 wrote:

Prior to Descartes' idea of a closed Cogito separate from the exterior world, ideas of consciousness were described under the term soul, and the soul was always something that was developed within a community and never isolated from the exterior world. Descartes unsuccessfully left philosophers in either solipsism or naive materialism, and both had drastic effects on the attitude of the entire Western Culture.

As Reconstructo touched on earlier, I think Heidegger understood that the Greeks, and even some Medievals, spoke of a much richer reality simply because of this ability to understand the self as existing within a whole network of other souls. It is the pre-Cartesian, primordial experience that Heidegger was trying to reach, and this was what is revealed with aletheia. The interesting thing he found is that this primordial experience is still being expressed within our everyday language, or idle chatter as he calls it, but it takes a Dasein to become aware of it.

Understanding Dasein allows for the ability to abstract this concealed understanding or experience of reality, and overcome the ontic, inauthentic, existence that we have been left with since Descartes.

Somewhere I got the idea that the movement from Descartes to Hegel was the movement from I to the WE. This is also the arch of the proletarian novel (e.g. Grapes of Wrath).
I understand the damaging effects of starting with Descartes cogito. Levels of certainty imply (like it or not) levels of truth. At least in praxis we trust more what we are more certain of. Thus by Descartes we are ever turned back to the individual self like an unweaned baby to the nipple (solipsism) or else once weaned we see the nipple for what we think it is...just another thing (naive materialism).

But I do not see yet how Dasein gets us out of this. Wittgenstein's rejection of private language seems more promising to me. What does Dasein really offer. It still seems the individual solipistic self interrogating a Being that is possibly completely contained within that Self. I am missing the gist. Never mind naive materialism but how does Dasein get us out of solipsism?

I'll check out those lectures thanks. Throw in a link to them if you have it handy.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:25 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162822 wrote:
Levels of certainty imply (like it or not) levels of truth.


Were that so, then the more certain someone was that God exists, the truer it would be that God exists. But, it is either true or false that God exists. There is no level of truth. So you must be mistaken. (The same goes, of course, for the proposition that Quito is the capital of Ecuador). You cannot repeal the law of the excluded middle.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:28 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162822 wrote:
Somewhere I got the idea that the movement from Descartes to Hegel was the movement from I to the WE. This is also the arch of the proletarian novel (e.g. Grapes of Wrath).
I understand the damaging effects of starting with Descartes cogito. Levels of certainty imply (like it or not) levels of truth. At least in praxis we trust more what we are more certain of. Thus by Descartes we are ever turned back to the individual self like an unweaned baby to the nipple (solipsism) or else once weaned we see the nipple for what we think it is...just another thing (naive materialism).

But I do not see yet how Dasein gets us out of this. Wittgenstein's rejection of private language seems more promising to me. What does Dasein really offer. It still seems the individual solipistic self interrogating a Being that is possibly completely contained within that Self. I am missing the gist. Never mind naive materialism but how does Dasein get us out of solipsism?

I'll check out those lectures thanks. Throw in a link to them if you have it handy.


UC Berkeley Webcasts | Video and Podcasts: Philosophy 185

Being doesn't just appear within individuals. The nature of inter-subjectivity is that Dasein can be present within groups of individuals as well.

Dasein is the questioning of ones own Being, and we can question to ourselves or with others. However, there are really no private ideas, and essentially there is no private self. So even Dasein is an inherently communal occurrence.

What makes "the self" is the distinction of our Being through our facticity. Most people let their factual existence dictate how they live, but by seeing Dasein in other people you are able to build relationship with them despite their facticty. It is the common ground so to speak between us, and it is this bridge which gets us out of solipsism.

I think you are right about Hegel going in the radically opposite direction of Descartes, to a complete "we", and for this reason he was very influential on Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, maybe more than any other philosopher.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 03:56 AM ----------

kennethamy;162828 wrote:
Were that so, then the more certain someone was that God exists, the truer it would be that God exists. But, it is either true or false that God exists. There is no level of truth. So you must be mistaken. (The same goes, of course, for the proposition that Quito is the capital of Ecuador). You cannot repeal the law of the excluded middle.


If I am using God as a placeholder for that which cannot be accounted for within a certain philosophical paradigm I feel I can be quite certain that he exists. Writings of St. Tomas Aquinas and Heidegger sound almost identical when you insert the word Being every time Thomas says the word God.

The word God functions very differently for different people, as do all words, and if someone is certain of something you can be quite sure that is exists within the context that they are using it. Even if it only exists to them.
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:56 am
@MMP2506,
MMP2506;162829 wrote:

What makes "the self" is the distinction of our Being through our facticity. Most people let their factual existence dictate how they live, but by seeing Dasein in other people you are able to build relationship with them despite their facticty. It is the common ground so to speak between us, and it is this bridge which gets us out of solipsism.

But how does one see Dasein in other people? I can only guess that it is some intuition or sixth sense that overwhelms any attempt to explain that Dasein away as an illusion... and admitidly it is difficult to overwhelm that intuition but Descartes (and there must have been others before him) did it and showed us how to do it.
 
kennethamy
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 02:59 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162839 wrote:
But how does one see Dasein in other people? I can only guess that it is some intuition or sixth sense that overwhelms any attempt to explain that Dasein away as an illusion... and admitidly it is difficult to overwhelm that intuition but Descartes (and there must have been others before him) did it and showed us how to do it.


Descartes did what?
 
Deckard
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 03:07 am
@kennethamy,
kennethamy;162828 wrote:
Were that so, then the more certain someone was that God exists, the truer it would be that God exists. But, it is either true or false that God exists. There is no level of truth. So you must be mistaken. (The same goes, of course, for the proposition that Quito is the capital of Ecuador). You cannot repeal the law of the excluded middle.

Well there is Faith which is a very different thing from Descartes cogito. The cogito acts more as a beginning point..there is nothing more certain, there is no truth I am more certain of, than that "thinking is" (never mind whether or not there is an I doing it) and radiating out from that most absolute certainty all else is less certain, that is I am less certain of all truths beyond that truth or contingent upon that first truth.

Certainty is subjective.
Truth is objective.
The first truth Descartes was certain of was that there was thinking going on. And this thinking he wrongly or rightly attributed to some I. But that thinking might just as well be attributed to something more inclusive than the I. We need not trust anymore in the subjective I than in the intersubjective WE.

---------- Post added 05-11-2010 at 04:08 AM ----------

kennethamy;162840 wrote:
Descartes did what?

Maybe he didn't.
 
MMP2506
 
Reply Tue 11 May, 2010 03:09 am
@Deckard,
Deckard;162839 wrote:
But how does one see Dasein in other people? I can only guess that it is some intuition or sixth sense that overwhelms any attempt to explain that Dasein away as an illusion... and admitidly it is difficult to overwhelm that intuition but Descartes (and there must have been others before him) did it and showed us how to do it.


It is a difficult thing to explain, and I think it is on purpose. The very fact that it cannot be translated completely into English makes this even more evident.

This is where a good understanding of Husserl become so very crucial. You must complete a phenomenological reduction, as he would say, to epoche the natural attitude which includes the dualist perspective. The natural attitude is our every day assumptions concerning reality which tend to conceal the true nature of things from us. By learning to epoche this attitude, what was once concealed about the world becomes revealed in our everyday lives. Husserl says phenomenology is an attempt to get back to the things themselves, and this means that he wishes to get back to looking at things as they were thought to exist before they became separated from consciousness.

You are on the right track calling it an intuition, but remember, all thoughts are inherently public, so it is a public intuition of sorts. When Witt says that no language is private, he doesn't just mean the words that make up language, but also the reason that puts together those individual words.

You have to understand that he is trying to explain something which he feels has never been explained, so it isn't surprising that it sounds as if he is basically making up words. Essentially he is, which is what makes it so mind blowing when you actually begin to piece it all together.
 
 

 
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